Washington v. General Motors Corporation/Opinion of the Court

[p111] MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiffs are 18 States who, by this motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, seek to invoke this Court's original jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Named as defendants are the Nation's four major automobile manufacturers and their trade association.

Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy among the defendants to restrain the development of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment. They allege that the conspiracy began as early as 1953 but was concealed until January 1969. Count I of the proposed complaint charges a violation of the federal antitrust laws. Count II charges a common-law conspiracy in restraint of [p112] trade independently of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring the defendants to undertake "an accelerated program of spending, research and development designed to produce a fully effective pollution control device or devices and/or pollution free engine at the earliest feasible date" and also ordering defendants to install effective pollution control devices in all motor vehicles they manufactured during the conspiracy and as standard equipment in all future motor vehicles which they manufacture. Other prophylactic relief is also sought.

The proposed complaint plainly presents important questions of vital national importance. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Our jurisdiction over the controversy cannot be disputed. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439; Georgia v. Tennessee Cooper Co., 206 U.S. 230. For reasons which will appear, however, we deny leave to file the bill of complaint.

The gravamen of plaintiffs' allegations is a horizontal conspiracy among the major automobile manufacturers to impede the research and development of automotive air pollution control devices. See generally L. Jaffe & L. Tribe, Environmental Protection 141-180 (1971). It [p113] is argued that the facts alleged in support of the statutory and common-law claims are identical and that they could be elicited as well as by a Special Master appointed by this Court as by a federal district court judge, and that resort to a Special Master would not place a burden on this Court's time and resources substantially greater than when we hear an antitrust case on direct appeal from a district court under the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 29. And it is argued that the sheer number of States that seek to invoke our original jurisdiction in this motion is reason enough for us to grant leave to file.

The breadth of the constitutional grand of this Court's original jurisdiction dictates that we be able to exercise discretion over the cases we hear under this jurisdictional head lest our ability to administer our appellate docket be impaired. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19; Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497-499; H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 259-260 (1953); Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 691; Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 694-700. In Massachusetts v. Missouri, supra, at 18-19, where Massachusetts sought to invoke our original jurisdiction in order to collect a tax claim, we said: "'In the exercise of our original jurisdiction so as truly to fulfill the constitutional purpose we not only must look to the nature of the interest of the complaining State—the essential quality of the right asserted—but we must also inquire whether recourse to that jurisdiction... is necessary for the State's protection.... To open this Court to [p114] actions by States to recover taxes claimed to be payable by citizens of other States, in the absence of facts showing the necessity for such intervention, would be to assume a burden which the grant of original jurisdiction cannot be regarded as compelling this Court to assume and which might seriously interfere with the discharge by this Court of its duty in deciding the cases and controversies appropriately brought before it.'"

By the same token, we conclude that the availability of the federal district court as an alternative forum and the nature of the relief requested suggest we remit the parties to the resolution of their controversies in the customary forum. The nature of the remedy which may be necessary, if a case for relief is made out, also argues against taking original jurisdiction.

Air pollution is, of course, one of the most notorious types of public nuisance in modern experience. Congress has not, however, found a uniform, nationwide solution to all aspects of this problem and, indeed, has declared "that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments." 81 Stat. 485, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (a)(3). To be sure, Congress has largely pre-empted the field with regard to "emissions from new motor vehicles," 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a (a); 31 Fed. Reg. 5170 (1966); and motor vehicle fuels and fuel additives, 84 Stat. 1699, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c (c)(4). See Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083 (1970); Hill, The Politics of Air Pollution: Public Interest and Pressure Groups, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 37, 44-45 (1968); Stevens, Air Pollution and the Federal System: Responses to Felt Necessities, 22 Hastings L.J. 661, 674-676 (1971). It has also pre-empted the field so far as emissions from airplanes are concerned, 42 U.S.C. [p115] §§ 1857f-9 to 1857f-12. So far as factories, incinerators, and other stationary devices are implicated, the States have broad control to an extent not necessary to relate here. See Stevens, supra, passim; Comment, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1474 (1970). But in certain instances, as, for example, where federal primary and secondary ambient air quality standards have been established, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 and 1857c-5, or where "hazardous air pollutant[s]" have been defined, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-7, there may be federal pre-emption. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 et seq. Moreover, geophysical characteristics which define local and regional airsheds are often significant considerations in determining the steps necessary to abate air pollution. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 (1967); Coons, Air Pollution & Government Structure, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. [p116] 48, 60-64 (1968). Thus, measures which might be adequate to deal with pollution in a city such as San Francisco, might be grossly inadequate in a city such as Phoenix, where geographical and meteorological conditions trap aerosols and particulates.

As a matter of law as well as practical necessity corrective remedies for air pollution, therefore, necessarily must be considered in the context of localized situations. We conclude that the causes should be heard in the appropriate federal district courts.

The motions of the States of North Dakota and West Virginia to be joined as parties plaintiff are granted. The motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied and the parties are remitted without prejudice to the other federal forum.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.