Wolf v. Colorado/Opinion of the Court

The precise question for consideration is this: Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the 'due process of law' required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered it admissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the United States because there deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment as applied in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A.1915B, 834, Ann.Cas.1915C, 1177? The Supreme Court of Colorado has sustained convictions in which such evidence was admitted, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926; 117 Colo. 321, 187 P.2d 928, and we brought the cases here. 333 U.S. 879, 68 S.Ct. 910, 92 L.Ed. 1155.

Unlike the specific requirements and restrictions placed by the Bill of Rights, Amendments I to VIII, upon the administration of criminal justice by federal authority, the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the States to specific limitations. The notion that the 'due process of law' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has been rejected by this Court again and again, after mpressive consideration. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 292, 28 L.Ed. 232; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 287, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288. Only the other day the Court reaffirmed this rejection after thorough reexamination of the scope and function of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 47 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223. The issue is closed.

For purposes of ascertaining the restrictions which the Due Process Clause imposed upon the States in the enforcement of their criminal law, we adhere to the views expressed in Palko v. Connecticut, supra, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288. That decision speaks to us L.Ed. 288. That decision speaks to us particularly in matters of civil liberty, of a court that included Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo, to speak only of the dead. In rejecting the suggestion that the Due Process Clause incorporated the original Bill of Rights, Mr. Justice Cardozo reaffimred on behalf of that Court at affirmed but deeper and more pervasive conception of the Due Process Clause. This Clause exacts from the States for the lowliest and the most outcast all that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' 302 U.S. at page 325, 58 S.Ct. at page 152.

Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. as of any one time, even though, as a as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.

To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement may satisfy a longing for certainty but ignores the movements of a free society. It belittles the scale of the conception of due process. The real clue to the problem confronting the judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where the line is once and for all to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion.' Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104, 24 L.Ed. 616. This was the Court's insight when first called upon to consider the problem; to this insight the Court has on the whole been faithful as case after case has come before it since Davidson v. New Orleans was decided.

The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable againt the States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.

Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order. How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it should be afforded, the means by which the right should be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.

In Weeks v. United States, supra, this Court held that in a federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure. This ruling was made for the first time in 1914. It was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The decision was a matter of judicial implication. Since then it has been frequently applied and we stoutly adhere to it. But the immediate question is whether the basic right to protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the exclusion of logically relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure because, in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would be excluded. As a matter of inherent reason, one would suppose this to be an issue to which men with complete devotion to the protection of the right of privacy might give different answers. When we find that in fact most of the English-speaking world does not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient of the right. The contrariety of views of the States is particularly impressive in view of the careful reconsideration which they have given the problem in the light of the Weeks decision.

I. Before the Weeks decision 27 States had passed on the     admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search and      seizure.

(a) Of these, 26 States opposed the Weeks doctrine. (See     Appendix, Table A.)

(b) Of these, 1 State anticipated the Weeks doctrine. (Table     B.)

II. Since the Weeks decision 47 States all told have passed     on the Weeks doctrine. (Table C.)

(a) Of these, 20 passed on it for the first time.

(1) Of the foregoing States, 6 followed the Weeks doctrine. (Table D.)

(2) Of the foregoing States, 14 rejected the Weeks doctrine. (Table E.)

(b) Of these, 26 States reviewed prior decisions contrary to     the Weeks doctrine.

(1) Of these, 10 States have followed Weeks, overruling or     distinguishing their prior decisions. (Table F.)

(2) Of these, 16 States adhered to their prior decisions     against Weeks. (Table G)

(c) Of these, 1 State adhered to its prior formulation of the     Weeks doctrine. (Table H.)

III. As of today 30 States reject the Weeks doctrine, 17     States are in agreement with it. (Table I.) IV. Of 10 jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and  the British Commonwealth of Nations which have passed on   the question, none has held evidence obtained by illegal   search and seizure inadmissible. (Table J.)

The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks doctrine have not left the right to privacy without other means of protection. Indeed, the exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford. Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective. Weighty testimony against such an insistence on our own view is the opinion of Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585. We cannot brush aside the experience of State which deem the incidence of such condust by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence. There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonable obtained by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under State or local authority. The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppresive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country.

We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. And though we have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid the admission of such evidence, a different question would be presented if Congress under its legislative powers were to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks doctrine. We would then be faced with the problem of the respect to be accorded the legislative judgment on an issues as to which, in default of that judgment, we have been forced to depend upon our own. Problems of a converse character, also not before us, would be presented should Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment uindertake to enforce the rights there guaranteed by attempting to make the Weeks doctrine binding upon the States.

Affirmed.

TABLE A.

ALA. Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85, 53 Am.St.Rep. 17.

ARK. Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538, 36 S.W. 940.

CONN. State v. Grisworld, 67 Conn. 290, 34 A. 1046, 33 L.R.A. 227.

GA. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624, 39 L.R.A. 269.

IDAHO State v. Bond, 12 Idaho 424, 439, 86 P. 43, 47.

ILL. Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 583, 32 N.E. 431.

KANS. State v. Miller, 63 Kan. 62, 64 P. 1033.

ME. See State v. Gorham, 65 Me. 270, 272.

MD. Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 35, 63 A. 96, 103.

MASS.C.ommonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329.

MICH. People v. Aldorfer, 164 Mich. 676, 130 N.W. 351.

MINN. State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 N.W. 913.

MO. State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489, 32 S.W. 1002.

MONT. See State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 19, 85 P. 369, 373, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 762, 9 Ann.Cas. 648.

NEB. Geiger v. State, 6 Neb. 545. N.H. State v. Flynn, 36 N.H. 64.

N.Y. People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636, 63 L.R.A. 406, 98 Am.St.Rep. 675.

N.C. State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 622, 78 S.E. 1, Ann.Cas.1915B, 423.

OKLA. Silva v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 97, 116 P. 199.

ORE. State v. McDaniel, 39 Or. 161, 169-170, 65 P. 520, 523.

S.C. State v. Atkinson, 40 S.C. 363, 371, 18 S.E. 1021, 1024, 42 Am.St.Rep. 877.

S.D. State v. Madison, 23 S.D. 584, 591, 122 N.W. 647, 650.

TENN. Cohn v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S.W. 1149, 17 L.R.A.,N.S., 451, 15 Ann.Cas. 1201.

Vt. State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. 101, 23 A. 590, 15 L.R.A. 268, 33 Am.St.Rep. 921.

WASH. State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 80 P. 268, 3 Ann.Cas. 351.

W. Va. See State v. Edwards, 51 W.Va. 220, 229, 41 S.E. 429, 432-433, 59 L.R.A. 465.

TABLE B.

STATE WHICH HAD FORMULATED THE WEEKS DOCTRINE BEFORE THE WEEKS DECISION.

IOWA State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730.

TABLE C.

STATES WHICH HAVE PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE SINCE THE WEEKS CASE WAS DECIDED.

Every State except Rhode Island. But see State v. Lorenzo, 72 R.I. 175, 48 A.2d 407, 49 A.2d 316 (holding that defendant had consented to the search, but that even if he had not and even if the federal rule applied, the evidence was admissible because no timely motion to suppress had been made).

STATES WHICH PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION AND IN SO DOING FOLLOWED IT.

FLA. Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329.

IND. Flum v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353.

KY. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860, 13 A.L.R. 1303.

MISS. Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, 24 A.L.R. 1377.

WIS. Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89, 27 A.L.R. 673.

WYO. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683.

TABLE E.

STATES WHICH PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION AND IN SO DOING REJECTED IT.

ARIZ. Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 P. 372.

CALIF. People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383 (adopting the general rule but distinguishing the cases then decided by this Court on the ground that they apply only when a timely motion for return of the property seized has been made).

COLO. Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 P. 1019.

DEL. State v. Chuchola, 32 W.W.Harr. 133, 120 A. 212 (distinguishing this Court's decisions).

LA. State v. Fleckinger, 152 La. 337, 93 So. 115. The constitutional convention of 1921 refused to adopt an amendment incorporating the federal rule. See State v. Eddins, 161 La. 240, 108 So. 468.

NEV. State v. Chin Gim, 47 Nev. 431, 224 P. 798.

N.J. Statev. Black, 135 A. 685, 5 N.J.Misc 48.

N.M. State v. Dillon, 34 N.M. 366, 281 P. 474, 88 A.L.R. 340.

N.D. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67.

OHIO State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490.

PA. Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 A. 679.

TEX. Welchek v. State, 93 Tex.Cr.R. 271, 247 S.W. 524. In 1925, a statute changed the rule by providing that 'no evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution of the United States of America, shall     be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal     case.' Texas Laws 1925, c. 49, as amended, Texas Code Crim.Proc. § 727a  (Vernon, 1948).

UTAH State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704, 32 A.L.R. 375.

VA. Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S.W. 154.

TABLE F.

STATES WHICH, AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION, OVERRULED OR DISTINGUISHED PRIOR CONTRARY DECISIONS.

IDAHO Idaho expressly refused to follow the Weeks decision in State v. Myers, 36 Idaho 396, 211 P. 440, but repudiated the Myers case and adopted the federal rule in State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788, 52 A.L.R. 463.

ILL. After two cases following the former state rule, Illinois adopted the federal rule in People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112, 32 A.L.R. 357.

MICH. People v. Marxhaus n, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557, 3 A.L.R. 1505 (distinguishing earlier cases on the ground that in them no preliminary motion to suppress had been made).

MO. State v. Graham, 295 Mo. 695, 247 S.W. 194, supported the old rule in a dictum, but the federal rule was adopted in State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100, 32 A.L.R. 383 (distinguishing earlier cases on the ground that in them no preliminary motion to dismiss had been made).

MONT. State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 P. 862.

OKLA. Gore v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 394, 218 P. 545.

S.D. State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234 N.W. 610. But cf. S.D. Laws 1935, c. 96, now S.D. Code § 34.1102 (1939), amending Rev.Code 1919, § 4606 (all evidence admissible under a valid search warrant is admissible notwithstanding defects in the issuance of the warrant).

TENN. Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588, 20 A.L.R. 639 (distinguishing Cohn v. State, supra, Table A).

WASH. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390.

W. VA. State v. Andrews, 91 W.Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257 (distinguishing earlier cases).

TABLE G.

STATES WHICH, AFTER THE WEEKS DECISION, REVIEWED PRIOR CONTRARY DECISIONS AND IN SO DOING ADHERED TO THOSE DECISIONS.

ALA. Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359.

ARK. Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633, 233 S.W. 758.

CONN. State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 A. 636.

GA. Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 647, 119 S.E. 525.

KANS. State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 58, 226 P. 245.

ME. State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 16, 92 A. 867 (alternative holding, not noticing Weeks).

MD. Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 141 A. 536, 142 A. 190. But cf. Md. Laws, 1929, c. 194, as amended, Md. Code Ann., Art. 35, § 5 (1947 Supp.) (in trial of misdemeanors, evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is inadmissible).

MASS.C.ommonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N.E. 11.

MINN. State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789.

NEB. Billings v. State, 109 Neb. 596, 191 N.W.2d 721.

N.H. State v. Agalos, 79 N.H. 241, 242, 107 A. 314 (not noticing Weeks).

N.Y. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585; People v. Richter's Jewelers, 291 N.Y. 161, 169, 51 N.E.2d 690, 693, 50 A.L.R. 560 (holding that adoption og Amendment to State Con stitution in same language as Civil Rights Law, McK. Consol. Laws, c. 6,   construed in the Defore case is not occasion for changing  interpretation, especially since proceedings of the conviction which    framed the amendment show that no change was intended).

N.C. State v. Simmons, 183 N.C. 684, 110 S.E. 591 (distinguishing between evidentiary articles and corpus delicti).

ORE. See State v. Folkes, 174 Or. 568, 588-589, 150 P.2d 17, 25. But see State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443, 493-495, 204 P. 958, 974 975, 206 P. 290.

S.C. After granting a motion to return illegally seized property in Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441, L.R.A.1916E, 714; South Carolina reaffirmed its agreement with the general rule in State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230, 114 S.E. 317.

VT. State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 401, 160 A. 257, 266, 747.

TABLE H.

STATE WHICH HAS ADHERED TO ITS PRIOR FORMULATION OF THE WEEKS DOCTRINE.

IOWA State v. Rowley, 197 Iowa 977, 195 N.W. 881 (recognizing the Weeks case but following earlier Iowa cases).

TABLE I.

SUMMARY OF PRESENT POSITION OF STATES WHICH HAVE PASSED ON THE WEEKS DOCTRINE.

(a) States that reject Weeks:

Ala., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Conn., Del., Ga., Kans., La., Me., Md., Mass., Minn., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Ore., Pa., S.C., Texas, Utah, Vt., Va.

(b) States that are in agreement with Weeks:

Fla., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Mich., Miss., Mo., Mont., Okla., S.D., Tenn., Wash., W. Va., Wis., Wyo.

TABLE J.

JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS WHICH HAVE HELD ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

AUSTRALIA Miller v. Noblet, (1927) S.A.S.R. 385.

CANADA ALTA. Rex v. Nelson, (1922) 2 W.W.R. 381, 69 D.L.R. 180.

MAN. ex v. Durousel, 41 Man. 15, (1933) 2 D.L.R. 446.

ONT. Regina v. Doyle, 12 Ont. 347.

SASK. Rex v. Kostachuk, 24 Sask. 485, 54 Can.C.C. 189.

ENGLAND See Elias v. Pasmore, (1934) 2 K.B. 164.

INDIA ALL. Ali Ahmad Khan v. Emperor, 81 I.C. 615(1).

CAL. Baldeo Bin v. Emperor, 142 I.C. 639.

RANG. Chwa Hum Htive v. Emperor, 143 I.C. 824.

SCOTLAND See Hodgson v. McPherson, (1913) S.C.(J.) 68, 73.