Wood v. Lovett/Dissent Black

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting:

There is far more involved here than a mere litigation between rival claimants to a few hundred acres of Arkansas land. In my view, the statute here stricken down is but one of many acts adopted both by Congress and by state legislatures in an effort to meet the baffling economic and sociological problems growing out of a nation-wide depression. These problems—among them the owners' loss of homes and farms, chiefly through mortgage sales and tax forfeitures and the states' concomitant loss of tax revenues—challenged the wisdom and capacity of the nation's legislators.

Among the efforts of Arkansas' legislators to meet these problems was the legislation adopted by Act 142 of 1935 and repealed by Act 264 of 1937—the repealing act being the statute here held invalid. It is quite apparent that considerations of public policy induced the Arkansas legislature to pass the 1935 act whereby Arkansas courts were prohibited from setting aside certain types of defective tax sales "by any proceedings at law or in equity." At the time that act was passed, more than [p373] 25% of the real property in the state was tax delinquent. Loss of revenue from so substantial a portion of the state's total acreage was a serious matter. In the eyes of some people, the land could be sold and the lost revenues recouped if some of the formal grounds on which tax titles could be invalidated were rendered unavailing. It seems clear that the 1935 legislature was persuaded of the wisdom of such a step. But it also seems clear that the 1935 act was repealed in 1937 because the legislature became convinced that the law had worked directly contrary to the state's policy of obtaining the benefits believed to flow from continuity of possession by home owners and farmers, that it had accomplished inequitable results, that it had thereby "operated injuriously to the interests of the State, and that sound policy dictated its repeal." This is apparent from reading that part of § 2 of the repealing act of 1937 which declared that "said Act 142, Acts 1935, ignores jurisdictional prerequisites to effect valid sales of tax delinquent lands, as prescribed by law, and has brought the laws of [p374] the State incident thereto into doubt and confusion "

Both the 1935 act and the 1937 act repealing it touch on Arkansas' policy as to taxation, tax forfeiture, and land ownership—matters of public policy which are of vital interest to the state and all its citizens. It was a matter of serious moment to Arkansas that 25% of the state's privately owned land—homes, farms, and other property—was in jeopardy of being taken from its owners because of inability to pay taxes. If only 50% of the forfeitures were homes and farms, simultaneous ouster of so many citizens could result in forced migrations and discontents disastrous in their consequences. The manifestations of financial distress revealed by the widespread delinquency spotlighted conditions which called for the best in legislative statesmanship. To seek a rational and fair solution to the problem was not only within the power of Arkansas' lawmakers, but was also their imperative duty. Without attempting to judge the wisdom or equities of either act, it is easy to see that both the 1935 and the 1937 act represented rational and understandable attempts to achieve such a solution. To hold that the contract clause of the Federal Constitution is a barrier to the 1937 attempt to restore to the distressed landowners the remedy partly taken away by the 1935 act is, in my view, wholly inconsistent with the spirit and the language of that Constitution.

As already stated, Arkansas was not faced with a problem peculiar to that state alone. At the depth of the depression, over 20% of all real property in the United States was tax delinquent. Nor was Arkansas alone in seeking to do something about the situation. "Since 1928 [p375] nearly every state in the Union has enacted legislation dealing with the problem of delinquent taxes and a number of states have completely remodeled their systems of tax delinquency laws. This legislative activity has been called forth by the unprecedented increase just before and during the depression in the amount of unpaid property taxes and by the consequent threat both to the financial stability of state and local governments and to the security of private property." By acts passed in the single year of 1933, twelve states extended the time for paying taxes already due, eleven states postponed sales for taxes, twenty-six states (among them Arkansas) waived or reduced penalties and interest on taxes already delinquent or for which property had already been sold, nine states (among them Arkansas) lengthened the period of redemption on property already sold, and sixteen states permitted payment of already delinquent taxes in installments spread over a period of years.

The states, and the federal government also, were faced with a "financial crisis [which had] the same results as if it were caused by flood, earthquake, or disturbance in nature." The federal government greatly expanded facilities for farm loans; set up the Home Owners Loan Corporation; practically underwrote the nation's banking system; passed the Frazier-Lemke Act; widened the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction; and embarked on a system of nationwide relief. In the states, [p376] part of the effort to meet the crisis took the form of mortgage and tax moratoria; part took other forms, including that of the legislation now before us. All may well be considered parts of the larger and over-all effort to avert catyclysmic changes which were thought to threaten the equilibrium and tranquility of our society. This Court, in its notable decision in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, upheld that phase of the Minnesota effort which took the form of a mortgage moratorium. In the course of the opinion, the Court quoted the state Attorney General, who in his argument here had stated: Tax delinquencies were alarmingly great, rising as high as 78% in one county of the state. In seven counties of the state the tax delinquency was over 50%. Because of these delinquencies many towns, school districts, villages and cities were practically bankrupt' [and] serious breaches of the peace had occurred." The policy behind mortgage moratoria and the policy behind tax leniency to landowners are inextricably intertwined. The basic philosophy of the two types of legislation is identical. For encouragement of home and farm ownership has always been treated as a major objective of our social and governmental policy. And therefore what was said in the Blaisdell case with reference to the contract clause is equally applicable here: "Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which the state retains over remedial processes, but the state also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.' Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276. Not only are existing laws [p377] read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order."

So much for the general setting which gave rise to the law here held invalid. In order better to understand the effect that law had on the appellants and the appellee, it is necessary to consider other provisions of Arkansas law.

At the time appellants secured from the state a quit claim deed to the lands here in question, the law provided two alternative means of assuring purchasers of tax forfeited lands against loss:

(1) Such purchasers, under certain circumstances, could hold on to the land through the protection afforded by the remedial processes of the courts;

(2) In case they could not hold on to the land, such purchasers were afforded the protection of a judicially enforceable right to be reimbursed by the landowner for the amount paid out for purchase price and subsequent taxes, with interest, as well as for improvements-all in the event that the former owners of the land should for any reason be able to prove that the lands had never been validly forfeited. Ark. Dig. Stats. (Pope, 1937) §§ 4663–4665, 13881.

[p378] The Arkansas legislature, by Act 264 of 1937, narrowed the circumstances under which purchasers might hold on to the land. But the second alternative assurance remained intact.

From my study of the case I am of opinion that:

(1) The 1937 Arkansas statute here attacked neither impaired nor sought to repudiate any contractual agreement or obligation expressly or impliedly assumed by the state;

(2) The 1937 Arkansas statute was enacted well within the state's general legislative powers and is in no way inconsistent with the true intent and fair interpretation of the federal constitutional prohibition which commands that "No State shall pass any  Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts "

First. The state, by quitclaim deeds, without any express warranty whatever, conveyed the lands in question to appellants. It is appellants' claim that an "obligation of the contract created by the grant of the State" has been impaired by the Arkansas statute. Stripped of surplus verbiage, appellants' naked contention is that Arkansas, by its quit claim sale and conveyance, obligated itself to refrain from thereafter passing a general legislative enactment if such enactment would affect in any manner any of the legal means provided to protect tax sale purchasers against loss. We need not here consider whether under the Arkansas Constitution the legislature could have thus bargained away the state's legislative power in setting up a scheme for the sale of tax forfeited land. For there was no attempt on the part of the state officials who made the sale to exercise any such extraordinary authority.

A deed to property without warranty is an agreement to transfer whatever title the grantor has. And even without express language to that effect in the conveyance, it is reasonable to say that a valid quit claim conveyance [p379] carries along with it an implied obligation that the grantor will not repudiate the grant and attempt to reassert title in himself, for such a reassertion of title would be contrary to the express purpose which actuated the parties in reaching the agreement which ended in the conveyance. The implied obligation not to reassert title was the basis of the decision in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, a decision which this Court relies on in the case at bar. Cf. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 414, 415. In Fletcher v. Peck, the court said: "A contract executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert that right. A party is, therefore, always estopped by his own grant." What the State of Georgia did in that case was to seek to reassert title to land which the court found it had conveyed for a consideration under what the court deemed to be a valid contract. True, Georgia was not a party to the actual litigation, but by purporting to convey to one purchaser land which had already been conveyed by it to another purchaser the state clearly attempted to assert that it still had title to the land. Here the State of Arkansas has not repudiated any implied obligation by attempting to reassert title in the lands whose ownership is now in issue. There is no litigation here between the state and its grantees, and none, as in Fletcher v. Peck, between rival grantees of the state. Appellee claims title through an owner whose estate Arkansas had purportedly forfeited for unpaid taxes. Neither in the facts of this case nor in the legislation attacked is there any kind of challenge to the validity of [p380] the state's conveyance of all the title the state possessed. As pointed out above, Fletcher v. Peck rested upon the assumption that there was a continuing obligation on the part of the state, as on the part of any other grantor, not to repudiate a valid conveyance and attempt to reassert a claim to property which had been sold. Such a ruling offers no support to the contention that Arkansas, in quit claiming all its interest to appellants, thereby assumed a continuing contractual obligation that its legislative department would in no way alter the procedural rules to be followed by the Arkansas courts in adjudicating controversies between the state's grantees and the original owners whom the state had attempted to divest of their property by the drastic method of forfeiture. "The trouble at the bottom of the case is that the supposed promise  on which it is founded does not exist. If such a promise had been intended, it was far too important to be left to implication." Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 189 U.S. 434, 436. "The patent [here, the quit claim deed] contains no covenant to do, or not to do, any further act in relation to the land; and we do not, in this case, feel at liberty to create one by implication." Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 289, 7 L.Ed. 679. "A contract binding the state is only created by clear language, and is not to be extended by implication beyond the terms of the statute In the case at bar the act  operated in no manner as a restraint upon the legislature or as a contract upon its part that the state would not act whenever in its judgment it perceived the necessity for an additional ferry No promise made by the legislature by the first act is broken by the second." Williams v. Wingo, 177 U.S. 601, 603. "There is no undertaking on the part of the state with the purchaser that the remedy prescribed in this statute, and no other, shall be pursued, unless it is to be implied from the mere presence of the provision in the statute, [p381] and we think it well settled that no such implication arises." Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U.S. 399, 410.

In this case Arkansas has fully complied with the express terms of its contract. For there was certainly no express obligation on the part of Arkansas that its general laws concerning forfeiture of property and sale of land should remain static. Nor do I believe that any such obligation can properly be implied. Arkansas did not agree with the appellants that it would keep on its statute books legislation which in effect forfeited its citizens' lands in a way and manner which was directly in the teeth of what had been the Arkansas law at the time the alleged forfeitures occurred. And I do not believe that we should compel the accomplishment of such a result by what I conceive to be a stretching of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution.

Second. Measured either by the constitutional provision itself or by that provision as construed by prior decisions of this Court, I am of opinion that the Arkansas statute is consistent with what was referred to in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438, 439, as the true intent and fair interpretation of the contract clause.

Writing in 1817, Judge Livingston, of the Federal Circuit Court of New York, had this to say of the contract clause: "There is not, perhaps, in the constitution any article of more ambiguous import, or which has occasioned, and will continue to occasion, more discussion and disagreement, or the application of which to the cases which occur, will be attended with more perplexity and embarrassment  and it will not be surprising if, in the discharge of it, great diversity of opinion should arise." Adams v. Storey, Fed. Cas. No. 66, 1 Paine's Rep. 79, 88–89. In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra, written in 1933, appears a resumé of previous decisions which [p382] substantiate the accuracy of Judge Livingston's prophecy. And in the Blaisdell case this Court quoted a statement originally made by Justice Johnson in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 286: "But to assign to contracts, universally, a literal purport, and to exact for them a rigid literal fulfilment, could not have been the intent of the constitution. It is repelled by a hundred examples. Societies exercise a positive control as well over the inception, construction and fulfilment of contracts, as over the form and measure of the remedy to enforce them." The accuracy of this statement cannot be questioned by one who reflects upon the extent to which contracts and agreements are a part of the daily activities of our society. For so nearly universal are contractual relationships that it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of laws which do not have either direct or indirect bearing upon contractual obligations. Therefore, it would go far towards paralyzing the legislative arm of state governments to say that no legislative body could ever pass a law which would impair in any manner any contractual obligation of any kind. Upon a recognition of this basic truth rests the decision in the Blaisdell case. Such recognition was made clear by the use of the following expressions, either quoted and implicitly approved, or used for the first time: "the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula"; "No attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of the remedy, which are to be deemed legitimate, and those which, under the form of modifying the remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances"; "In all such cases the question becomes, therefore, one of reasonableness, and of that the legislature is primarily the judge"; "The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but [p383] whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end"; "If it be determined, as it must be, that the contract clause is not an absolute and utterly unqualified restriction of the state's protective power, this legislation is clearly so reasonable as to be within the legislative competency." 290 U.S. 398, 430, 438, 447.

The Blaisdell decision represented a realistic appreciation of the fact that ours is an evolving society and that the general words of the contract clause were not intended to reduce the legislative branch of government to helpless impotency. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn., 310 U.S. 32, 38. Whether the contract clause held been given too broad a construction in judicial opinions prior to the Blaisdell decision is not now material. And whether I believe that the language quoted from the Blaisdell opinion constitutes the ultimate criteria upon which legislation should be measured I need not now discuss. For I am of opinion that the Arkansas statute, passed in pursuance of a general public policy of that state, comes well within the permissible area of state legislation as that area is defined by the Blaisdell case and the decisions upon which that case rests. The only part of the Blaisdell decision mentioned by the Court in the case at bar is a passage quoting a statement which in Blaisdell, the Chief Justice quoted from Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 550, 552: "the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms." The Court now quotes this language as the governing law. In the Blaisdell case, however, the Chief Justice followed the quotation with this statement: "But this broad language cannot be taken without qualification. Chief Justice Marshall pointed out the distinction between obligation and remedy. Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra, 4 Wheat. 122], p. 200. Said he: 'The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given [p384] by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra, at 430. And Chief Justice Marshall, elaborating his views of this same subject in his dissenting opinion in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 343, 353: "We have, then, no hesitation in saying that, however law may act upon contracts, it does not enter into them, and become a part of the agreement. The effect of such a principle would be a mischievous abridgment of legislative power over subjects within the proper jurisdiction of states, by arresting their power to repeal or modify such laws with respect to existing contracts." "We think, that obligation and remedy are distinguishable from each other. That the first is created by the act of the parties, the last is afforded by government."

[p384] As has already been pointed out the forfeiture in the case at bar was wholly invalid under what was the governing law at the time of such forfeiture. That invalidity was rendered unavailing to the land's former owners—and to all other owners similarly situated—by the 1935 act. As has also been pointed out, experience evidently demonstrated to the legislature that the best interest of all the people of the state was not served by the change effected by the 1935 act; hence its repeal in 1937. In Arkansas, as appellants argue here, "these actions to cancel tax deeds are in their essential nature nothing more or less than suits to redeem the property " And it has long been recognized as the law in Arkansas that "the right to redeem lands from a tax-sale depends upon the statute in force at the date of the sale." Thompson v. Sherrill, 51 Ark. 453, 458; 11 S.W. 689, 690; Groves v. Keene, 105 Ark. 40, 43; 150 S.W. 575. At the time of the forfeiture and sale to the state, Arkansas law protected the purchaser by providing that he should be reimbursed and made whole in case his tax purchase was set aside for irregularity. That protection is today afforded to the full extent that it was when appellants [p385] bought the land; the repealing act of which appellants complain did not take away any part of that right. From all of this it is manifest that the entire plan of the state in connection with tax sales, both before and after the repealing act of 1937, shows a scrupulous desire to provide compensation for the purchaser in order that he may not suffer pecuniary loss, whatever may be the consequences of a suit for the land. And the whole course of legislation in Arkansas shows a desire to be fair both to the purchaser of tax forfeited land and to the former owners whose land is about to be lost by reason of the drastic device of forfeiture. Cf. Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68, 71. I cannot believe that the true intent and interpretation of the contract clause prohibits Arkansas from making such an effort to preserve the rights of both the landowner and the one who claims the landowner's forfeited property. Arkansas has not here taken away appellants' "entire remedy" but has done so "in part only." Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370, 378. I am willing to concede that there may be a "vast disproportion between the value of the land and the sum for which it is usually bid off at such sales." Curtis v. Whitney, supra, at 70. But assuming that the tax forfeited land here was obtained at such a bargain, I am still of the opinion that these appellants—who have the right to their money, with interest—have been denied no right guaranteed by the contract clause. And in this connection it is not to be forgotten that appellants could have obtained a perfect title by openly and adversely holding possession of the land for two years—a privilege which the state courts finally and authoritatively found had not been exercised. Tax sold properties are undoubtedly bought with the knowledge on the part of those who speculate in them that states ordinarily [p386] adopt a liberal policy in order to protect property owners from tax forfeiture. And even granting that we could enter into questions of policy, I would be unable to reach the conclusion that Arkansas, by repealing its 1935 statute, acted "without reason or in a spirit of oppression." W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60. It would seem to me to be difficult to support an argument that Arkansas was acting either unreasonably, unjustly, oppressively, or counter to sound public policy in adopting a law which, without depriving purchasers of the right to recover their money outlay, with interest, sought to make the way easy for former home owners and property owners of all types to reacquire possession and ownership of forfeited property. If under the contract clause it is justifiable to seek to find "a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare," Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra, at 442, then it seems to me that this is a case for the application of that principle. I do not believe that the Arkansas legislaure is prohibited by the Federal Constitution from adopting the public policy which the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court has upheld in this case. "Especial respect should be had to such decisions when the dispute arises out of general laws of a state, regulating its exercise of the taxing power, or relating to the State's disposition of its public lands."

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY concur in this opinion.