Walker v. Walker's Executor/Opinion of the Court

The bill here seeks to charge the estate of Dr. Walker, in the hands of his executors, with a trust in favor of his widow. The court below found that the trust existed and was valid, and this appeal seeks to review that decision as erroneous.

Two principal questions are presented for consideration:

1st. Is the trust created by the articles of separation in this case valid, and will a court of equity enforce it?

2d. Can a husband be a trustee for his wife; and if so, did Dr. Walker constitute himself such a trustee or not?

It is contended that deeds of separation between husband and wife cannot be upheld, because it is against public policy to allow parties sustaining that relation to vary their duties and responsibilities by entering into an agreement which contemplates a partial dissolution of the marriage contract. If the question were before us, unaffected by decision, it would present difficulties, for it cannot be doubted that there are serious objections to voluntary separations between married persons. But contracts of this nature for the separate maintenance of the wife, through the intervention of a trustee, have received the sanction of the courts in England and in this country for so long a period of time that the law on the subject must be considered as settled.

It is true that different judges, in discussing the question, have struggled against maintaining the principle; but while doing so they have not felt themselves at liberty to disregard it, on account of the great weight of authority with which it was supported, and have, therefore, uniformly adhered to it. It is unnecessary to consider whether the extent to which the doctrine has been carried meets our approbation, nor are we required to discuss the subject in any aspect which this case does not present. It is enough for the purposes of this suit to say that a covenant by the husband for the maintenance of the wife, contained in a deed of separation between them, through the medium of trustees, where the consideration is apparent, is valid, and will be enforced in equity, if it appears that the deed was not made in contemplation of a future possible separation, but in respect to one which was to occur immediately, or for the continuance of one that had already taken place. And this is especially true if the separation was occasioned by the misconduct of the husband, and the provision for the wife's support was reasonable under the circumstances, and no more than a court, before which she was entitled to carry her grievances, would have decreed to her as alimony. In this state of the law on the subject, it is clear the deed of settlement in controversy was unobjectionable. It is equally clear that the separation accomplished by it was the best thing for the parties at the time, and that it ultimately led to a reunion which lasted over fourteen years. The evidence shows that the bad conduct of Dr. Walker to his wife justified her in leaving him, and entitled her to a legal separation at the hands of a court, with alimony in proportion to the value of his estate. For many reasons, which are apparent without stating them, it was desirable, if possible, to avoid a judicial investigation, and accordingly negotiations to this end were commenced on the part of the husband, which resulted in securing to the wife a suitable provision for her support. This settlement was made by him, and accepted by her, not only in lieu of alimony, which she could have obtained, but also in place of dower; and the covenant of the trustees against any future claim of alimony, and their agreement that the wife's debts should be paid out of the property conveyed to them, furnished the security to the husband for the permanent arrangement contemplated by the parties. If we consider that the value of the property transferred to the trustees for the benefit of the wife was but little more than the husband received in her right from her father's estate, and that, at the time, he was worth between three and four hundred thousand dollars, it would seem the provision for the wife's maintenance was less than she had a right to demand and ought to have received. If the law authorizes a wife to leave her husband on account of cruel treatment, and to get from him a competent support, it cannot withhold its sanction to the articles of separation concluded between these parties under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence in this case. It is insisted the obligation of the trust was discharged when the wife returned to her husband's house, but this is a mistaken view of the effect of the instrument. It was the intention of the parties that the arrangement should be permanent, and to accomplish that purpose the agreement was framed so that the wife should enjoy her separate estate during life, although she should subsequently become reconciled to her husband, and cohabit with him. We can see no valid objection to such a provision, and it is certainly supported by authority. The husband had a right to make a settlement upon his wife without any view to separation, and the insertion of this provision shows that he did not intend the settlement to cease on the return of the wife to cohabitation. There is no good reason why effect should not be given to the intention of the parties on the subject. If, on grounds of public policy, it is desirable that the parties should be reconciled, whatever tends to promote such a result will receive the favorable consideration of a court of equity. Without this provision there was no inducement for Mrs. Walker to return to her husband; with it she could try to live with him again, and if his previous bad treatment was repeated she was fortified against the contingency of being turned away another time penniless. There was nothing in his previous conduct to inspire her with confidence in his subsequent good behavior, and but for the fact that the means of support were secured to her in case her life became intolerable with him, it is reasonable to infer that she would never have ventured to cohabit with him after the separation. It is clear, then, that this trust was operative during the life of the wife, and that a court of equity will enforce it.

The next inquiry relates to transactions which occurred after the wife returned to her husband at his request, and on which the claim for relief in this case is based. That a husband may be a trustee for his wife, and can be compelled in equity to account for any money or property belonging to her which he has received, in the same manner that a stranger would be held to account, is a doctrine so well settled that it hardly requires a citation of authorities to sustain it.

It makes no difference whether the property which he has received was settled by him upon his wife, or came to her through other sources. If the property was her own separate and exclusive estate and he has agreed to become her trustee respecting it, his liability attaches, and he will be charged with the trust. The property settled upon Mrs. Walker by the articles of separation was her separate estate, and to be enjoyed by her in the same manner as if it had been conveyed to trustees for her benefit, by settlement before marriage. The income secured to her was not suspended by her returning to live with her husband, on his solicitation, nor had he any right to retain it by way of set-off against the expense of her living. If for any cause he desired the state of separation to cease, and invited his wife to return, it was his duty, as it should have been his pleasure, out of his abundant means, to have given her a decent support. What is the evidence touching the question whether Dr. Walker constituted himself the trustee for his wife in respect to the income derived from her separate estate?

It is clear and uncontradicted, that Dr. Walker received the rents and incomes of his wife's estate, from her, on the condition to which he agreed, that he would invest them for her benefit as they were received, and this agreement imposed on him the character of a trustee as to this property. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the grossest fraud. It is not necessary to create the trust that the husband should use any particular form of words, nor need those words be in writing. All that is required is that language should have been employed equivalent to a declaration of trust. That the words which Dr. Walker used constituted him the trustee of his wife, cannot admit of controversy. An attempt is made to discredit the principal witness, by whom the important facts in this case are proved, but it has wholly failed. Her narrative of the occurrences which led to the separation, and of the transactions out of which the trust arises, is intelligently given, does not vary on cross-examination, and bears the impress of truth.

It is insisted that this suit should have been brought in Rhode Island, because Dr. Walker had his domicile in that State when he died, and his will is proved there. But the will was also proved in Massachusetts, where ancillary administration was obtained; and if, as is conceded in such a case, the assets received and inventoried by the executors there are liable to the claims of the citizens of Massachusetts, the citizens of other States will be placed on the same footing in this respect, in the Federal courts sitting in Massachusetts, where there is no suggestion of insolvency. The Circuit Courts of the United States, with full equity powers, have jurisdiction over executors and administrators, where the parties are citizens of different States, and will enforce the same rules in the adjustment of claims against them that the local courts administer in favor of their own citizens.

It is urged that Mrs. Walker is estopped from setting up this claim because she was a party to the indenture of compromise. But if so, she was only a formal party to it, received nothing under it, and was not concerned with the residue of the estate, which it proposed to adjust only after the debts, legacies, and liabilities were paid. Having done nothing to conceal her claim, nor imposed upon the parties to the compromise respecting it, she cannot be considered as having waived her right to prosecute it.

But if this defence is overruled, it is nevertheless contended that Mrs. Walker, by accepting the provisions of her husband's will, waived her right to institute this suit; but this is giving an effect to the acceptance not warranted by the terms of the will, or anything connected with the case. Dr. Walker in his will saw fit to make a limited provision for his wife, and to declare that it was to be received, with the income under the trust deed, in full satisfaction of dower in his estate. Nothing is said about the other trust under which he received the separate property of his wife to be invested, and it is hard to see how his estate can be released from accounting for it, or the status of the complainant affected, because she consents to take under the will what is given her in satisfaction of dower.

It is objected that the executors are not liable to this suit because it was commenced within one year after they gave bonds for the discharge of their trust. But this defence is not now open to the respondents. To have availed themselves of it, it was necessary that it should have been presented at the earliest stage of the proceedings. In not doing so, they will be considered as having waived their right to insist that the suit was brought too soon.

The remaining questions in this case relate to the exceptions of the parties to the master's report. In dealing with these exceptions, it seems to us that all we are required to notice are embraced in three different points of inquiry:

1st. Did the master err in allowing Dr. Walker $2400, as a deduction from the income of the trust property?

2d. Should the interest charged against the trustee be compounded annually, or semi-annually?

3d. Was the trustee entitled to any compensation for his services?

The solution of the first inquiry depends on the effect to be given to the receipt or memorandum signed by the complainant, dated March 27th, 1847. The complainant insists in the adjustment of the account the master mistook the effect of the instrument, and that he should have allowed as a credit against her $1500, instead of $2400. It is not easy, after this lapse of time, to tell the exact basis on which the accounts should be settled with reference to this receipt. It was a memorandum made when the parties were living in harmony, and after Dr. Walker had undertaken to invest for his wife the first check delivered to him by her, and after her purpose was manifest that the entire income of her estate should be invested to provide against the contingencies of the future. And yet this memorandum shows that she so far modified this purpose as to authorize her husband to give for her $1200 to each of her two sons, and expressed the intention of making an equal donation to her other children. The matter was probably adjusted between the parties, and, although there is no proof on the subject, the Circuit Court, doubtless, in approving this part of the master's report, acted on the idea that by long acquiescence it should be treated as having been settled. We cannot say that this view of the subject is wrong, and the exception is, therefore, overruled.

2d. The next exception relates to the manner of computing interest. That Dr. Walker acted in utter disregard of his trust, is too plain for controversy. He treated the money as his own; neither kept nor rendered any account of his trust; and his conduct throughout is irreconcilable with the intention to perform his agreement. There is not a shadow of excuse for his neglect. The reason assigned for it to his daughter, when on his sick-bed, that he had not been able to find safe investments for the money, was the merest pretence. It could not be otherwise, as he was an intelligent man, of large wealth, and well informed on the subject of investing moneys. The condition of his estate shows that he had abundant opportunities for profitable investment on his own account; and if so, how can it truthfully be said he could not find safe investments for the small sums in his hands belonging to his wife? A court of equity, the especial guardian of trusts, will not tolerate excuses of this sort on the part of a trustee, for omitting to discharge his duty to his cestui que trust. There is, therefore, no hesitation in the court to allow, in the adjustment of the trustee's account, the interest to be compounded annually. It has been argued with earnestness that this is a case for severe treatment, and that the master should have allowed semi-annual rests; but we are not at liberty to discuss the subject, as the court are equally divided in opinion upon the question which it presents.

3d. The master was wrong in allowing any compensation to the trustee for his services, and the exception taken to that part of his report is, therefore, sustained. To hold that, in a case like this, the trustee should be allowed compensation, when he literally did nothing towards executing his trust, but on the contrary was guilty of the grossest abuses concerning it, would be a departure from correct principle. The sustaining this exception renders a modification of the decree in the Circuit Court necessary. That court passed a decree in favor of the complainant for $81,750.85. It should have been increased by the addition of $1682.38, which sum was deducted, in the account stated, for the trustee's services. The decree of the Circuit Court is, therefore, modified, on the basis that the complainant, at the time it was rendered, was entitled to recover from the respondents the sum of $83,433.23.

Interest will follow from the date of the decree, at the rate allowed on judgments and decrees in Massachusetts.