Waller v. Texas & Pacific Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

To establish a trust against the Texas & Pacific Company it is argued that the purpose of the act of Congress of 1871 was to provide for the construction of a transcontinental railroad from Texas to San Diego, cal., and from thence to San Francisco by another company, and that the Baton Rouge Company, the New Orleans Company and principally the Texas & Pacific Company were instruments of that purpose and the grant of the Baton Rouge Company, by its mortgage to the Union Trust Company, became charged with a lien for the payment of the bonds issued by the railroad company, which lien followed the conveyance of the lands to the New Orleans Company and to the Texas & Pacific Company, and that besides there was a personal trust first in the Union Trust Company and successively in the other companies. And the argument is attempted to be fortified by section 4 of the act of Congress of 1871, which authorized the Texas & Pacific Company to acquire other railroad corporations, and was by section 6 to become responsible for the debts or obligations of any company so acquired.

To sustain this contention the provisions of the various instruments are adduced and their requirements, especially that the bonds were entitled to the benefit and security of a sinking fund to be set apart for their redemption whereby the proceeds of all lands granted to the railroad company (the Baton Rouge Company) were to be applied to the payment of interest on the bonds and to their redemption and also 1 per cent. of the gross earnings of the company, and that the railroad and its equipment were mortgaged for like purposes and all 'the lands and sections of land situated, lying and being on either side of the said railroad, as the same may be finally located and constructed in accordance with and as granted by the act of Congress' of March 3, 1871.

The mortgage to the Union Trust Company was in trust for the purposes expressed above and it was provided that, if default should be made in payment of interest or of any payment to the sinking fund and continue for the period of 6 months or in default of any requirement of the mortgage, all of the bonds outstanding, at the option of the holders of a majority in interest of such outstanding bonds, should forthwith become due and payable. And further, upon written request of the holders of at least 1000 bonds then out standing, the trustee should foreclose the equity of redemption of the property embraced in the hypothecation, and at the request of a bondholder might take possession of the road.

Sales of the lands were provided for and the disposition of the proceeds, any balance remaining to be appropriated to the purpose of the sinking fund. There was a covenant by the company to pay on June 1, 1880, and on the 1st of June of each succeeding year a sum which should equal 1 per cent. of the gross earnings received by the road from its operation 12 months immediately preceding, which sum should be applied by the trust company or its successors to the redemption of the bonds, and that the trust company on the 1st days of January and July of each and every year should designate by lot for redemption a number of bonds sufficient to equal, as near as might be, the accumulations of the sinking fund and cause a notice to be printed of such purpose.

It is contended that by reason of these provisions and the facts detailed a trust was created that followed the lands to whosesoever hands they reached and each possessor of them became a trustee and bound with respect to the property to the execution of the trust in the same manner as the original trustee, the Union Trust Company, was citing for this result Ketchum v. City of St. Louis, 101 U.S. 306, 25 L. ed. 999.

And by virtue of this principle the New Orleans Company is declared to have been a trustee and the lands granted to it subject to the execution of the trust and the Texas & Pacific Company has also become a trustee.

Another ground of liability is asserted against the latter company. It has been consolidated, the contention is, with the New Orleans Company and the latter has disappeared from sight and significance, leaving the Texas & Pacific in sole responsibility. And yet the instrument of consolidation expressly excepts 'the lands and the land grants acquired or to be acquired' by the New Orleans Company from the United States, the state of Louisiana, or the Baton Rouge Company, or from any other source, other than lands necessary or needful for railway purposes. There is an express exemption and exclusion of such from the provisions of the instrument of consolidation. And it was provided that the corporate existence of the New Orleans Company should be maintained and its power to carry out the existing contracts and to mortgage any land grant it had acquired or might acquire from the Baton Rouge Company or otherwise should remain unimpaired.

There is, therefore, some ground for the contention of the Texas & Pacific Company that there is a want of that privity of property which, according to the insistence of appellant, is necessary to make that company trustee of the Baton Rouge Company's mortgage of 1872, and that sections 4 and 6 of the act incorporating the Texas & Pacific Company have not the meaning ascribed to them, and further that the Baton Rouge Company never acquired any lands to which a lien could attach, and that the asserted trust had nothing upon which it could be exercised, neither lands to sell nor railroad to take possession of and operate, both of which-sale of lands and operation of road-were necessary to the execution of the trust, and that it was so determined in a suit against proper parties by the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

To this contention complainants reply: (1) The decree was collusively obtained; (2) it did not cover the right of way and roadbed which, it is said, is admitted to have come to the Texas & Pacific Company from the New Orleans Company; (3) independently of the deed of trust and irrespective of it, the arrangement between those companies was an attempt to conserve the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders of the Baton Rouge Company at the expense of its creditors; an attempt, it is insisted, always judicially condemned. Cases are cited, among others, N. P. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931.

The argument to sustain or oppose the respective contentions we need not recite. They have indication in the pleadings and, it may be, in what we have already said. We rest our decision on the defense of laches which, we think, has been sustained.

In 1872 the Baton Rouge Company executed the instrument the particular trusts of which are now attempted to be enforced. Before that time it had filed a map of general route but no map of definite location; but after that time the record discloses nothing done by it until 1880, when it conveyed the lands to the New Orleans Company.

The activities of the New Orleans Company are shown and through and by what struggles it was enabled to construct the road. The record shows assertion of rights by some of the bondholders, but also shows that the assertion was met by challenge of legality and judicially determined against. During all that time, during all of the notoriety of the transactions detailed, the owner or owners of the bonds in suit made no claim by word or act and now, over 10 years after their maturity and 40 years after their issue, a claim of personal liability is made against the Texas & Pacific Company. It is to be borne in mind that the interest on the bonds has always been in default, certainly since 1876, and there was remedy provided for such default. At the instance of any holder of the bonds the trustee could have taken possession of the road, and, if of the Baton Rouge Road, then of its successors in liability, the New Orleans and the Texas & Pacific Companies, for if they were successors in liability they were successively subject to the remedy. If it be said that such remedy was extreme and inconvenient, it had potency as a threat in the hands of a diligent creditor, and, besides, if there was a successive personal liability, it accrued against the New Orleans Company in 1880 and the Texas & Pacific Company in 1883.

The delay is attempted to be excused. It is said action for nonpayment of interest could only be taken by the holders of 1,000 or a majority of bonds outstanding, and that it appears the Texas & Pacific Company had acquired 1,183 of the 1,275 bonds which were outstanding. It is hence contended that complainants' testate could not have been guilty of laches before his death and that the present complainants could not act until the maturity of the bonds in 1902. It is further said that complainants filed a bill in 1908 in the United States District Court in Louisiana to collect the bonds and that until the filing of the answer in that case complainants were ignorant of the merger of the New Orleans and the Texas & Pacific companies or of the suit filed in 1890 to remove the cloud of the asserted lien of the mortgage of the Baton Rouge Company to the Union Trust Company of 1872.

But what complainants' testate knew does not appear and whether he was an original holder or a purchaser, except that it was thought he owned the bonds for 7 or 8 years before his death. And the ignorance of complainants is extraordinary in view of their interest, if it was an attentive interest. If we may suppose ignorance of records we cannot suppose, certainly not indulge, an ignorance of the open activities of the companies and the possession and operation of the railroad by the Texas & Pacific Company.

It is again said in excuse that it does not appear that the Texas & Pacific Company has changed its position, which it is said is the same as it was in 1881, and that it has even realized the benefit of the trust and so far executed it as to pay before 1890 most of the bonds. Why those bonds were paid or acquired and upon what motive do not appear, and it cannot be said that a company which has been in possession of and operating a great property for many years, having spent large sums of money upon it, in the belief of having a clear and unincumbered right, is inequitably unaffected by a claim against it, asserted as a result of remote transactions with which it had no connection. And certainly it may be urged that it would surprise and strain any condition to be suddenly called upon to pay $107,700, that sum being the amount of principal and interest (7 per cent.) of complainants' demand.

Decree affirmed.