Walton v. Arizona/Dissent Stevens

Justice STEVENS, dissenting.

While I join Justice BLACKMUN's dissent, I write separately to dissent from the Court's holding in Part II and to comment on Justice SCALIA's opinion. I

The Court holds in Part II of its opinion that a person is not entitled to a jury determination of facts that must be established before the death penalty may be imposed. I am convinced that the Sixth Amendment requires the opposite conclusion.

Arizona Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-1105(C) (1989) provides that first-degree murder, which includes both premeditated murder and felony murder, is "punishable by death or life imprisonment as provided by § 13-703." Section 13-703(B) requires, after guilt of first-degree murder is established, that a judge conduct a hearing to determine if any statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist. The State bears the burden of proving the existence of any aggravating circumstance by evidence admissible under the Arizona Rules of Evidence. § 13-703(C). Section 13-703(E) then provides, as the Arizona Supreme Court has explained: "Where none of the statutory aggravating circumstances are found to be present, our statute prohibits the death penalty. Where one or more statutory aggravating circumstance is found, and no mitigation exists, the statute requires the death penalty. Where both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found in a given case, the trial judge, and then this court on review, must determine whether the mitigating circumstances are 'sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.' "  State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 55, 659 P.2d 1, 13 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). Thus, under Arizona law, as construed by Arizona's highest court, a first-degree murder is not punishable by a death sentence until at least one statutory aggravating circumstance has been proved.

In this case, the sentencing judge found two aggravating circumstances: that petitioner committed the offense "as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value" and that he committed it "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 13-703(F)(5), (F)(6) (1989). At issue is the narrow question whether these findings about petitioner's commission of the offense are, under Arizona law, elements of a capital crime and therefore must be determined by a jury.

If this question had been posed in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment became law, the answer would have been clear. By that time,

"the English jury's role in determining critical facts in     homicide cases was entrenched.  As fact-finder, the jury had      the power to determine not only whether the defendant was      guilty of homicide but also the degree of the offense.  Moreover, the jury's role in finding facts that      would determine a homicide defendant's eligibility for      capital punishment was particularly well established.      Throughout its history, the jury determined which homicide      defendants would be subject to capital punishment by making      factual determinations, many of which related to difficult      assessments of the defendant's state of mind.  By the time      the Bill of Rights was adopted, the jury's right to make      these determinations was unquestioned."

Similarly, if this question had arisen in 1968, when this Court held the guarantee of trial by jury in criminal prosecutions binding on the States, I do not doubt that petitioner again would have prevailed. Justice WHITE's eloquent opinion for the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), was faithful to the history and meaning of the Sixth Amendment:

"The history of trial by jury in criminal cases has been     frequently told.  It is sufficient for present purposes to      say that by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial      in criminal cases had been in existence in England for      several centuries and carried impressive credentials traced      by many to Magna Carta.  Its preservation and proper      operation as a protection against arbitrary rule were among      the major objectives of the revolutionary settlement which      was expressed in the Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689.  In the 18th century Blackstone could      write:

" 'Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and     two-fold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury,      between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of      the crown.  It was necessary, for preserving the admirable      balance of our constitution, to vest the executive power of      the laws in the prince:  and yet this power might be      dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if      exerted without check or control, by justices of oyer and      terminer occasionally named by the crown;  who might then,      as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man      that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant      declaration that such is their will and pleasure.  But the      founders of the English law have, with excellent forecast,      contrived that . . . the truth of every accusation, whether      preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal,      should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of      twelve of his equals and neighbors, indifferently chosen and      superior to all suspicion.'

"Jury trial came to America with English colonists, and     received strong support from them.

.   .    .    ..

"The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State     Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in      which law should be enforced and justice administered.  A      right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in      order to prevent oppression by the Government.  Those who      wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that      it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal      charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too      responsive to the voice of higher authority.  The framers of      the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary      but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary      action.  Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his      peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt      or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,      or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the     common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but      perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was      to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the     Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental      decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to      entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the      citizen to one judge or to a group of judges."  Id., at      151-152, 155-156, 88 S.Ct., at 1448-1449, 1450-1451      (footnotes omitted).

Since Duncan, this Court has held that a death sentence under Florida law may be imposed by a judge, rather than a jury, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), and has held that a judge may make a factual determination that mandates imposition of a minimum sentence within the penalty range of certain noncapital offenses, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). By stretching the limits of sentencing determinations that are made by judges exposed to "the voice of higher authority," these decisions have encroached upon the factfinding function that has so long been entrusted to the jury. Further distorting the sentencing function to encompass findings of factual elements necessary to establish a capital offense is the unhappy product of the gradual "increase and spread" of these precedents, "to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous concern." Even if the unfortunate decisions in Spaziano and McMillan fell just one step short of the stride the Court takes today, it is not too late to change our course and follow the wise and inspiring voice that spoke for the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana.

Justice SCALIA announces in a separate opinion that henceforth he will not regard Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), and other cases adopting their reasoning as binding precedent. The major premise for this rejection of our capital sentencing jurisprudence is his professed inability to reconcile those cases with the central holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Although

The cases that Justice SCALIA categorically rejects today rest on the theory that the risk of arbitrariness condemned in Furman is a function of the size of the class of convicted persons who are eligible for the death penalty. When Furman was decided, Georgia included virtually all defendants convicted of forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnaping, and first-degree murder in that class. As the opinions in Furman observed, in that large class of cases race and other irrelevant factors unquestionably played an unacceptable role in determining which defendants would die and which would live. However, the size of the class may be narrowed to reduce sufficiently that risk of arbitrariness, even if a jury is then given complete discretion to show mercy when evaluating the individual characteristics of the few individuals who have been found death eligible.

The elaborate empirical study of the administration of Georgia's capital sentencing statute that the Court considered in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), further illustrates the validity of this theory. In my opinion in that case I observed:

"One of the lessons of the Baldus study is that there exist     certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which      prosecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently      impose, the death penalty without regard to the race of the      victim or the race of the offender.  If Georgia were to      narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to those      categories, the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory      imposition of the death penalty would be significantly      decreased, if not eradicated." Id., at 367, 107 S.Ct., at     1806 (dissenting opinion).

The Georgia Supreme Court itself understood the concept that Justice SCALIA apparently has missed. In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), we quoted the following excerpt from its opinion analogizing the law governing homicides in Georgia to a pyramid:

" 'All cases of homicide of every category are contained     within the pyramid.  The consequences flowing to the      perpetrator increase in severity as the cases proceed from      the base of the apex, with the death penalty applying only to      those few cases which are contained in the space just beneath      the apex.  To reach that category a case must pass through      three planes of division between the base and the apex.

" 'The first plane of division above the base separates     from all homicide cases those which fall into the category of murder.  This plane is established by the legislature in      statutes defining terms such as murder, voluntary      manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and justifiable      homicide.  In deciding whether a given case falls above or      below this plane, the function of the trier of facts is      limited to finding facts.  The plane remains fixed unless      moved by legislative act.

" 'The second plane separates from all murder cases     those in which the penalty of death is a possible punishment.      This plane is established by statutory definitions of      aggravating circumstances.  The function of the factfinder is      again limited to making a determination of whether certain      facts have been established.  Except where there is treason      or aircraft hijacking, a given case may not move above this      second plane unless at least one statutory aggravating      circumstance exists.  Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(c).

" 'The third plane separates, from all cases in which a     penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it      shall be imposed.  There is an absolute discretion in the      factfinder to place any given case below the plane and not      impose death.  The plane itself is established by the      factfinder.  In establishing the plane, the factfinder      considers all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and      aggravation of punishment.  Code Ann. § 27-2503 and §      27-2534.1.  There is a final limitation on the imposition of      the death penalty resting in the automatic appeal procedure:      This court determines whether the penalty of death was      imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any      other arbitrary factor;  whether the statutory aggravating      circumstances are supported by the evidence;  and whether the      sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the      penalty imposed in similar cases. Code Ann. § 27-2537.     Performance of this function may cause this court to remove a      case from the death penalty category but can never have the      opposite result.

" 'The purpose of the statutory aggravating     circumstances is to limit to a large degree, but not      completely, the factfinder's discretion.  Unless at least one      of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the      death penalty may not be imposed in any event.  If there      exists at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the      death penalty may be imposed but the factfinder has a      discretion to decline to do so without giving any reason.      Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 369, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981);      Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 334, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977);      Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S.E.2d 37 (1977).  In      making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder takes      into consideration all circumstances before it from both the      guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial.  These      circumstances relate both to the offense and the defendant.

" 'A case may not pass the second plane into that area     in which the death penalty is authorized unless at least one      statutory aggravating circumstance is found.  However, this      plane is passed regardless of the number of statutory      aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is at least      one.  Once beyond this plane, the case enters the area of the      factfinder's discretion, in which all the facts and      circumstances of the case determine, in terms of our      metaphor, whether or not the case passes the third plane and      into the area in which the death penalty is imposed.'  250      Ga. 97, 99-100, 297 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1982)." Id., at 870-872,     103 S.Ct., at 2739-2740.

Justice SCALIA ignores the difference between the base of the pyramid and its apex. A rule that forbids unguided discretion at the base is completely consistent with one that requires discretion at the apex. After narrowing the class of cases to those at the tip of the pyramid, it is then appropriate to allow the sentencer discretion to show mercy based on individual mitigating circumstances in the cases that remain.

Perhaps a rule that allows the specific facts of particular cases to make the difference between life and death-a rule that is consistent with the common-law tradition of case-by-case adjudication-provides less certainty than legislative guidelines that mandate the death penalty whenever specified conditions are met. Such guidelines would fit nicely in a Napoleonic Code drafted in accord with the continental approach to the formulation of legal rules. However, this Nation's long experience with mandatory death sentences-a history recounted at length in our opinion in Woodson and entirely ignored by Justice SCALIA today has led us to reject such rules. I remain convinced that the approach adopted by this Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910), and in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958), followed by Justice Stewart, Justice Powell, and myself in 1976, and thereafter repeatedly endorsed by this Court, is not only wiser, but far more just, than the reactionary position espoused by Justice SCALIA today.