Wood v. Lovett

Where a State has sold land under a tax title which is valid with the help of a statute curing irregularities in the tax proceeding, but invalid without it, a repeal of the curative statute impairs the obligation of the contract between the State and its vendee, in violation of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. P. 371.

201 Ark. 129; 143 S.W.2d 880, reversed.

APPEAL from a decree affirming a decree quieting title in Lovett, relying on a deed from a former owner, against Wood et al., relying on a tax title.

Mr. J. G. Burke submitted for appellants.

The effect of Act 142 was to cure all defects in the tax sale and vest a valid title in the State of Arkansas.

Appellants acquired vested rights by their deeds from the State of Arkansas. Holland v. Rogers, 33 Ark. 251; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620; ''Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Alexander'', 49 Ark. 190; 4 S.W. 753; Walker v. Ferguson, 176 Ark. 625; 3 S.W.2d 694; Smith v. Spillman, 135 Ark. 279; 205 S.W. 107; Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144; 3 A.2d 839; Kosek v. Walker, 196 Ark. 656; 118 S.W.2d 575.

The repeal of the Act impaired the obligation of appellants' contracts with the State, in violation of Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution.

Act 264 of the General Assembly of 1937, Vol. 1, page 933, approved March 17, 1937; Berry v. Davidson, 199 Ark. 96; 133 S.W.2d 442; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87; Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; [p363] Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270; W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1; Reid v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 166 Miss. 39; 148 So. 392; State v. Osten, 91 Mont. 76; 5 P.2d 562; State v. Gether Co., 203 Wis. 311; 234 N.W. 331.

The repeal deprived appellants of their property without due process of law, and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 484; Beavers v. Myar, 68 Ark. 333; 58 S.W. 40; ''Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S. 165; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620; Rhodes v. Cannon'', 112 Ark. 6; 164 S.W. 752; Carle v. Gehl, 193 Ark. 1061; 104 S.W.2d 445.

Mr. Walter G. Riddick submitted for appellee.

The construction of Act 142 presents a question exclusively within the power and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.

We may concede for the argument that appellants purchased from the State in the belief that the effect of Act 142 was to make impervious to attack a tax title conveyed by the State and to vest such title in the State's grantees. But even so, appellants purchased at their peril and under the risk that the Supreme Court of Arkansas might disagree with them as to the effect of the Act upon which they relied, and might place upon it another and entirely different construction. This is what has been done, and all that has been done, in the present case.

[p364] In Carle v. Gehl, 193 Ark. 1061, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Act 142 was not a statute of limitations. In Kosek v. Walker, 196 Ark. 656, the court held that the Act was of no avail to purchasers from the State in litigation over such titles arising after the repeal of the Act by Act 264 of 1937.

In Union Trust Co. v. Watts, 75 Ark. L.R. 30, the court again held that Act 142 was not a confirmation act and that it was not effective to cure defective tax titles nor to vest title during the time it was in force.

Before this litigation was instituted, the Supreme Court of Arkansas had authoritatively determined the meaning of the Act in question. The fact that this determination was made after appellants had bought from the State, relying upon another interpretation of the Act, is unimportant.