West River Bridge Company v. Dix/Separate McLean

Mr. Justice McLEAN.

As this is a constitutional question of considerable practical importance, I will state, succinctly, my general views on the subject.

The West River Bridge, under the statutes of Vermont, was appropriated to public purposes. And it is alleged that the charter under which the bridge was built and possessed by such appropriation was impaired. Our inquiry is limited to this point. For whatever injury the proceedings may have done to the interests of the corporation, unless its contract with the State was impaired, we have no jurisdiction of the case.

The power in a State to take private property for public use is undoubted. It is an incident to sovereignty, and its exercise is often essential to advance the public interests. This act is done under the regulations of the State. If those regulations have not been strictly observed, that is not a matter of inquiry for this court. The local tribunals have the exclusive power in such cases.

This act by a State has never been held to impair the obligations of the contract by which the property appropriated was held. The power acts upon the property, and not on the contract. A State cannot annul or modify a grant of land fairly made. But it may take the land for public use. This is done by making compensation for the property taken, as provided by law. But if it be an appropriation of property to public use, it cannot be held to impair the obligations of the contract.

It is insisted, that this was a pretended exercise of the power of the eminent domain, with the view of destroying the force and obligation of the plaintiffs' charter.

This whole proceeding was under a standing law of the State, and it was sanctioned, on an appeal, by the Supreme Court of the State. A procedure thus authorized by law, and sanctioned, cannot be lightly regarded. It has all the solemnities of a sovereign act.

But it is said that the franchise of the plaintiff cannot be denominated property; that 'it included the grant of no property real or personal; that it lay in grant, and not in livery.'

If the action of the State had been upon the franchise only, this objection would be unanswerable. The State cannot modify or repeal a charter for a bridge, a turnpike-road, or a bank, or any other private charter, unless the power to do so has been reserved in the original grant. But no one doubts the power of the State to take a banking-house for public use, or any other real or personal property owned by the bank. In this respect, a corporation holds property subject to the eminent domain, the same as citizens. The great object of an act of incorporation is, to enable a body of men to exercise the faculties of an individual. Peculiar privileges are sometimes vested in the body politic, with the view of advancing the convenience and interests of the public.

The franchise no more than a grant for land can be annulled by the State. These muniments of right are alike protected. But the property held under both is held subject to a public necessity, to be determined by the State. In either case, the property being taken renders valueless the evidence of right. But this does not, in the sense of the Constitution, impair the contracts. The bridge and the ground connected with it, together with the right of exacting toll, are the elements which constitute the value of the bridge. The situation and productiveness of the soil constitute the value of land. In both cases, an estimate is made of the value, under prescribed forms, and it is paid when the property is taken for public use. And in these cases the evidences of right are incidents to the property.

No State could resume a charter, under the power of appropriation, and carry on the functions of the corporation. A bank charter could not be thus taken, and the business of the bank continued for public purposes. Nor could this bridge have been taken by the State, and kept up by it, as a toll-bridge. This could not be called an appropriation of private property to public purposes. There would be no change in the use, except the application of the profits, and this would not bring the act within the power. The power must not only be exercised bona fide by a State, but the property, not its product, must be applied to public use.

It is argued, that, if the State may take this bridge, it may transfer it to other individuals, under the same or a different charter. This the State cannot do. It would in effect be taking the property from A to convey it to B. The public purpose for which the power is exerted must be real, not pretended. If in the course of time the property, by a change of circumstances, should no longer be required for public use, it may be otherwise disposed of. But this is a case not likely to occur. The legality of the act depends upon the facts and circumstances under which it was done. If the use of land taken by the public for a highway should be abandoned, it would revert to the original proprietor and owner of the fee.

It is objected that this bridge, being owned by a corporation and used by the public, does not come within the designation of private property. All property, whether owned by an individual or individuals, a corporation aggregate or sole, is within the term. In short, all property not public is private.

The use of this bridge, it is contended, is the same as before the act of appropriation. The public use the bridge now as before the act of appropriation. But it was a toll-bridge, and by the act it is made free. The use, therefore, is not the same. The tax assessed on the citizens of the town, to keep up and pay for the bridge, may be impolitic or unjust; but that is not a matter for the consideration of this court.

It is supposed, if this power is sustained by the State of Vermont, it will be in the power of a State to seize the evidences of its indebtment in the hands of its citizens, or within its jurisdiction, have their value assessed, and, by paying the amount, extinguish them. Such a case bears no analogy to the one before us. The contract only is acted upon in the case supposed. The obligation to pay the money by the State is materially impaired, which brings the case within the Constitution. But the appropriation of property affects the contract or title by which it is held only incidentally. This, it is said, is an extremely technical distinction, and is not sustainable, as it enables a State to do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits.

However nice the distinction may seem to be, when examined it will be found substantial.

The power of appropriation by a State has never been held by any judicial tribunal as impairing the obligation of a contract, in the sense of the Constitution. And this power has been frequently exercised by all the States, since the adoption of the Constitution. In the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution it is declared, 'Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.' This refers to the action of the federal government, but a similar provision is contained in all the State constitutions. Now the Constitution does not prohibit a State from impairing the obligation of a contract unless compensation be made, but the inhibition is absolute. So that if such an act come within the prohibition, the act is unconstitutional. But this power has been exercised by the States, since the foundation of the government, and no one has supposed that it was prohibited by that clause in the Constitution which inhibits a State 'from impairing the obligations of a contract.'

The only reasonable result, therefore, to which we can come is, that the power in the State is an independent power, and does not come within the class of cases prohibited by the Constitution.

This view gives effect to the Constitution in imposing a salutary restraint upon legislation affecting contracts, but leaves the States free in their exercise of the eminent domain, which belongs to their sovereignties, is essential for the advancement of internal improvements, and acts only upon property within their respective jurisdictions. The powers do not belong to the same class. That which acts upon contracts and impairs their obligation only is prohibited.