Weir v. Norman/Opinion of the Court

Section 4077 of the compilation of the Kentucky Statutes of 1894 provides that each of the enumerated companies or corporations, 'every other like company, corporation or association,' and also 'every other corporation, company or association having or exercising any special or exclusive privilege or franchise not allowed by law to natural persons, or performing any public service, shall, in addition to the other taxes imposed on it by law, annually pay a tax on its franchise to the state, and a local tax thereon to the county, incorporated city, town and taxing district, where its franchise may be exercised'; and in the succeeding sections the words 'franchise,' 'franchises,' and 'corporate franchise' are used. But, taking the whole act together, and in view of the provisions of sections 4078, 4079, 4080, and 4081, we agree with the circuit court that it is evident that the word 'franchise' was not employed in a technical sense, and that the legislative intention is plain that the entire property, tangible and intangible, of all foreign and domestic corporations, and all foreign and domestic companies possessing no franchise, should be valued as an entirety, the value of the tangible property be deducted, and the value of the intangible property thus ascertained be taxed under these provisions; and as to railroad, telegraph, telephone, express, sleeping car, etc., companies, whose lines extend beyond the limits of the state, that their intangible property should be assessed on the basis of the mileage of their lines within and without the state.

But from the valuation on the mileage basis the value of all tangible property is deducted before the taxation is applied.

So far as the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution are concerned, this scheme of taxation is not in contravention thereof, as already determined in Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor (Sanford v. Poe) 165 U.S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, and cases cited.

And, considered as a property tax, as, in our opinion, the prescribed exaction must be held to be, we regard it as in harmony with the provisions of the constitution of the commonwealth of Kentucky. The property, tangible and intangible, owned by corporations, is subjected to like taxation, and so the tangible and intangible property of individuals associated together in companies; and, while the provisions of sections 4077 and 4078 do not apply to all individual taxpayers yet reference to section 4020 and the schedule which must be returned by each taxpayer, as required by section 4058, demonstrates that individual taxpayers are also subjected to taxation on all their intangible property, whatever that may be, as well as on all their tangible property. As pointed out by the circuit court, the mode of the assessment of the intangible property of companies, corporations, and associations mentioned in section 4077 and that of individual taxpayers is different, and the intangible property of such corporations, companies, and associations may, in some respects, differ from the intangible property belonging to individual taxpayers; but there is nothing in the statute which exempts any intangible property owned by any corporation, company, or individual taxpayer from taxation, or discriminates between them.

Section 174 of the constitution of Kentucky provides that: 'All property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempted by this constitution; and all corporate property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from providing for taxation based on income, licenses or franchises.'

But this does not prevent intangible property from being taxed, and the tax mentioned in section 4077 is not an additional tax upon the same property, but on intangible property which has not been taxed as tangible property.

We concur with the views of the circuit court that neither section 172 of the constitution nor any other section confines 'the levy of an ad valorem tax to tangible property; but, as decided by the Kentucky court of appeals in Levi v. City of Louisville (Ky.) 30 S. W. 973, it does require the levy of an ad valorem tax upon personal property as well as real estate, and this case decides that a license tax, which is not a property tax, cannot be substituted for an ad valorem tax upon personal property engaged in certain commercial pursuits in the city of Louisville. It does not decide that section 171 of the constitution, which declares that taxation shall be uniform upon all property subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, applies to taxation based upon income, license, or franchise. If there is any intimation upon the subject in this case, it is that taxation which is based upon income, license, or franchise may be classified by the legislature; and, as to licenses, they may be levied upon some employments and occupations, and not upon others. If, however, we are correct in our construction of the Kentucky statutes, there is no ground for contending that there is a want of uniformity in the levy of the taxes against the defendant, even though section 171, requiring uniformity of taxation upon all property subject to taxation, applies to taxation based upon income, license, or franchise, and is given its broadest possible construction.'

The act received consideration in Henderson Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth, 31 S. W. 486, and the court of appeals of Kentucky, speaking through Grace, J., said:

'Thus we see what a varied meaning this term 'capital stock' may have. So that it becomes necessary to examine and see what was the object and meaning of the legislature when using this term in the clause before quoted from section 4079 of our statutes. In this examination it becomes important to notice those clauses of the constitution in reference to revenue and taxation, and see what was contemplated and enjoined by that instrument in reference to taxation. Section 172 provides: 'That all property not exempt from taxation, by this constitution, shall be assessed at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale.' * *  * Section 174 provides: 'That all property, whether owned by natural persons or by corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempted by this constitution, and all corporate property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from providing for taxation, based on income, licenses or franchises.'

'Thus it is manifest that what the constitution intended to be taxed was property,-all property; and, as to corporations, not only all tangible property, but that it intended to leave the legislature of the state free to tax the franchise of corporations if it so desired; that the property of a corporation should be taxed as the property of an individual. It will be observed that in these, several sections quoted 'capital stock,' 'stock,' and 'shares of stock' are not mentioned as being appropriate terms to designate the subjects of taxation, but it says 'property,' 'all property,' etc., so that there might be no confusion as to what that instrument intended. Neither is there any reason to suspect that the legislature did not understand the language and meaning of the constitution when it came to frame the revenue laws of the state under it now under consideration. Neither is there reason to suspect that it did not intend and endeavor in good faith to carry into effect the intent and meaning of the constitution. So that we may safely interpret all words and phrases (of doubtful and uncertain meaning) in accordance with and so as to effectuate and carry out that intent.'

The statute, thus construed, cannot be overthrown for failure to conform to the requirements of sections 171, 172, and 174 of the state constitution.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom concur Mr. Justice FIELD, Mr. Justice HARLAN, and Mr. Justice BROWN, dissenting.