Weems v. George/Opinion of the Court

The defendants in error brought this suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, against Weems, the plaintiff in error, by petition, according to the practice in the courts of that State. They aver, in their petition, that they are aliens, and subjects of the Queen of Great Britain, with the exception of two, who were citizens of the State of Illinois; and that they are the heirs of Alexander George, deceased. That said George, in his lifetime, was owner of a certain island, the undivided moiety of which he had sold to Weems. That, in the act of partition between them, Weems agreed to pay two certain notes, given by George for the purchase-money, and which were secured by mortgage on the land,-one for $1,305.82, payable on the 1st of January, 1848, and the other for $1,250.22, on 1st of January, 1849. That Weems paid the sum of $600 on the notes, but neglected or refused to pay the balance. That Alexander George having died, and the defendants in error having been admitted to the succession as his heirs, an execution was issued on the mortgage for the balance of the notes, on which certain slaves held by them, as such heirs, were seized and sold; and the sum of $2,435.88 raised in satisfaction of the balance of said notes, with interest and costs of suit.

The defendant below filed two pleas to the jurisdiction: 1st, That the plaintiffs were not aliens, as set forth in their bill; and, secondly, that the claim of the plaintiffs is under Alexander George, who was a citizen of Louisiana.

These pleas were overruled,-the first, it is to be presumed, because it was not true in fact; and the second, because it was not good in law. For the plaintiffs' petition does not set forth a claim as assignees of the negotiable paper or notes mentioned therein, but for damage and loss incurred by them, from the neglect and refusal of Weems to pay certain liens which he had contracted to pay in the act of partition between himself and George.

As the argument submitted by the counsel for plaintiff in error does not insist that there was error in overruling these pleas to the jurisdiction, they need not be further noticed.

The case was afterwards heard on the merits before the court, without the intervention of a jury; and a paper, called a bill of exceptions to the admission of certain testimony, is found on the record, on which the plaintiff in error seems mainly to rely for the reversal of judgment. It might be thought, perhaps, hypercritical to object to the form of this paper, as it comes from a State where common-law forms are little known in practice; but it may be remarked, that this document certifies only that certain testimony was offered and received by the court after objection by the defendant's counsel, and does not state that any exception was taken to such ruling of the court, or that the judge who signed it was asked to seal, or did seal a bill of exceptions. But, waiving this objection, the first exception is to receiving in evidence a certain paper, marked D. That paper is not copied in, or annexed to, the bill. It is said to be a certificate from the clerk of the eighth Judicial District for the parish of St. Tammany, offered to prove that certain claims against the succession of Alexander George were paid by his heirs. The objection to it was undoubtedly a good and valid objection, if the contents of the paper were what the objection assumes them to be. But as the paper itself is not set forth in the bill, this court cannot know whether the objection was overruled because the paper was not what it was assumed to be, or because the objection was not well taken, if it was.

The second exception was to the admission of parol testimony, that a suit had been brought against the defendant, Weems. The objection, that the contents of a record cannot be proved by parol, is certainly a good and legal one, if such were the offer or such the evidence given by the witness.

But the bill does not state any of the preceding evidence in the case, nor the purpose or bearing of the testimony offered. It may have been merely offered to show demand of the payment of a note; a fact in pais, which may be proved in parol, like any other mode of demand, notwithstanding it was made by presenting a writ.

But there remains an objection to these bills of exception which is conclusive against them, even if they had been drawn in all proper and legal form. It has been frequently decided by this court that, notwithstanding there is no distinction between suits at law and equity in the courts of Louisiana, in those of the United States this distinction must be preserved. When the case is submitted to the judge, to find the facts without the intervention of a jury, he acts as a referee, by consent of the parties, and no bill of exceptions will lie to his reception or rejection of testimony, nor to his judgment on the law. In such cases, when a party feels aggrieved by the decision of the court, a case should be made up, stating the facts as found by the court, in the nature of a special verdict, and the judgment of the court thereon. If testimony has been received after objection, or overruled, as incompetent or irrelevant, it should be stated, so that this court may judge whether it was competent, relevant, or material, in a just decision of the case. See Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 427.

In Field v. The United States, 9 Pet. 202, Marshall, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: 'As the case was not tried by a jury, the exception to the admission of evidence was not properly the subject of a bill of exceptions. But if the District Court improperly admitted the evidence, the only effect would be, that this court would reject that evidence, and proceed to decide the cause as if it were not on the record. It would not, however, of itself, constitute any ground for the reversal of the judgment.' And, again, in The United States v. King, 7 How. 853, 854, it is decided, that 'no exception can be taken where there is no jury, and where the question of law is decided in delivering the final decision of the court.' And, 'when the court decides the fact without the intervention of a jury, the admission of illegal testimony, even if material, is not of itself a ground for reversing the judgment, nor is it properly the subject of a bill of exceptions.'

It is alleged, also, that there is error on the face of this record, because the court allowed the whole amount levied from the property of the plaintiffs below, being the amount of the notes and costs; because, by art. 1929 of the Code of Louisiana, 'the damages due for delay in the performance of an obligation are called interest. The creditor is entitled to these damages without proving any loss, and whatever loss he may have suffered he can recover no more.' But we are of opinion that this objection is founded on a mistake of the nature of the action, which is not brought on the notes mentioned in the petition, but for damages suffered by the plaintiffs below, on account of the non-performance by the defendant of his stipulations contained in his act of partition. This case, therefore, comes within the art. 1924 of the code, which says: 'The obligations of contracts extending to whatsoever is incident to such contracts, the party who violates them is liable, as one of the incidents of his obligations, to the payment of the damages which the other party has sustained by his default.'

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed with costs.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisinia, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and damages, at the rate of six per centum per annum.