Woodruff v. Parham/Dissent Nelson

Mr. Justice NELSON, dissenting.

I am unable to agree to the judgment of the court in this case. The naked question is, whether a State can tax the sale of an article, the product of a sister State, in the original package, when imported into the former for a market, under the Constitution of the United States? If she can, then no security or protection exists in this government against obstructions and interruptions of commerce among the States; and, one of the principal grievances that led to the Convention of 1787, and to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, has failed to be remedied by that instrument. And hereafter (for this is the first time since its adoption that the clause in question has received the interpretation now given to it), this inter-state commerce is necessarily left to the regulation of the legislatures of the different States. We think we hazard nothing in saying, that heretofore the prevailing opinion of jurists and statesmen of this country has been that this commerce was protected by the clause-the subject of discussion-namely: 'No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.'

An attempt was made by the State of Maryland, in 1821, to lay a tax upon foreign imports, but which was pronounced unconstitutional by this court after an elaborate argument of counsel and a very full and carefully considered opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, concurred in by the whole court, and he closed it by saying: 'It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case to apply equally to importations from a sister State.' A tax was attempted by the State of California, in 1857, upon an export from that State to the State of New York, but was pronounced unconstitutional by this court, the opinion delivered by the late Chief Justice. He observed: 'If the tax was laid on the gold or silver exported (it was in form a stamp tax on the bill of lading), every one would see that it was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, which, in express terms, declares that 'no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws." Again he observes: 'In the case now before the court, the intention to tax the export of gold and silver, in the form of a tax on the bill of lading, is too plain to be misunderstood.'

It is now said, however, that this clause relates only to foreign commerce, and is no prohibition against taxation upon commerce among the States; and, as we have already said, if this be so, it is left to the unrestricted imposition by a State of duties, or tax, upon all articles imported into the same from sister States. In looking at this clause, it will be seen that there is nothing in its terms, or connection, that affords the slightest indication that it was intended to be confined to the prohibition of a tax upon foreign imports. Surely, if this had been intended, it must have occurred to the distinguished members of the Convention, it would be quite important to say so that the prohibition might not be misunderstood, especially when we take into consideration the eminent men who not only discussed and settled the terms and meaning of the clause, but to whom the whole instrument was committed for special and final revision. It would have been easy to have made the clause clear by affixing the word 'foreign' before the word 'imports.' Then the clause would read 'foreign imports,' that now is affixed, by construction, a pretty liberal one of the fundamental charter of the government.

The same clause also provides: 'No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage,' &c. Does this also relate to tonnage employed in foreign trade? If so, then it will be competent hereafter for the States to levy a tax upon the tonnage of vessels employed in carrying on commerce among the States, including the tonnage employed in the coasting trade. But, independently of the terms of the clause and the connection in which it is found, why should not the prohibition extend to imports and exports of commerce among the States? At the time of the Convention and formation of the Constitution the States were independent and foreign to each other, except as bound together by the feeble 'league of friendship' in the Articles of Confederation in 1777, the second article of which provided, that 'each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.' And the only specified restraint then submitted to in respect to their commercial relations is found in the third section of the article, namely: 'No State shall lay any imposts or duties which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States, in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain.' There is another provision relating to commerce among the States in the fourth article, to which we shall hereafter refer.

Now, as is seen, at the time the delegates assembled in 1787 to form the Constitution, they represented States that for all the substantial purposes of government were foreign and independent, and especially so in respect to all commercial relations among them, or with foreign countries. Looking at this condition of things, and to the delegates in the Convention representing such constituencies, is it reasonable or consistent with proper rules of construction to suppose, in the absence of any indication from the words of this clause prohibiting the tax on imports or exports, the members used the terms with exclusive reference to foreign countries-that is, countries foreign to the States-and not in reference to the States themselves? We again ask, if this distinction was intended, why was not the clause so framed as to indicate it on its face, and not left to mere conjecture and speculation?

Again, at the time the Convention was assembled, as it has been ever since and now is, the commerce among the States was many fold greater, and vastly more productive of wealth, independence, and happiness of the people, then all the foreign commerce of the country. Its magnitude and importance, therefore, invited protection and encouragement far beyond that of foreign commerce, and could not, and did not, escape the particular care and attention of the members of the Convention. Besides the clause in question, it is provided in the ninth section that 'no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.' And in the clause conferring upon the Federal Government the general power over commerce, it is given, in terms, 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.' The two are placed upon the same footing without any discrimination. The power is equally broad and absolute over the one as over the other. No distinction is made between foreign and inter-state commerce, and why should the specific prohibitions to be found in the Constitution in relation to this subject receive a different interpretation in the absence of any words indicating any such distinction? Take, as an example, the prohibition upon the Federal Government: 'No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.' Is this clause, also, to receive the narrow and strained construction given to the one in question, and be applied only to exports to a foreign country? If so, then Congress may tax all exports from one State to another. If the terms in the clause before us do not embrace inter-state commerce, then the above clause does not. As was said by the Chief Justice in Brown v. Maryland, 'There is some diversity in the language, but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited.' Now, this is a prohibition or limitation upon the general commercial power conferred upon Congress, but if it only applies to foreign commerce, it loses more than half its efficiency as heretofore supposed to belong to it.

We will now recur to a provision in the Articles of Confederation to which we have heretofore alluded. It is the fourth section: 'The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens of the several States, and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same restrictions as the inhabitants thereof, respectively.'

It will be seen the last clause of this article contains the doctrine of my brethren in the case before us.

The people of one State have the right of egress and regress to and from any other for the purposes of trade and commerce, and the articles may be taxed by the State into which they are carried; but there must be no discrimination. We have gone back to the Articles of Confederation, and have incorporated into the Constitution, by construction, a provision which the framers of that instrument had rejected as wholly inadequate for the protection of inter-state commerce. Instead, therefore, of adopting this article into that instrument, they adopted a more complete and thorough security to the enjoyment of the privileges of this commerce-'no State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports.'

Why this change? If there had been no diversity of soil or climate in the States of the Confederacy, or in the mineral riches of the earth, any commercial regulation among them would have been of little importance. Foreign trade and commerce would have been their only dependence for a market of their surplus productions. The products would, as a general rule, have been common among all the States. But the fact was otherwise. From the diversity of soil and climate the Middle and Eastern States were mostly grain-growing States, and their surplus products were flour, pork, beef, butter, and cheese, with a modicum of the manufacture of woollens.

The Southern States were cotton, tobacco, and rice-growing States. It was the exchange of these commodities that constituted the bulk of inter-state commerce.

Virginia and North Carolina looked to the Middle and Eastern States for their products in exchange for tobacco, tar, rosin, and turpentine; South Carolina and Georgia for their cotton and rice. Now, the provision in the Articles of Confederation securing egress and regress for the purposes of trade and commerce furnished no protection to either State. New York and Pennsylvania could lay a tax upon all sales of cotton, tobacco, or rice within these States, which would be a tax without any discrimination; and yet it would be in fact, in its operation and effect, exclusively upon these Southern products. So in respect to the wheat, flour, pork, beef, butter, and cheese, when shipped to these Southern States. Each State not producing the article sold, the general tax would not affect their people. We have no doubt the case before us falls within this category.

Alabama is a cotton-growing State, and depends upon the Northern States bordering on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers for most of her corn, wheat, and flour. She cannot be, therefore, a State largely engaged in the manufacture of whiskey. The tax, so far as regards her own people, is probably nearly nominal. We see from the above view why this non-discriminating article in the Confederation was not incorporated into the Constitution. It was entirely worthless as a protection against the taxation of the inter-state commerce.

The same results will follow, applying the principle to commerce among the States as it exists at the present time. The State of Pennsylvania supplies New York with the article of coal from her mines which is consumed in that State. The trade is very great, and is increasing every year as the facilities for the conveyance of the article by railroads into the interior of the State are multiplied. According to the judgment of the court in the present case, the State of New York may tax these sales if she makes no discrimination. She may, therefore, pass a law imposing a tax on all sales of coal in the State, as the State of Alabama has done in respect to sales of whiskey. Such a law may be passed and enforced without imposing any burden upon her own people, as there is no coal of any comparative value in the State but what is brought into it from abroad. So, in turn, Pennsylvania can tax the salt and plaster of New York, carried into that State, with like impunity to her people. Massachusetts may tax the grain and flour of the West, carried into the State, by a like law, as she does not raise a sufficient supply for home consumption, and a general tax upon all sales would not harm her people. In like manner she can tax the cotton and rice of the Southern States, and sugar of Louisiana, and those in turn can tax her cotton, woollen manufacture, and shoes carried into those States. The lumber of Wisconsin can be taxed at Chicago, its principal mart, by a general law of Illinois, without any serious prejudice to the interests of the people of that State. The gold dust and gold and silver bars of California carried to New York can be taxed upon a like principle without prejudice to her people.

We have extended this discussion much further than we had intended, and will close it by referring to the views expressed by Judge Story on this clause of the Constitution. After stating the bistory of the clause in the Convention, he observes, in his valuable Commentaries on the Constitution: 'So it seems that a struggle for State powers was constantly maintained, with zeal and pertinacity, throughout the whole discussion. If there is wisdom and sound policy in restraining the United States (referring to the prohibition upon it in respect to articles exported from the State) from exercising the power of taxation unequally in the States, there is, he observes, at least equal wisdom and policy in restraining the States themselves from the exercise of the same power injuriously to the interests of each other. A petty warfare of regulation is thus prevented which would rouse resentments and create dissensions to the ruin of the amity of the States. The power to enforce their inspection laws is still retained, subject to the revision and control of Congress. So that sufficient provision is made for the convenient arrangement of the domestic and internal trade whenever it is not injurious to the general interests.'

Judge Story entertained no doubt but that this clause applied to the domestic and internal commerce of the States, as well as to the foreign. We have, therefore, the deliberate opinions of Marshall, and Taney, and Story concurring in this construction great names in this and in every country where jurisprudence is cultivated as a science, and especially eminent at home as expounders of our constitutional law.

At the same time with the preceding case was decided another from the same court, much like it in general principle; the case of