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" is not traditional. As a mere inheritance it carries no benefit to either man or boy. The more it is a received dogmatic the less it is a quickening process." " Philosophy exists only to correct the inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to fulfil, no other office to overtake, no other business to do. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think aright. If he is already and without an effort in possession of the truth, he does not require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of Philosophy is gone, her office is superfluous, there is nothing for her to put her hand to. Therefore Philosophy assumes, and must assume, that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to do so; that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be brought to him by his own exertions." "This assumption is the ground and only justification of the existence of Philosophy." "She is controversial as the very tenure and vindication of her existence, for how can she correct the slips of common opinion—the oversights of natural thinking—except by controverting them?" "Truths are unintelligible, or nearly so, unless when contrasted with their opposing errors." "The only light of every truth is its contrasting [PAGE 2] error." "Are we to suppose that the real revolutions of the celestial spheres differ widely from their apparent courses, and that the same great law does not hold rule, and may not be found out, in the movements of human thought—that mightier than planetary sphere?" "Metaphysic is the substitution of true ideas—i.e., of necessary truths of reason—in the place of oversights of popular opinion and the errors of psychological science." "It carries on a warfare by compulsion, not assuredly by choice. So soon as man is born'' with true and correct notions about himself and all other things, Philosophy will take her departure from the world, for she will be no longer needed." " If philosophy were a science which aimed merely at the positive establishment of certain truths of its own, without having for its vocation to challenge and put right the fundamental verdicts of man's natural judgment, the study of it might, not unreasonably, be declined on the ground that, by the exercise of our ordinary faculties, we were already in possession of as much truth as we wanted, or as was good for us. If truth comes to us spontaneously, why should we not be satisfied with it? why should we fatigue ourselves in the pursuit of any other truth than that which comes to us from nature? Why, indeed? But what if no truth, what if nothing but error comes to us from nature? what if the ordinary operation of our faculties involves us in interminable contradictions? . . . In that case, it is conceived that the usefulness of philosophy, as corrective of these spontaneous fallacies, and as emendatory of the inherent infirmities of the human intellect, cannot be too highly estimated, or its study too earnestly recommended."

We have purposely made the foregoing quotations the introduction to this paper because, containing as they do a thorough-going assertion at once of the value of philosophy and the imperativeness of controversy, they should form a justification for the frequency with which we place metaphysical papers before our readers; and they ought to conciliate towards their author the favourable regards of British Controversialists who know how much, yet how unjustly, discussion is contemned and condemned. Their author was a bold, consistent, and persistent thinker, the sinewy vigour of whose mind, the relentless rigour of whose reasoning, and the pellucid clearness of whose style make him a man of mark among metaphysicians. He was at once ingenious and ingenuous, a hater of every byepath either in thinking or in life. In terse, vehement, yet logical polemic, he had no philosophical match except Sir William Hamilton; who was less popular, poetical, and fascinating than he. Ferrier would not swerve from truth, palter with conscience or equivocate at the solicitation of a sect "for a king's ransom;" no, nor for what he valued more, a philosoher's renown. If we endeavour to understand this man, whose love for truth was so ardent, whose capacity for research was so great, and whose passionate pursuit of it cost him much, we may learn not only a great deal regarding metaphysical speculations, and the forms of reasoned [PAGE 3] truth, but about the energy, faith, courage, composure, and comfort of soul which a life's devotion to truth can give.

James Frederick Ferrier was the son of John Ferrier, Writer to the Signet—as a member of the highest class of attorneys or legal agents is called in Scotland,—and his wife, Margaret Wilson, sister of Christopher North. His aunt, on the Father's side, was Miss Susan Edmonston Ferrier,the novelist—whom Sir Walter Scott named his "Sister Shadow,"—authoress of "Marriage," "Inheritance," and "Destiny;" while his uncle, by the mother's side, owes the "Isle of Palms," "Noctes Ambrosianæ," &c., from whom the students of Edinburgh University received their inspirations in Moral Science for upwards of thirty years, and who was for an equal period the main man, though never actual editor, of Blackwood's Magazine. Literary, legal, and philosophic influences, therefor surrounded the author of "the Institutes of Metaphysic" from his very birth, which occurred at Edinburg, 16th June, 1808. He was placed, when very young, under the care of the Rev. Henry Duncan, D.D., author of the "the Sacred Philosophy of the Seasons;" memorable to posterity as the founder of savings banks, a work in which he was sedulously employed, among his other avocations, when J. F. Ferrier was sent to the manse of Ruthwell, of which parish Dr. Duncan was the clergyman. Ruthwell lies along the north coast of the Solway Firth for about six miles; it was just about this time newly intersected by the road from Portpatrick to England, and the village had been almost entirely rebuilt. It contained, within its bounds, among other antiquities, a curious sculptured stone, and the ruins of the venerable Comlongan Castle. Here, at the parish school, in the manse study, by the sea, upon the high road, up among the hills, beside the trout streams, and in the devious bypass of the parish in which Robert Burns had made his last endeavor to acquire restorative vigor, the lively-minded boy found health, play, knowledge, and intellectual influences. Here, along with Dr. Duncan's sons, he pursued the elementary studies which form part of a school boys training, and was advanced so far otherwise as to have been initiated into the elements of English composition, and an acquaintance with some of the classical authors of Rome and Greece. His knowledge of Ovid and Virgil enabled him to take a fair position in the High School of Edinburgh, which he attended for a short time; but as it was intended that he should pursue his studies in and English university comma he was placed under the scholastic training of Dr. Charles Parr Burney, of Greenwich, where we believe he had for a compeer his age-fellow and fellow-thinker, G. H. Lewes.

Dr. Burney was the son of one of the most learned and accomplished scholars in the critics of Greek language and literature of his age, and was himself considered to be a worthy successor of a famous father. Here Ferrier was thoroughly drilled into the usual quantity of classical reading and composition. During sessions [PAGE 4] 1825-6, 1826-7, he studied Greek and logic, mathematics and morals, in the University of Edinburgh; his professors being respectively George Dunbar, David Ritchie, William Wallace, and John Wilson quotation (his uncle), in whose house at Elleray, amidst all its literary and political associations and activities, he spent the summer vacations. In eighteen twenty eight he entered Magdalen college, Oxford, as fellow commoner, where, after pursuing the ordinary round, he graduated B.A. at the Easter Term, 1832. He was immediately called to the Scottish bar as an advocate and having as year-fellows Lord Mackenzie, the late W. B. D. D. Turnbull, Henry Glassford Bell, &c. The bar in Scotland is considered the avenue to public and official life; the admission to the faculty of advocates is therefore strictly guarded, not only by a double examination in literature and law, but by heavy entrance fees, amounting to the aggregate to about £350. For a short time after his advocate ship was gained Ferrier frequented the parliament house and practiced in the courts, though caring little for the dry work and fruitless studies which the "getting up" of cases involved.

The publication, in 1829, of Sir William Hamilton's famous paper on "The Philosophy of the Conditioned", and in 1830 of that on philosophy of perception, had stirred the thoughtful, and excited the hope of fresh results following up on new endeavors. In 1831, Ferrier became intimate with Hamilton, who was like himself and advocate devoted to metaphysical studies, and on the outlook for professional employment. Between two such minds friendship was speedily matured, and Ferrier resolved to sound the deep seas of speculation for himself. Hamilton subsequent articles increased his eagerness to know the inner secrets of thought and life; he determined to master the language and philosophy of Germany; For which purpose he spent the summer of 1834 in Heidelberg one of the chief sitters of Teutonic culture and speculation. Here he acquired not only a familiarity with the language, but even with the thought of Germany, and practice himself thoroughly in the transference of the thoughts attained in that language into the speech of his own country. He became an adept in the language of philosophy of Germany, and penetrated into the seminal thoughts of the several systems.

He continued his readings and studies of metaphysical writings after his return from Germany, and in 1836, when at last Edinburgh recognized, by electing him to the professorship of logic, the extraordinary merits of Sir William Hamilton, Ferrier made his earliest appeal for a professorial appointment as candidate for the chair of history which his friend vacated. In his candidature he was defeated by George Skene. In 1837, Ferrier married his cousin Margaret—a woman, a competent witness says, with intellect fit to appreciate and sustain, and humor and esprit fit to charm and cheer, even a man like him,—the eldest daughter of professor [PAGE 5] Wilson, and shortly thereafter commenced a literary connection with Blackwood's Magazine, in which a few philosophical articles had been published, 1836-7, by professor Wilson, under the title of "The Metaphysician." These, though characterized by Hamilton as showing "great acuteness," or destined to be eclipsed in brilliancy and acumen by his son in law, when, in 1838-9, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness" appeared holding on its course unflaggingly through seven issues. In these papers Ferrier threw himself boldly forward into a world of new thought, and sought, as Hamilton said "the solution of problems hitherto unattempted in the humbler speculation of this country." This series of papers, we think will yet be regarded as forming the first word of a new era in British speculative science. In acuteness and eloquence few metaphysical disquisitions at all approached them, and none excel them in persistent, close-keeping, unrelaxed sing pursuit of the main idea amidst all the deviousness through which it winds, twists, and turns. Hide and jink as it may, he keeps the object of his search clearly in view, and permits no dodge or difficulty to take his eyes off it. In this initial speculation of his Ferrier insists on "faithfulness and completeness." Push speculation to its uttermost limits, and error is impossible, if we have attended rigidly to the facts which philosophy reveals to us: overlook but a single fact, and our reason, otherwise our faithful minister, is truly a heap of untold treasure, may be converted into a brood of fiends to baffle and destroy us. We can only touch in our analysis one or two of the chief points he enforces, illustrates, and maintains, but these will show how much is to be learned from the perusal of the entire production:—

"That which is called I is a living reality, and though mind, in the psychologist's sense, were annihilated, it would remain a repository of given facts." "I am; what more would I have? what more would I be?" it is the characteristic of man to exist, to be conscious of existence; to be rational, and to know that he is so. That "marks man off from other things with a line of distinct and deep-drawn demarcation." "There are three problems vital to the science of ourselves; these are—first, when does consciousness come into operation? Second, how does consciousness come into operation? And 3rd, what are the consequences of coming into operation?" "Consciousness develops and preserves itself by refusing to take part or to identify itself with the sensation, passion, or whatever it may be that is striving to enslave the man; and the ego (I)—which is but the person and vital expression of consciousness—exists merely by refusing to imbibe the impressions of external things. Thus so far is it from being true, that outward objects take effect upon me, that I, in truth only am by resisting and refusing to be impressed by their action." "Consciousness is action, and is opposed to sensation because it is not derivative." "The word I is evolved out of the active consciousness; the act of consciousness is evolved out of an active antagonism, put forth against all the derivative modifications of our being; this act of antagonism is evolved out of freedom, and freedom is evolved out of will; and thus we make will the lowest foundation stone of humanity."

[PAGE 6] This penetrating and incisive paper was read with marveling. It threatened to upset the entire labors of the famous "Scottish School," which had wielded such influence in one such praise. The prime tenant of that school was that consciousness cannot misinform, that all it tells is true, and all that we find in it is trustworthy; whereas he maintained that science is the disintegration of the real from the apparent.

Consciousness is the apparent in psychological, as nature is the apparent in physical science; How to each the real has to be brought by thought. Consciousness, like nature must be looked at, into, and through, not from only. Science is the progressive deduction of one truth from another in order sequence. It is the correction of the result of ordinary observation by the criticism of reason, and gaining from these appearances a knowledge of the realities which they involve. In this physics and psychics agree, only that the letter pierces into the appearances more deeply; For "while physical observation is simple, philosophical, or psychological, observation is double. It is observatio duplex; the observation of observation, observatio observationis."

The thoroughness of Ferrier's knowledge of German was proved in August, 1839, in his spirited translation of Ludwick Tieck's "Pietro d'Abano; the Conciliator," a tale of enchantment, and in series of papers on Goethe's life and works, running through several numbers: while, if we mistake not, that critical disquisition "On Hume's Argument against Miracles," in July of the same year, proceeds from the same pen. Of the authorship of another paper in Blackwood, showing an acquaintance with German philosophy, Ferrier has himself accepted responsibility, viz., "The Plagiarisms of S. T. Coleridge," March, 1840. Of the unacknowledged obligations of the author of Biographia Literaria to Schelling (1775-1854) full and accurate details are given in this paper, which, if read in conjunction with a paper by Thomas de Quincy (Works, vol. ii., p. 38-122, with note, p. 242 &c.), will be found to concern a matter not only of philosophical, but also psychological interest.

In 1840 he delivered several lectures in Edinburgh on "War and Peace," and on several other subjects in which the incidence of moral principles on historical and political events could be exhibited. To Blackwood's Magazine, in September 1841, he contributed a translation of Ludwig Franz Deinhardstein's lively art-drama "The Picture of Danae;" and in December, 1841, under the title of the "Tittle-tattle of a philosopher, an epitome of "The Life Journey" of W. T. Krug, the immediate successor of Kant in the chair of Philosophy at Königsberg, and one of the most industrious and versatile German notabilities. On the resignation of professor [PAGE 7] George Skene, in 1842, Ferrier became again a candidate for the chair of history in Edinburgh University, and, only after a pretty keen canvass, succeeded. In this office which was "neither lucrative nor laborious," he delivered a few lectures annually on the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy, in their relations to each other, which are said to have been clear, well rounded, in striking, though be bearing the marks of task work, and delivered to small audiences.

In 1843 there came to the outrush of the disruption, as the exodus from of the Free Church is often called, and to this stirring topic Ferrier contributed a pamphlet which has been characterized as more ingenious than convincing—a lawyer-like endeavour to special plead for peace in the national Zion.

In the spring of 1844, Ferrier commenced a course of lectures on metaphysic. I have been favored by a highly intelligent student of philosophy, who enjoyed the privilege of hearing these, with some reminiscences of them, from which, as these lectures have been and a noted by others—even the editors of his Remains—I am happy to have permission to make the following extracts.

Curiosity was on tiptoe at the introductory lecture, and the hall was crowded; unusually enthusiastic applause greeted the lecturer, who was accompanied by Sir William Hamilton; and professor John Wilson. Ferriers aspect dwells in the memory at least as vividly as that of any one of his imminent contemporaries—and Chalmers was among them;—a man rather below the middle size, a frame slender but well knit; and in motion uncommon, even decisive. He advanced to the chair like one who knew his strength, whether others might recognize it or no. His physiognomy was still more marked and memorable; a finely formed head, features clearly cut and and regular, though somewhat approaching to sharpness; eyes which, disguised a little even as they were by spectacles, revealed in their swift and steadfast glances profundity, acuteness, genial sympathy, all in abundance, yet each predominating in turn, a complexion bordering on sallowness, but accompanied by a certain peculiar brightness or radiance, seemingly half physical, half the result of intellectual action, but which gave you the irresistible sense of the presence of genius. These were the elements of that new and most enlivening phenomenon which stood before us in the person of Professor Ferrier:—but how tedious and ineffective is description when it attempts to recall instantaneous vision!

"The lecturer swiftly and steadily reconnoitered the assembly, receiving back at once the sympathy which so visibly flowed out from himself; for this man possessed in no common measure that mysterious power of intense humanity, which returning as if diffuses itself, makes all that it influences gladsome and brotherly, cheering the desert of common life 'with sunny spots of greenery.' 'This full assurance given by looks' was followed up by words of force and frankness introducing with no hesitating preamble the [PAGE 8] theme of the day. The lecture was read in a voice clear and melodious as the style, and fixed every word in the mind of the hearer; boldly and unaffectedly he carried his audience well with him throughout. Of the lecture as a discussion I cannot now speak particularly. Being introductory it was popular, and manifested the subtlety of the poetic glow which, to all that he wrote, gave the stamp of originality. His purpose evidently was to create a spirit of fearless, not faithless criticism and research, to convince students that if they wish to profit by the writings of the great thinkers, they must be to each not the dead dogmas of their thinking, but the living products of his own.' this point he enforced by illustrations drawn from the other spheres of mental action:—all the men of science had been original; poetry would have faded into formal insincerity had not Wordsworth gone to truth and nature, inhaling and then diffusing into his verse the very spirit of the green hills and the flowing streams; the true giants of philosophy had been fearless, earnest men, who worked out their conceptions, looking steadfastly at truth, and scorning servility to fashion or mere authority; sciolists, and dogmatists spurned men of deep and close thought, but they did this through ignorance. Great men knew all these gentlemen did, and a good many things besides.

"To some older students, even to some disciples of Hamilton, this lecture was not entirely satisfactory. Here was a man of evident power about to assail the citadel of 'Scottish Philosophy;' this surely would never do! But there were younger minds not indisposed to rejoice at the advent of this eager, sunbright combatant, whose 'glaive of light' flashed in a manner not unlikely to make some little havoc in the metaphysical Valhalla. What if this revolutionary analyst, with small respect of persons, should bring down from his seat of high authority the cautious sage of Aberdeen, and enthrone instead the bold and fascinating Irish idealist, whose philosophy the Scottish school had refuted and denounced? Would such a catastrophe be altogether tragical in the eyes of youths brimful of life, humour, and mind, to whom in in Scotland, as elsewhere, nothing is so attractive as the frankness and daring, nothing so distasteful as timidity and dull common sense?

"In the next lecture the work of mingled back attack and defense began in earnest Berkeley had been ridiculed by Reid and his followers as an idealist;—what if he were the true realist? Reid imputed to him this consequence; if the existence of the outward world depends on our perceived perceiving mind, then, mind being absent or inattentive, matter must evaporate! Stop a little, said Ferrier; What do you mean by saying that in this case the world would be held as ceasing to exist? You mean that houses, trees, &c., would cease to exist. But let us conceive this world annihilated, would there not remain a world of empty space which you cannot think away? You know in slaying Berkeley you commit suicide; your sword stroke does not strike him, but reverts on yourself. This retort on Reid either preceded or followed an exposition of the doctrine that [PAGE 9] the mind is, at all events, in direct contact with the visible world, and not merely with its own impressions—that, in short, the outward world is the impression. In subsequent lectures the subject was discussed from an historical point of view. Farrier sought in my mythology and poetry, as well as ancient philosophy, confirmation of the doctrine of 'direct presentation' in perception. He referred to the Fetichism of ancient paganism, as identifying nature and mind, and quoted in illustration of its more refined operation the famous passage from Wordsworth on the Mythologization of Nature by the Greeks ("Excursion" Book IV.) beginning,—

"Later, philosophy having become analytical, and ultimately artificial, had joined with literature in subverting the natural 'representation,' and in substituting 'the representative ideas of the schools,' although a few ardent and sincere minds had retained their respect for nature and truth, and so were led to seek relief from such inventions. Of these, at least in Britain, Berkeley was among the greatest, and he had indicated the return to early truth which must terminate the circuit of philosophy, and shall result in the second illumination, far purer and less troubled than the first. Such was the scope of these lectures, so far as they linger in my our memory, after the lapse of nearly a quarter of a century.

Shortly after this in 1844, Sir William Hamilton became seriously invalid, and in the success succeeding session Professor Ferrier—who for years together, had been daily in his company, for hours debating, with the strong earnestness of sincere friendship and honest conviction, the tenets of the philosophical schools—read his class lectures for him, occasionally interpolating, by permission of their writer, expositions of his own, memorable for their subtlety and eloquence even to this day, by those who hurt him.

In the interval included in the narrative given above, Ferrier contributed to Blackwood's Magazine, "The Crisis of Modern Speculation," "Berkeley and Idealism," being papers on a notice of Samuel Bailey's "Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, designed to show the Unsoundness of the Celebrated Speculation," Mr. Bailey of Sheffield issued "A letter to a Philosopher, in reply to some recent attempts to vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision; and this gave occasion to another paper in June, 1843, in which the topic was pursued controversially, and supplemented by a speculation on the senses. All these papers are ingenious and profound, suggestive and argumentative, graceful and simple, full of happy expressions and sometimes noticeable for smiting phrases in which his wit and humor are shown no less than his mastery of speculative thought and poetic utterance; and they may be said to contain the very pith of the loftiest idealistic philosophy of recent times from these sufficiently full account of [PAGE 10] has interpreted by Ferrier, the ableist exposition and defense of the opinions of the Bishop of cloyne knowing to G. H. Lewes, J. D. Morel, &c., may be gathered by a thoughtful reader.

In 1844 he reviewed the poems of Miss Barrett (afterwards Mrs. Browning. In that same year he became candidate for the Chair of logic at St. Andrews, but fortunately both for him and the students of St. Andrews, Prof. Wm. Spalding, (see British Controversialist, Dec. 1863) was preferred on that occasion; for although both he and Spalding were unsurpassed as teachers, it was essential to success of both the Professor's Spalding should first have done the work of intellectual grindstone for the students.

He succeeded next year 1845 in gaining the Chair of Moral Philosophy, and thereafter he was busily engaged for a year or two in writing up class lectures. "Of these," he said, " I cancel and re-write about a third of my lectures every year, a circumstance which, if it proves that my lectures were bad to begin with, also proves that they have some chance of growing better." In 1846, Sir William Hamilton's edition of Reid was issued, after long delays, from the press; and in 1847, Ferrier reviewed the work in an article bearing the title "Reid and the Philosophy of Common Sense." In it he gives full credit to the editor for "unparalleled erudition," "vigorous logic, and speculative acuteness," while he ingeniously defends himself from the implied necessity of sacrificing the honesty of the critic to the amiability of the friend by saying he has taught those who study him to think, and he must must stand the consequences, whether they think in unison with himself or not." This book never "received the last consummate polish from the hand of its accomplished editor," nor did it ever receive the fuller review which Ferrier promised it. These personal friends and philosophical opponents are both gone—both having sunk overworked into the grave. But Ferrier's paper may fairly vie with any of Hamilton's "Dissertations" in thoroughness, perspicuity, and instructiveness. During 1847-8 he continued in his class lectures these criticisms of Reid, and few explications of the philosophical and poetic imagination can be happier and more exhaustive than the lectures on this subject, which appeared with these dates in the "Philosophical Remains," quoted in the commencement of this notice. In 1848 Prof. Ferrier, issued, anonymously, a pamphlet entitled "Observations on Church and Ctate suggested by the Duke of Argyle's Essay on the Ecclesiastical History of Scotland. The Duke of Argyle was elected Chancellor of St. Andrews in 1851.

In session 1848-9 the Professor of Morals took higher ground than he had hitherto done. He had been contented previously to interpret, now he resolved to think out the metaphysic. He dictated and explained several propositions from time to time to his students, and began to lay his views before the thinkers. With a two intense devotion he fixed before himself the ambition to form a complete and rigorous demonstration theory of the necessary laws of human [PAGE 11] thought, not as logic to overrule practice, but as a metaphysic to harmonize the facts of knowing and being into a system of reasoned and indissolubly linked truths. This he had scarcely accomplished when the illness of his father in law, Prof. Wilson, in 1852. After the keen contest in which sectarianism played a bitter and embittering part in the claims of this highly original thinker or pushed aside by the town council of the Scottish metropolis, on the side issue of university tests, in favor of a gentleman who has pursued a highly honorable career indeed, but who has made no substantive addition to knowledge, thought, or philosophic morality. Ferrier "had endeavored to excel" in new pad, but could only then lay down a slight chart of the speculative latitudes he had reached, and which he had expected to navigate without being wrecked. This disappointment certainly sank deeply into his soul, and caused him with even more persistent labours than before, to place the indubitable evidence of the righteousness of his claim before the philosophic world. With more care for his fame than his life, and greater love of truth than either, he underwent intense solitary toil to pierce—

perhaps failing within himself as Coleridge did in the days of his "Dejection."—

Of his father-in-law's works he fittingly became the editor, being entrusted by Messrs. Blackwood and Sons for the production of a uniform series of 12 volumes, with explanatory prefaces, notes, and comments. This editorial labor was one of love—a love that had grown up in the soul of Ferrier from boyhood, and which had been warmly reciprocated by his uncle and father-in-law. The explanatory preface to the "Noctes Ambrosianæ" (which occupy the first four volumes of the series) is by far the finest criticism extant on these wonderful productions; And the foot notes attached to them in their course or brief, pithy, and to the point. "The Critical and Imaginative Essays form the next four. "The Recreations of Christopher North," and an "Essay on Highland Scenery," fill the two succeeding volumes. A volume of "Tales" follows, and the series is closed by the "Poems." Under the conditions this collection is admirably edited; though we miss from them any specimens of his university lectures or his metaphysical disquisitions. Perhaps professor Ferrier had learned how thorough was the dislike in Scotland to discuss on matters of high [PAGE 12] thought after the passing away of Hamilton, Wilson, and Chalmers. The preparations of this series occupied him a good deal for some years, though its publication dates 1855-8.

Besides preparing and overlooking these volumes he was busily engaged in maturing a scheme of philosophy, which should shake the to its foundations the carefully up built metaphysics of Scotland by proving that the common dicta of consciousness are to be repudiated as false instead of being accepted as the source and first principles of all true mental science; and to take a new departure for philosophy and not only lay the foundations but build up the the column of an unwreckable lighthouse in the sea of speculation. Having given earnest and vigorous toil of thought to the execution of this great test textbook and evidence of metaphysical genius, he believed that he had achieved his end, and had it in his power to prove that he could do something for the fame of Scotland, the progress of truth, and the assertion of an individual right to the notice of his countrymen.

In 1854 the results of his long outwearing meditations were given to the public. They constitute—whatever opinion of the accuracy or adequacy of the system may be formed—one of the most remarkable productions in philosophical literature, a work, as one critic calls it, "without parallel modern speculation," one in which the author attempts to prove, by a series of demonstrations successively following from each other by a necessity as astringent as the propositions of Euclid, that nothing can be known, or exist, dissevered from the self or Ego, or percipient mind." "This is," says another, "no ordinary book. if we mistake not, its publication will mark an epoch in the history of speculation in this country. The author is familiar with what has been done in this field by ancients and moderns; and his acuteness and independence of thinking are as conspicuous as his learning."

The "Institutes of Metaphysic" consist of an Introduction, in which the object and method of worker explained and illustrated, and of three sections, in which the necessary truths or laws of all reason are laid down in a series of distinct propositions; and facing each of these propositions is laid down, in a counter-proposition, the contradictory inadvertency of ordinary opinion, so that we can always play them off against each other, and know exactly what we are dealing with, what we are contending for, and what we are contending against; enhance "proposition and counter-proposition are the two hinges of the system. Of the contents of this able and singular work we can offer only the scantiest summary.

Introduction.—"A system of philosophy" "ought to be true, and it ought to be reasoned." "Philosophy, therefore, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. It is more proper that the philosophy should be reasoned than it should be true; because well truth may be, perhaps, unattainable by man, to reason is certainly his province and within his power. "A system is of the highest value when it is both reasoned and [PAGE 13] true." "An unreasoned body of philosophy, however true and formal it may be, has no living and essential interdependency of parts on parts, and is therefore useless as a discipline of the mind, and valueless for purposes of tuition." "A system which is reasoned, but not true, has always some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, although it may fail to reach it." "In strict science, nothing, properly speaking, is intelligible unless it rests on grounds of rigorous demonstration or necessary reason." "A necessary truth or law of reason is a truth or law, the opposite of which is inconceivable, contradictory, nonsensical, impossible; more shortly, it is a truth, in the fixing of which nature has only one alternative, be a positive or negative." "The canon of all philosophy [is]—Affirm nothing except what is enforced by reason as a necessary truth—i.e., a truth, the supposed reversal of which would involve a contradiction; and deny nothing unless its affirmation involves a contradiction—i.e. contradicts some necessity necessary truth or law of reason. Let this rule be adhered to, and all will go well in philosophy. It's important consists not in it's being stated, but it's being practiced. This system starts from a single proposition, which, it is conceived, is an essential axiom of all reason, and one which cannot be denied without running against a contradiction, and "the scheme is rigidly demonstrated throughout; for a philosophy is not entitled to exist, unless it can make good this claim." "In philosophy nothing is left to the discretion of an individual thinker. His whole arrangement, every step which he takes, must be necessitated, not chosen. It must be prescribed and enforced by the object itself not, by his way of viewing it." Hitherto although things which are first in the order of nature are last in the order of knowledge;" we have tried to get to the end without having got to the beginning." "The difficulty is, so to turn round the whole huge machinery as to get its beginning towards us." "What is truth?—this is in itself the last or ultimate; but to us it is always the first or proximate question of philosophy. The immediate answer which moves away this question, and so causes the whole structure to turn on its pivot, is this: Truth is—what it is. Whatever absolutely is—is true. There can be no doubt about that. This answer instantly raises the question, But what is?'' "What is true being—absolute existence? This branch of the sciences usually and rightly denominated ontology—the science of that which truly is." "Each answer, as it wards off its own question, must always be of such a character as to bring round a new question into view;" hence "the ontological question instantly brings before us a new question, or rather a new section of questions—this, What is known, and what is knowing?" "This division explores and explains the laws both of knowing and of the known—in other words, the conditions of all the conceivable; laying out the necessary laws as laws of all knowing and all thinking, and the contingent laws as the laws of our knowing and our thinking. This section of the science is properly termed the epistemology—the doctrine or theory of knowing." Thereafter, "we must examine and fix what ignorance is—what we are and can be ignorant of. And thus we are thrown upon an entirely new research, constituting and intermediate section of philosophy, which we term the agnoiology, or theory of ignorance." "In solving the problem, What is? we shall have resolved definitively the ultimate or last question of all philosophy, What is truth?" What is knowledge? must mean one of two things. It must mean either, 1st, what is knowledge in [PAGE 14] so far as its kinds differ? In plainer words, what different kinds of knowledge are there? Or it must mean, 2nd, what is knowledge insofar as its various kinds agree? In plainer words, what is the one invariable feature, quality, or constituent common to all our cognitions, however diverse and multifarious dies in other respects maybe. What is the standard factor which never varies while all else varies?"

Epistemology.—(1) Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself. (2) The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, —object plus subject, thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." (3) "The objective part of the object of knowledge, though distinguishable, is not separable in cognition from the subjective part, or the ego; but the objective part and the subjective part do together constitute the unit or minimum of knowledge. (4) Matter per se, the whole material universe by itself, is, of necessity absolutely unknowable. (5) All the qualities of matter by themselves are, of necessity, absolutely unknowable. (6) Every cognition must contain an element common to all cognition, and an element (or elements) peculiar to itself: in other words, every cognition must have a part which is unchangeable, necessary, and universal (the same in all), and a part which is changeable, contingent, and particular (different in all); and there can be no knowledge of the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part: exclusive of the changeable, contingent, and particular part; or of the changeable, contingent, and particular part, exclusive of the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part: that is to say, neither of these parts by itself can constitute a cognition; but all knowledge is necessarily a synthesis of both factors." (7) "The ego (or mind) is known as the element common to all cognitions; matter is known as the element peculiar to some cognitions: in other words, we know ourselves as the unchangeable, necessary, and universal part of our cognitions, while we know matter, in all its varieties, as a portion of the changeable, contingent and particular part of our cognitions — or, expressed in the technical language of logic, the ego is the known summum genus, the known generic part, of all cognitions; matter is the known differential part of some cognitions." (8) "The ego cannot be known to be material—that is to say, there is a necessary law of reason which prevents it from being apprehended by the senses." (9) "The ego, or self or mind, per se, is, of necessity, absolutely unknowable. By itself—that is, in a purely indeterminate state, or separated from all things, and divested of all thoughts—it is no possible object of cognition. It can know itself only in some particular state, or in union with some non-ego—that is, with some element contradistinguished from itself." (10) "Mere objects of sense can never be objects of cognition; in other words, whatever has a place in the intellect (whatever is known) must contain an element which has had no place in the senses; or, otherwise expressed, the senses, by themselves, are not competent to place any knowable or intelligible thing before the mind. They are faculties of nonsense, and can present to the mind only the nonsensical or contradictory." (11) "That alone can be represented in thought which can be presented in knowledge: in other words, it is impossible to think what it is impossible to know; or, more explicitly, it is impossible to think that of which knowledge has supplied, and can supply, no sort of type." [PAGE 15] (12) "The material universe per se, and all its qualities per se, are not only absolutely unknowable, they are also of necessity absolutely unthinkable." (13) "The only independent universe which any mind or ego can think of is the universe in synthesis with some other mind or ego." (14) "There is no mere phenomenal in cognition; in other words, the phenomenal by itself is absolutely unknowable and inconceivable." (15) "Objects, whatever they may be, are the phenomenal in cognition; matter in all its varieties is the phenomenal in cognition; thoughts or mental states whatsoever are the phenomenal in cognition; the universal is the phenomenal in cognition; the particular is the phenomenal in cognition; the ego, or mind, or subject is the phenomenal in cognition." (16) "There is a substantial in cognition; in other words, substance, or the substantial, is knowable, and is known by us." (17) "Object plus subject is the substantial in cognition; matter mecum is the substantial in cognition; thoughts or mental states whatsoever, together with the self or subject are the substantial in cognition; the universal, in union with the particular, is the substantial in cognition; the ego or mind in any determinate condition, or with any thing or thought present to it, is the substantial in cognition. This synthesis, thus variously expressed, is the substantial, and the only substantial, in cognition." (18) "There is no mere relative in cognition; in other words, the relative per se, or by itself is, of necessity, unknowable and unknown." (19) "Objects, whatever they may be, are the relative in cognition; matter, in all its varieties, is the relative in cognition; thoughts or mental states whatsoever are the relative in cognition; the universal is the relative in cognition; the ego, or mind, or subject is the relative in cognition." (20) "There is an absolute in cognition; in other words, something absolute is knowable, and is known by us." (21) "Object plus subject is the Absolute in cognition; matter mecum is the absolute in cognition; thoughts or mental states whatsoever, together with the self or subject, are the absolute in cognition; the universal in union with the particular is the absolute in cognition; the ego or mind in any determinate condition, or with any thought or thing present to it, is the absolute in cognition. This synthesis, thus variously expressed, is the Absolute, and the only Absolute, in cognition. (22) "The senses are the contingent conditions of knowledge; in other words, it is possible that intelligences different from the human (supposing that there are such) should apprehend things under other laws, or in other ways, than those of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling; or, more shortly, our senses are not laws of cognition, or modes of apprehension, which are binding on intelligence necessarily and universally."

Agnoiology.—1 "Ignorance is an intellectual defect, imperfection, privation, or shortcoming." 2. "All ignorance is possibly remediable." 3. "We can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known; in other words, there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge. 4. "We cannot be ignorant of any kind of objects without a subject: in other words, there can be no ignorance of objects per se, or out of relation to a mind." 5. "We cannot be ignorant of material things out of all relation to a mind, subject, or self: in other words, there can be no ignorance of matter per se. 6. "We cannot be ignorant either of the universal element of cognition per se, or of the particular element of cognition per se." 7. "We cannot be ignorant of the ego per se; in other words, there can be no ignorance of the mind in a state of pure indetermination, or with no thing or thought present to it." 8. "The object of all ignorance, whatever [PAGE 16] it may be, is always something more than is usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, not any particular thing merely, but the synthesis of the particular and the universal: it must always consist of a subjective as well as of an objective element; in other words, the object of all ignorance is, of necessity, some object, plus some-subject."

Ontology.—1. "That which truly is, or, as it shall be usually termed, absolute existence, is either, 1st, that which we know; or it is, 2nd, that which we are ignorant of; or it is, 3rd, that which we neither know or are ignorant of; and no other alternative is possible." 2. "Whatever we neither know nor are ignorant of is the contradictory." 3. "Absolute existence, or being in itself is not the contradictory." 4. "Absolute existence is not what we neither know nor are ignorant of." 5. "Absolute existence is either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of." 6. "Absolute existence is not matter per se; in other words, mere material, things have no true and independent being." 7. "Absolute existence is not the particular by itself nor is it the universal by itself; in other words, particular things prescinded from the universal have no absolute existence, nor have universal things prescinded from the particular any absolute existence." 8. "Absolute existence is not the ego per se, or the mind in a state of pure indetermination—that is, with no thing or thought present to it; in other words, the ego per se is not that which truly and absolutely exists." 9. "Matter is not the cause of our perceptive cognitions; in other words, our knowledge of material things is not an effect proceeding from, and brought [about] by, material things." 10. "Absolute existence is the synthesis of the subject and object—the union of the universal and the particular—the concretion of the ego and non-ego; in other words, the only true, and real, and independent existences, are minds together with that which they apprehend." 11. "All absolute existences are contingent except one; in other words, there is ONE, but only one, absolute existence which is strictly necessary; and that existence is a supreme, and infinite, and everlasting "mind" in synthesis with all things."

These form but a poor summary of the materials of the 530 pages of the terse yet multifarious treatise, whose well-knit consecution challenges breakage by any power of analysis possible to human thought. "This system," says the author, "is incontrovertible, it is conceived, on every point; but at the very utmost it is controvertible only in its starting-point, its fundamental position. This, therefore, seems to be no little gain to philosophy to concentrate all possible controversy upon a single point—to gather into one focus all the diverging lances of the foe, and direct them on a single topic." On this point, therefore, we must be polemical, if on any, or we breakthrough the express condition of the controversy; and we have seen no critic yet who has set his face resolutely to confront this problem. Cairns, Fraser, Mansel, &c., have all fought shy of the contest so conditioned. We shall attempt a test of the proposition, and lay it before the reader for so much as he may find it worth. Ferrier's primary principle is, "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must has a ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of self. On this we remark, intelligence is the assumed as in existence, and knowledge [PAGE 17] as a fact; and hence all inferences drawn from this assumption have only the value and power of this fact in so far as it is one. But simultaneity or same-time-ness and necessity are also assumed in this proposition, and all inferences derived from it have value and power only so far as these two assumptions are valid. Selfhood as a cogitable subject, is also by implication assumed as the recipient or percipient of knowledge, and proposition is valid only so far forth as the assumption accords with the truth. He accepted therefore, of this first and foundation truth is embarrassed by four assumptions of grave import and incontrovertible credibility—a serious difficulty to begin with! But if we accept Professor Ferrier's statements that "perception is a synthesis of two facts, sensation, namely, and consciousness, or the realization of self in conjunction with the sensation experienced. The former of these is possessed in common by men and by animals; But if the latter is peculiar to man, and constitutes his differential quality, and is, therefore, the sole and proper fact to which our attention ought to direct itself when contemplating the phenomena of perception." "Perception, the perception of an external universe, is the groundwork and condition of all other mental phenomena. It is the basis of the reality of mind. It is the real this reality itself. Through its mind is what it is; and without it mind could not be conceived to exist." "There is a calm unobtrusive current of self consciousness flowing on in company with our knowledge, and during every moment of our waking existence; and this self consciousness is the ground or condition of all our other consciousness," —it follows certainly that perception and self-consciousness mutually conditioned each other, but this as concomitants only, not as composing the whole integer thought. But concomitancy is neither self sameness nor corporate individuality; concomitants do not necessarily integrate, for if they did it would be comitancy not concomitancy. For example, to use Ferrier's own illustration—one end of a stick is the concomitant of the other end but it is not that the other end, nor do they both together, though parts of that stick, form one end—neither does the one and necessarily interpret and explain the other; a centre implies a circumference, and of a circumference a centre is a necessary concomitant—the one it is unthinkable without the other, yet neither is the other. They are interinvolved, but they are not interchangeable; still less are they the selfsame. They are indispensable co-integrants, not identical and one.

Concomitancy (along-with-ness), is only affirmed of knowledge and self in prop. 1, while in prop. 2 this is silently changed into comitancy, (essential integration), a transition clearly seen in the words "self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition,"— [PAGE 18] words which are unjustified by prop. 1, unless in the sense of "a cognition of self is an integral and essential part of every process of cognition." Cognition of self must be either—1, prior to; 2, simultaneous with; or, 3, consequent upon "any intelligence" knowing. Professor Ferrier elects for necessary simultaneity, hence—1, self cannot be the condition of knowledge; 2, knowledge cannot be the condition of self, and they must therefore be, 3, con-causes (or mutually active conditions, producing a compound effect. These concurrent causes in producing this effect must either be—1, one subordinate to the another; 2, co-equal; or, 3, concomitantly variable. It is impossible (by prop. 1) to exclude or isolate either; we can hinder neither from being present, nor can we contrive that either should be present alone. We find rather "that consciousness on the one hand, and all our natural modifications on the other, exist in an inverse ratio to one another; that whenever the natural modification is plus the consciousness of it is minus and vice versâ.

Now, regarding concomitant variations, the canon of logic is that "whatever phenomenon varies in any manner, wherever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon—or is connected with it through some fact of causation." Every interference found on such concomitancy is exposed to uncertainty from "the possibility that beyond the limits [of our observation], and in circumstances therefore of which we have no direct observation, some counteracting cause might develop itself; either a new agent, or a new property of the agents concerned; which lies dormant in the circumstances we are able to observe. Hence we cannot with coherent logic, in these circumstances, reason with necessary certainty from what we observe in our intelligence that which must be of "any intelligence," "the ground or condition of its knowledge." Of self, therefore we cannot say, "Its apprehension is essential to the existence of our, and of all knowledge." ("Institutes page 75.) This polemic, we believe, when fairly and fully thought out would invalidate the universality and necessity of the foundation propositions of the Institutes, and show that the cognition of self is implicitly contained in each process, it does not form an integral and essential part of every object of cognition.

Space fails: and we must adjourn the consideration of this question and further details of Ferrier's life and works till another opportunity arises.