Washington Alexandria and Georgetown Steam-Packet Company v. Sickles

THESE two cases were brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

They related to the same subject-matter, and were argued together. The first case was an action brought by Sickles and Cook for their share of the earnings of the steam-packet company by the use of their cut-off from March 13, 1846, to October 19, 1846; the second for the same earnings from October 13, 1846, up to December 26, 1855.

The case was before this court at a preceding term, viz: December term, 1850, and is reported in 10 Howard, 419. The suit there was for earnings from 20th August, 1844, to March, 1846.

When the mandate went down a new trial was had, (the judgment of the court below having been reversed by this court,) which took place at October term, 1855. The plaintiffs below, Sickles and Cook, had in the mean time amended their pleadings according to the evidence as given on the first trial, by making the declaration consist of a special count and the common money counts. The record entries were as follows, relative to this trial in 1855:

Narr. Non assumpsit and issue.

November 22. July sworn; verdict for plaintiffs; damages $1,695.79, with interest from March 16, 1846; verdict rendered 7th December.

December 14. Judgment for plaintiffs on the first count in the declaration.

December 14, 1855. Appeal bond, writ of error, citation, &c.

The writ of error thus sued out was not prosecuted, and the case was docketed and dismissed, under the rule, with costs, on December 19, 1856. Of course this was done at the instance of the counsel for Sickles and Cook.

On the 26th of December, 1855, the suits now in question were brought by Sickles and Cook. The declaration consisted of two special counts and the common money counts, which were afterward abandoned, and the case went to trial on the two special counts. It resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs for $16,388.25.

On the trial of each of the two last-mentioned cases in the court below, the plaintiffs contended that by the verdict and judgment rendered in the case tried in 1855, between said plaintiffs and defendant, the existence of the contract as set forth in the two first counts of their declarations in said causes, (which was identical with that set forth in the declaration in said first-mentioned cause,) and the rate of saving ascertained by said experiments, were judicially settled between said plaintiffs and defendant; and that in all subsequent suits between the same parties on said contract, the said defendant was estopped to deny the same, or the rate of saving fixed by the experiment provided for by said contract, and the court below so ruled. The defendant excepted to the ruling of the court, and presented objections in various forms by different exceptions.

The reader will perceive that the principal question brought before this court by the bills of exception was that relating to the doctrine of estoppel, when taken in connection with the order or the Circuit Court passed on the 14th December, 1855, ordering judgment to be entered on the first count of the declaration.

The case was argued by Mr. Badger and Mr. Carlisle for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Bradley and Mr. Stone for the defendants.

The whole doctrine of estoppel was reviewed, and also that of docket entries as being records. In order to give some account of the views of the counsel upon the first subject, the following may be referred to as a small branch of the argument.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error said:

Now, the rule we take to be this. If, in the former proceeding, the title of the party has been directly alleged, and an issue taken upon it which involves no other matter, or if any fact being part of that title has been thus separated from all other matters and made the point of an issue, the finding upon it may in such subsequent suit be relied on in pleading as a technical estoppel, and not otherwise. And that where in the former suit there has not been such separation of the title from all other matters, but the same has been involved in a general issue with other matters, whether this arise from the mode of pleading adopted by the parties, or required by the nature of the action, no finding thereon can either establish or disaffirm the title so as to estop either of the parties in a subsequent suit; and that if it cannot operate as an estoppel by pleading, neither can it have the effect of an estoppel when given in evidence to the jury.

This is the undoubted law in England; which is proved by the case of Outram v. Morewood, already cited, where Lord Ellenborough shows the true nature and office of an estoppel as distinguished from a bar; by the case of Evelyn v. Hayes, cited with approbation in Outram v. Morewood, and tried before Lord Mansfield, which is precisely in point; by Hooper v. Hooper, McCl. and Young, 509, where, in an action for obstructing a way, the record of a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in a former action, had on the plea of not guilty, was given in evidence, and it was held not to be conclusive of the plaintiff's right so as to prevent the defendant from going into his case; by Miles v. Rose, 5 Taunt. 704; and by the case of Carter v. James, 13 M. and W., 137; and there is no English case to the contrary.

It is true that different views prevail in the several States of the Union-some holding the English doctrine, and some admitting, in aid of the record, parol evidence to show on what points the case turned, of the most dangerous and latitudinarian scope and tendency, upon the notion that certainty was to be obtained by evidence in its nature the most uncertain, and that there was no danger in allowing one trial upon a general issue to conclude a question of title.

Mr. Justice GRIER, when delivering the opinion of this court, in the case of Richardson v. Boston, (19 How.,) takes notice of this contrariety of opinion in the several States; and we submit that the present is a fit occasion for this high tribunal to lay down a rule which may tend to introduce order and consistency into the decisions in the States, and at all events to establish the true rule in this District. Here the court is trammeled by no State decisions establishing a local law, to which respect must be paid, whether right or wrong.

And we submit that the English decisions are in every respect entitled to the highest authority. They show the rule of the English law from the earliest times-from the Year Books down-of that common here, which is still maintained by our ancestors and established here, which is till maintained in many of the States in its original simplicity and directness, and which ought not to be subject to capricious variations by judges speculation how, in this age of progress, they can amend what they have no rightful authority to alter-what they are appointed to expound, and apply, and preserve, until the legislative power shall interpose to change it.

If this court should adopt the exposition of the law established in England, the rule is clear beyond controversy, that in a second action for a second injury to the same right or title, a verdict and judgment for a plaintiff on the plea of not guilty in a former suit cannot be used as an estoppel in pleading, and cannot be conclusive of the right when given in evidence to the jury.

And does not this rule apply to and settle our case? Ours it an action of assumpsit. There is no English case in assumpsit to which the rule has been applied, because no case has happened in which it could have been applied. Before Slade's case, as Lord Loughborough has shown, this action was never brought to recover a debt under the name of damages, but only to recover special damages for a breach of promise, as, for example, to recover on account of a breach of a promise to deliver corn, by which the plaintiff was obliged to buy corn at a higher price.

See Rudder v. Price, 1 Hen. Bl., pages 550 and 551, n. (a.)

Since the 29 Car. II no such case could well arise, since all contracts not to be performed within a year were avoided by that statute, unless reduced to writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith. Hence, cases resting upon mere verbal evidence could not present such a question, and if the contract was in writing, there would be no occasion to call in the aid of the former proceedings. But no case on an assumpsit where this question could have arisen has been found, so far as we know, in any English reports. Nothing is said against the application of the rule to it, nor intimated, and the case now before the court is precisely within the principle on which the cases establishing the rule are founded.

Upon the particular point decided by this court the counsel for the defendants in error said:

III. Are the plaintiffs to be deprived of the benefit of the estoppel for the reason that, when the verdict was rendered, the declaration, in addition to the special count in the contract, contained also common counts?

The jury by their verdict necessarily found the statements of fact in all the counts of the declaration to be true. The theory of several counts is that they represent distinct and independent transactions, otherwise the declaration would be subject to the charge of duplicity. When the verdict was rendered the plaintiffs might have had it entered on the first count, and the judgment following the verdict, there could have been no question as to the estoppel in this case, (if there can be an estoppel in any case,) for that count sets forth the contract and experiment, with the result of it.

This will hardly be doubted. Yet why is it, if not because the verdict found the truth of the allegation in each count?

Although the plaintiffs did not, when the verdict was rendered, have it entered on the first count alone, yet they subsequently had the verdict amended and applied to that count by the court, who were satisfied that the evidence given applied to it, and not to the other counts. That the court had power to do this is well settled, and an amendment may be made even after writ of error brought and argued in the upper court.

See Matheson, administrator, v. Grant, administrator, 2 Howard, 281, 282.

See Stockton et al. v. Bishop, 4 How., 167.

Bank of the United States v. Moss, 6 How., 39, shows that at a subsequent term, after judgment has been arrested, the verdict may be amended and applied to the good count.

See, also, Parker v. Turner et al., 12 How., 45, as to amendments of verdicts at common law, and also the effect of the 32d section of the Judiciary act of 1789. If courts have power to amend verdicts for one purpose, there can be no good reason why they should not for another, when the amendment is made to apply the verdict to the count on which the testimony was given, particularly when the one purpose is as meritorious as the other. It may be that the amendment of the verdict in the case tried in 1855 is not regularly noted, but it is sufficiently shown by the entry of the judgment, by order of court, as the judgment must follow the verdict. This could not have been urged in a direct proceeding on that judgment, but would have been cured by the 32d section of the Judiciary act of 1789.

See 12 How., 45, and 4 How., 167.

It can hardly be an objection in a collateral proceeding.

This doctrine of estoppel is not a mere technical rule, tending to exclude truth, but it is based on sound principles of public policy. Society has an interest in putting an end to litigation, and preventing the unnecessary repetition of it. Courts are established for the benefit of the community, not to encourage the litigious spirit of individuals. This case is a striking illustration of the necessity of such a rule. The trial of the questions now disputed occupied the time of the court and jury below for fourteen business days. It does not appear that there was a motion for a new trial; if made, it was overruled before judgment was entered.

No writ of error was prosecuted.

Under such circumstances, public policy forbids a retrial of facts thus established.

The defendants had a fair trial as to the contract-had nine years to prepare for the trial, and should now abide by its result.

See Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 1, sec. 531, R. 2.

Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 131.

'Interest republicae ut sit finis litium.' Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.