War Guilt Information Program memorandum, 3 March 1948

CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

Civil Information and Education Section

3 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CIE.

SUBJECT: War Guilt Information Program

I. THE PRO? PRESENTED
 * 1. To determine the advisability and feasibility of initiating a high priority information program designed to
 * a. offset a growing tendency on the part of certain Japanese and Americans to consider the use of the atom bomb at Hiroshima as "an atrocity" and
 * b. prepare the Japanese public for the verdicts the IMTFE.

II. FACTS SEARING ON THE PROBLEM
 * 1. Under General Orders No. 4 (SCAP), dated 2 October 1945 as amended by General Orders No. 14 (SCAP), dated 17 October 1945, General Orders No. 27 (SCAP), dated 3 June 1946 (Tab A), one of the function of CIE is to:
 * "a. make recommendations to:
 * (3) Make clear to all levels of the Japanese public the true facts of their defeat, their war guilt, the responsibility of the militarists for present and future Japanese suffering and privation and the reasons for and objectives of the military occupation of the Allied Powers."


 * 2. In accomplishing its mission, CIE first initiated a War Guilt Information Program extending through the period, October 1945 to June 1946. This program was implemented through all public information media in Japan; newspapers (Tab B), books (Tab C), magazines (Tab D), radio (Tab E), and motion pictures (Tab F).


 * 3. Early in 1946 (overlapping to a certain extent the program described in paragram two above) a second information program was initiated and has continued to the present. This program carried a more positive tone of democratisation and hope for the future of Japan as an orderly, peaceful member of the family of nations. ?rring references have been made, however, to the ? of the war, Japanese war guilt and war crimes. Some of these references have been continuous? ? point?. This program has been implemented through the press (Tab G), the radio (Tab H), motion pictures (Tab I), and books (Tab J).


 * 4. Information recently received from G-2 (CIS) and other sources indi-ates that:


 * a. some indivisuals and groups in Japan, inspired by writings and public remarks of certain scientists, clergyman, suthers, journalists and professtioinal de-g??dere in the United States, are br?nding the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as "str??ities." There is also a growing feeling among some of these Americans, reflested in ?ding of the certain Japanese, that whatever educational or phil?nthropie movements are undertaken in Hiroshima with American ? should be done in a apirit of "ato?" for the alleged astrosity.


 * b. There is a growing feeling among certain Japanese, particularly among there seeking? to justify to the world and the Japanese the nation's aggression and ultra-nationalism, that Tojo has stated the case e??vonnigly and should be admired by the Japanese people for his courage This could even extend to martyrdom of Tojo, in the event of his ?


 * c. Both of these points ?tinte a foundation upon which the new qu? ultra-nationalists ?vable might seek to rebuild their structure after the Occupation has been terminated.

III. CONCLUSION


 * 1. Descpite the information program implenmented to date by CIE, new developments indicate that an extensive and intensive information program is nessesary, designed to counter ?rrent and/or suspented attitudes relating to misinterpretations of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings, the water crimes trials, and the Tojo role, and possible ? of totaliterini?? as a result of these misinterpretations.


 * 2. That the prastiembility of any such information program will be determined by the extreme care with which it is banled in order that it will achive the desired ends and not prove inimical to other objectives of the Occupetion.

IV. RECOMMENDATION:


 * That the preliminary draft of the proposed information program attended as Tab "K" approved.

V. CONCURRENCE


 * G-2 __________________

CONFIDENTIAL