Wilson v. Eureka City/Opinion of the Court

Whether the provisions of the charter enabled the council to delegate any power to the mayor is not within our competency to decide. That is necessarily a state question, and we are confined to a consideration of whether the power conferred does or does not violate the constitution of the United States.

It is contended that it does, because the ordinance commits the rights of plaintiff in error to the unrestrained discretion of a single individual, and thereby, it is claimed, removes them from the domain of law. To support the contention, the following cases are cited: In re Frazee, 63 Mich, 396, 30 N. W. 72; State v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104; Anderson v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac. 719; Mayor, etc., v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359.

With the exception of Mayor, etc., v. Radecke, these cases passed on the validity of city ordinances prohibiting persons parading streets with banners, musical instruments, etc., without first obtaining permission of the mayor or common council or police department. Funeral and military processions were excepted, although in some respects they were subjected to regulation. This discrimination was made the basis of the decision in State v. Dering; but the other cases seem to have proceeded upon the principle that the right of persons to assemble and parade was a well-established and inherent right, which could be regulated, but not prohibited or made dependent upon any officer or officers, and that its regulation must be by well-defined conditions.

This view has not been entertained by other courts, or has not been extended to other instances of administration. The cases were reviewed by Mr. Justice McFarland, of the supreme court of California, in Re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 38 Pac. 981, in which an ordinance which prohibited the beating of drums on the streets of one of the towns of that state, 'without special permit in writing so to do first had and obtained from the president of the board of trustees,' was passed on and sustained. Summarizing the cases, the learned justice said:

'Statutes and ordinances have been sustained prohibiting awnings without the consent of the mayor and aldermen (Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161); forbidding orations, harangues, etc., in a park without the prior consent of the park commissioners (Com. v. Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 30 N. E. 79), or upon the common or other grounds, except by the permission of the city government and committee (Com. v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485, 4 N. E. 577); 'beating any drum or tambourine, or making any noise with any instrument for any purpose whatever, without written permission of the president of the village,' on any street or sidewalk (Vance v. Hadfield [Sup.] 4 N. Y. Supp. 112); giving the right to manufacturers and others to ring bells and blow whistles in such manner and at such hours as the board of aldermen or selectmen may in writing designate (Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239); prohibiting the erecting or repairing of a wooden building without the permission of the board of aldermen (Hine v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 478); authorizing harbor masters to station vessels and to assign to each its place (Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349); forbidding the occupancy of a place on the street for a stand without the permission of the clerk of Faneuil Hall Market (In re Nightingale, 11 Pick. 168); forbidding the keeping of swine without a permit in writing from the board of health (Quincy v. Kennard, 151 Mass. 563, 24 N. E. 860); forbidding the erection of any kind of a building without a permit from the commissioners of the town through their clerk (Commissioners v. Covey, 74 Md. 262); forbidding any person from remaining within the limits of the market more than twenty minutes unless permitted so to do by the superintendent or his deputy (Com. v. Brooks, 109 Mass. 355).'

In ll of these cases the discretion upon which the right depended was not that of a single individual. It was not in all of the cases cited by plaintiff in error, nor was their principle based on that. It was based on the necessity of the regulation of rights by uniform and general laws,-a necessity which is no better observed by a discretion in a board of aldermen or council of a city than in a mayor; and the cases, therefore, are authority against the contention of plaintiff in error. Besides, it is opposed by Davis v. Com., 167 U.S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731.

Davis was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Boston by making a public address on the 'Common,' without obtaining a permit from the mayor. The conviction was sustained by the supreme judicial court of the commonwealth (162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113), and then brought here for review.

The ordinance was objected to, as that in the case at bar is objected to, because it was 'in conflict with the constitution of the United States and the first section of the fourteenth amendment thereof.' The ordinance was sustained.

It follows from these views that the judgment of the supreme court of Utah should be, and it is, affirmed.