Walker v. Taylor/Opinion of the Court

This case comes before us by a writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.

It has been argued by counsel, on the merits, without noticing the important preliminary question of jurisdiction.

The power intrusted to this court, of reviewing the decisions of State tribunals, is within narrow and well defined limits, and has been, in some instances, looked upon with jealousy. Our decisions may fail to command respect, unless we carefully confine ourselves within the bonds prescribed for us by the constitution and laws. If they have not conferred jurisdiction, the consent of parties will not justify its assumption. The record in this case shows, that the plaintiff declared, in an action on the case, for a disturbance of her right of ferry; asserting an exclusive right, in herself, by virtue of an act of the legislature of Kentucky, of the 31st of December, 1829. The defendants' first plea (the only one sustained by the court), after averring a previous grant to themselves, by an act of the 27th of December, 1820, and other facts, unnecessary to notice, concludes as follows:-'And so the defendants say that the said act, dated the 31st of December, 1829, purporting to establish a public ferry at the warehouse landing of Owen G. Cates and Robert Walker, fronting their lot No. 3, in the town of Columbus, over the Mississippi river to the opposite shore, is unconstitutional and void, being an attempt to impair prior vested rights, without compensation therefor; all of which defendants are ready to verify,' &c.

To this plea the plaintiff demurred; the defendants joined in demurrer, and the Circuit Court of Kentucky gave judgment for defendants. The plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeals of that State, who affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.

The record, therefore, presented this single issue,-'Whether the act of the legislature of Kentucky, of the 21st of December, 1829, under which the plaintiff claimed title, was unconstitutional and void,' as being repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and the decision of the Court of Appeals, is against its validity.

The twenty-fifth section of the act of the 24th of September, 1789, which confers on this court the power of supervision over the State tribunals, so far as at present applicable, confines it to cases 'where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States, and the decision is favor of such their validity.' That this case does not come within the category, is too plain to admit of argument or require authority. The reason and policy of granting to this court the power to revise the decisions of the State courts when in favor of the validity of their own statutes, and refusing it to us when the judgment is against their validity, are obvious, and are fully stated by the court in the case of The Common-wealth Bank of Kentucky v. Thomas Griffith et al., 14 Pet., 56. That case is precisely in point with the present, and decides that,-'Under this clause of the act of Congress, three things must concur to give this court jurisdiction. 1st. The validity of a statute of a State must be drawn in question. 2d. It must be drawn in question upon the ground that it is repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. 3d. The decision of the State court must be in favor of their validity.'

As the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky was rendered against the validity of the statute in this case, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals for the State of Kentucky, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that this writ of error be and the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.