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United States v. Sokolow

Syllabus Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents stopped respondent upon his arrival at Honolulu International Airport. The agents found 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. When respondent was stopped, the agents knew, inter alia, that (1) he paid $2,100 for two round-trip plane tickets from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was listed;  (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs;  (4) he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours;  (5) he appeared nervous durin  his trip;  and (6) he checked none of his luggage. Respondent was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The District Court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, as required by the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed respondent's conviction, applying a two-part test for determining reasonable suspicion. First, ruled the court, at least one fact describing "ongoing criminal activity"-such as the use of an alias or evasive movement through an airport-was always necessary to support a reasonable-suspicion finding. Second, "probabilistic" facts describing "personal characteristics" of drug couriers-such as the cash payment for tickets, a short trip to a major source city for drugs, nervousness, type of attire, and unchecked luggage were only relevant if there was evidence of "ongoing criminal activity" and the Government offered "[e]mpirical documentation" that the combination of facts at issue did not describe the behavior of "significant numbers of innocent persons." The Court of Appeals held the agents' stop impermissible, because there was no evidence of ongoing criminal behavior in this case. Held: On the facts of this case the DEA agents had a reasonable suspicion that respondent was transporting illegal drugs when they stopped him. Pp. 7-11. (a) Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if they have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot," even if they lack probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop-that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. P. 7. (b) The Court of Appeals' two-part test creates unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Under this Court's decisions, the totality of the circumstances must be evaluated to determine the probability, rather than the certainty, of criminal conduct. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. The Court of Appeals' test draws an unnecessarily sharp line between types of evidence, the probative value of which varies only in degree. While traveling under an alias or taking an evasive path through an airport may be highly probative, neither type of evidence has the sort of ironclad significance attributed to it by the Court of Appeals, because there are instances in which neither factor would reflect ongoing criminal activity. On the other hand, the test's "probabilistic" factors also have probative significance. Paying $2,100 in cash for airline tickets from a roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that amount is not ordinary conduct for most business travelers or vacationers. The evidence that respondent was traveling under an alias, although not conclusive, was sufficient to warrant consideration. Of similar effect is the probability that few Honolulu residents travel for 20 hours to spend 48 hours in Miami during July. Thus, although each of these factors is not by itself proof of illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel, taken together, they amount to reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct was afoot. Pp. 7-10. (c) The fact that the agents believed that respondent's behavior was consistent with one of the DEA's "drug courier profiles" does not alter this analysis, because the factors in question have evidentiary significance regardless of whether they are set forth in a "profile." P. 10. (d) The reasonableness of the decision to stop does not, as respondent contends, turn upon whether the police used the least intrusive means available to verify or dispel their suspicions. Such a rule would unduly hamper the officers' ability to make on-the-spot decisions here, respondent was about to enter a taxicab-and would require courts to indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 495, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1322-23, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, distinguished. Pp. 10-11. 831 F.2d 1413 (CA9 1987), reversed and remanded. REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 11. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Robert P. Goldberg, Honolulu, Hawaii, for respondent. Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Articles generated

 * United States v. Sokolow
 * Talk:United States v. Sokolow
 * United States v. Sokolow/Opinion of the Court
 * Talk:United States v. Sokolow/Opinion of the Court
 * United States v. Sokolow/Dissent Marshall
 * Talk:United States v. Sokolow/Dissent Marshall
 * 490 U.S. 1
 * 109 S.Ct. 1581
 * 104 L.Ed.2d 1

City Of Dallas v. Stanglin

Syllabus For the express purpose of providing a place where teenagers can socialize with each other but not be subject to the potentially detrimental influences of older teenagers and adults, a Dallas ordinance authorizes the licensing of "Class E" dance halls, restricting admission thereto to persons between the ages of 14 and 18 and limiting their hours of operation. Respondent, whose roller-skating rink and Class E dance hall share a divided floorspace, filed suit in state court to enjoin the ordinance's age and hour restrictions, contending, inter alia, that they violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court upheld the ordinance, but the Texas Court of Appeals struck down the ordinance's age restriction, holding that it violated the First Amendment associational rights of minors.

Held: 1. The ordinance does not infringe on the First Amendment right of association. Respondent's patrons, who may number as many as 1,000 per night, are not engaged in a form of "intimate association." Nor do the opportunities of adults and minors to dance with one another, which might be described as "associational" in common parlance, involve the sort of "expressive association" that the First Amendment has been held to protect. The teenagers who congregate are not members of any organized association, and most are strangers to one another. The dance hall admits all who pay the admission fee, and there is no suggestion that the patrons take positions on public questions or perform other similar activities. Moreover, the Constitution does not recognize a generalized right of "social association" that includes chance encounters in dance halls. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, distinguished. Pp. 23-25. 2. The ordinance does not violate the Equal Prot ction Clause because there is a rational relationship between the age restriction for Class E dance halls and the city's interest in promoting the welfare of teenagers. Respondent's claims-that the ordinance does not meet the city's objectives because adults and teenagers can still associate with one another in places such as his skating rink and that there are other, less intrusive, alternatives to achieve the objectives-misapprehend the nature of rational-basis scrutiny, the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Under this standard, a classification that has some reasonable basis does not offend the Constitution because it is imperfect. Here, the city could reasonably conclude that teenagers might be more susceptible to corrupting influences if permitted to frequent dance halls with older persons or that limiting dance-hall contacts between adults and teenagers would make less likely illicit or undesirable juvenile involvement with alcohol, illegal drugs, or promiscuous sex. While the city permits teenagers and adults to rollerskate together, skating involves less physical contact than dancing, a differentiation that need not be striking to survive rational-basis scrutiny. Pp. 25-28. 744 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.App.1987), reversed and remanded. REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 28. Craig Lee Hopkins, Dallas, Tex., for petitioners. Daniel J. Sheehan, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for respondent. Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Articles generated

 * City Of Dallas v. Stanglin
 * Talk:City Of Dallas v. Stanglin
 * City Of Dallas v. Stanglin/Opinion of the Court
 * Talk:City Of Dallas v. Stanglin/Opinion of the Court
 * City Of Dallas v. Stanglin/Concurrence Stevens
 * Talk:City Of Dallas v. Stanglin/Concurrence Stevens
 * 490 U.S. 19
 * 109 S.Ct. 1591
 * 104 L.Ed.2d 18

Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield

Syllabus On the basis of extensive evidence indicating that large numbers of Indian children were being separated from their families and tribes and were being placed in non-Indian homes through state adoption, foster care, and parental rights termination proceedings, and that this practice caused serious problems for the children, their parents, and their tribes, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), which, inter alia, gives tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings involving an Indian child "who resides or is domiciled within" a tribe's reservation. This case involves the status of twin illegitimate babies, whose parents were enrolled members of appellant Tribe and residents and domiciliaries of its reservation in Neshoba County, Mississippi. After the twins' births in Harrison County, some 200 miles from the reservation, and their parents' execution of consent-to-adoption forms, they were adopted in that county's Chancery Court by the appellees Holyfield, who were non-Indian. That court subsequently overruled appellant's motion to vacate the adoption decree, which was based on the assertion that under the ICWA exclusive jurisdiction was vested in appellant's tribal court. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding, among other things, that the twins were not "domiciled" on the reservation under state law, in light of the Chancery Court's findings (1) that they had never been physically present there, and (2) that they were "voluntarily surrendered" by their parents, who went to some efforts to see that they were born outside the reservation and promptly arranged for their adoption. Therefore, the court said, the twins' domicile was in Harrison County, and the Chancery Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings. Held: The twins were "domiciled" on the Tribe's reservation within the meaning of the ICWA's exclusive tribal jurisdiction provision, and the Chancery Court was, accordingly, without jurisdiction to enter the adoption decree. Pp. 42-54. (a) Although the ICWA does not define "domicile," Congress clearly intended a uniform federal law of domicile for the ICWA and did not consider the definition of the word to be a matter of state law. The ICWA's purpose was, in part, to make clear that in certain situations the state courts did not have jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. In fact, the statutory congressional findings demonstrate that Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly responsible for the child separation problem it intended to correct. Thus, it is most improbable that Congress would have intended to make the scope of the statute's key jurisdictional provision subject to definition by state courts as a matter of state law. Moreover, Congress could hardly have intended the lack of nationwide uniformity that would result from state-law definitions of "domicile," whereby different rules could apply from time to time to the same Indian child, simply as a result of his or her being moved across state lines. Pp. 43-47. (b) The generally accepted meaning of the term "domicile" applies under the ICWA to the extent it is not inconsistent with the objectives of the statute. In the absence of a statutory definition, it is generally assumed that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used, in light of the statute's object and policy. Well-settled common-law principles provide that the domicile of minors, who generally are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish a domicile, is determined by that of their parents, which has traditionally meant the domicile of the mother in the case of illegitimate children. Thus, since the domicile of the twins' mother (as well as their father) has been, at all relevant times, on appellant's reservation, the twins were also domiciled there even though they have never been there. This result is not altered by the fact that they were "voluntarily surrendered" for adoption. Congress enacted the ICWA because of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents, finding that the removal of Indian children from their cultural setting seriously impacts on long-term tribal survival and has a damaging social and psychological impact on many individual Indian children. These concerns demonstrate that Congress could not have intended to enact a rule of domicile that would permit individual Indian parents to defeat the ICWA's jurisdictional scheme simply by giving birth and placing the child for adoption off the reservation. Pp. 47-53. 511 So.2d 918 (Miss.1987), reversed and remanded. BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., joined, post, p. 54. Edwin R. Smith, Meridian, Miss., for appellant. Edward O. Miller, Gulfport, Miss., for appellees. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Articles generated

 * Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
 * Talk:Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
 * Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield/Opinion of the Court
 * Talk:Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield/Opinion of the Court
 * Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield/Dissent Stevens
 * Talk:Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield/Dissent Stevens
 * 490 U.S. 30
 * 109 S.Ct. 1597
 * 104 L.Ed.2d 29

Amerada Hess Corporation v. Director Division Of Taxation New Jersey Department Of The Treasury

Syllabus Appellant oil companies do business in New Jersey and are subject to that State's Corporation Business Tax. They are also subject to the federal windfall profit tax on their crude-oil product on, which does not occur in New Jersey. They each sought a deduction for the federal tax in calculating "entire net income" on their 1980 and 1981 state tax returns, but appellee, the Director of the New Jersey Division of Taxation, assessed deficiencies on the ground that the "add-back" provision of the state tax statute prohibited corporations from deducting a federal tax that is "on or measured by profits or income." The State Tax Court affirmed the assessments, but the Appellate Division of the State Superior Court reversed. The State Supreme Court in turn reversed and reinstated the Tax Court's judgment, holding that the windfall profit tax is measured by "profits or income" for the purposes of the add-back provision and that, as so construed, that provision did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Held: 1. The New Jersey tax satisfies all four elements of the test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326, and therefore passes Commerce Clause scrutiny even though the add-back provision denies appellants deductions for windfall profit tax payments. Pp. 72-79. (a) New Jersey has a "substantial nexus" with the activities that generate appellants' "entire net income," including oil production occurring entirely outside the State, since each appellant's New Jersey operations are part of an integrated "unitary business" that includes crude-oil production. P. 73. (b) The tax is fairly apportioned, since the part of the "entire net income" to be taxed is determined according to the standard three-factor apportionment formula that this Court has expressly approved. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 170, 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2943, 77 L.Ed.2d 545. The use of the formula as applied to appellants is not invalid on the ground that the windfall profit tax is an exclusively out-of-state expense, since the costs of a unitary business cannot be deemed confined to the locality in which they are incurred. Id., at 182, 103 S.Ct. at 2949. Pp. 73-75. (c) The tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The add-back provision is not facially discriminatory, since there is no explicit discriminatory design to the tax. Nor does the provision apply exclusively to a localized industry, since it generally excludes any federal tax "on or measured by income or profits," including the nationwide federal income tax. Moreover, appellants concede that no discriminatory motive underlies the provision, which cannot be held to exert pressure on an interstate business to conduct more of its activities in New Jersey. Pp. 75-79. (d) The tax is "fairly related" to the benefits the State provides appellants, including police and fire protection, a trained work force, and the advantages of a civilized society. P. 79. 2. The New Jersey tax does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 79-80. 107 N.J. 307, 526 A.2d 1029 (1987), affirmed. BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 80. O'CONNOR, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Mark L. Evans, for appellants. Mary R. Hamill, Trenton, N.J., for appellees. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Articles generated

 * Amerada Hess Corporation v. Director Division Of Taxation New Jersey Department Of The Treasury
 * Talk:Amerada Hess Corporation v. Director Division Of Taxation New Jersey Department Of The Treasury
 * Amerada Hess Corporation v. Director Division Of Taxation New Jersey Department Of The Treasury/Opinion of the Court
 * Talk:Amerada Hess Corporation v. Director Division Of Taxation New Jersey Department Of The Treasury/Opinion of the Court
 * Amerada Hess Corporation v. Director Division Of Taxation New Jersey Department Of The Treasury/Concurrence Scalia
 * Talk:Amerada Hess Corporation v. Director Division Of Taxation New Jersey Department Of The Treasury/Concurrence Scalia
 * 490 U.S. 66
 * 109 S.Ct. 1617
 * 104 L.Ed.2d 58

Federal Savings And Loan Insurance Corporation v. Ticktin

Syllabus The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. (FSLIC), in its capacity as receiver of a state-chartered savings and loan association, brought an action in Federal District Court against former directors of the association for breach of their fiduciary duties under Illinois law. The District Court held that it had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which specifies that, except as "otherwise provided" by federal law, district courts have jurisdiction of all civil actions "commenced by" a federal agency "expressly authorized to sue" by Act of Congress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a proviso in 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) withdraws federal jurisdiction in cases in which the FSLIC "is a party in its capacity as . . . receiver . . . of an insured State-chartered institution" if the suit "involves only the rights or obligations of investors, creditors, stockholders, and such institution under State law." Held: The District Court has jurisdiction over the FSLIC's action. Pp. 1627-1629. (a) In view of the fact that this case was "commenced by" a federal agency "expressly authorized to sue" under 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c), § 1345 supports the District Court's jurisdiction unless § 1730(k)(1) "otherwise provide[s]." Pp. 84-85. (b) A limitation on § 1345's jurisdictional grant is not "otherwise provided" by § 1730(k)(1), the proviso of which declares that FSLIC receivership cases involving specified parties and state-law rights "shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States." The proviso does not apply to clause (A) of § 1730(k)(1)-which states that the FSLIC "shall be deemed to be an agency of the United States" and thereby confirms that § 1345's party-based jurisdiction is applicable in cases brought by the FSLIC-since that clause does not rely on the presence of a federal question as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Rather, the proviso imposes a limit on the grant of federal-question jurisdiction set forth in clauses (B) and (C) of § 1730(k)(1), which declare respectively that any civil suit in which the FSLIC is a party "shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States," and that the FSLIC has the right to remove "any such action" from state to federal court. Pp. 85-87. 832 F.2d 1438 (CA 7 1987), reversed. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard G. Taranto, for petitioner. James B. Koch, Chicago, Ill., for respondents. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Articles generated

 * Federal Savings And Loan Insurance Corporation v. Ticktin
 * Talk:Federal Savings And Loan Insurance Corporation v. Ticktin
 * Federal Savings And Loan Insurance Corporation v. Ticktin/Opinion of the Court
 * Talk:Federal Savings And Loan Insurance Corporation v. Ticktin/Opinion of the Court
 * 490 U.S. 82
 * 109 S.Ct. 1626
 * 104 L.Ed.2d 73