Ure v. Coffman

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, sitting in admiralty.

It was a case of collision, which occurred in the Mississippi river, about fifty-five miles above New Orleans.

The narrative of the case is given in the opinion of the court.

The District Court decreed in favor of the owners of the flat-boat, who were the libellants, in the sum of $3,416.15, with five per cent. interest from the 24th of December, 1853, until paid, and costs.

Upon an appeal to the Circuit Court, this decree was affirmed, whereupon the claimants of the Gipsey appealed to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Taylor for the appellants, and by Mr. Benjamin for the appellees.

Mr. Taylor made the following points:

1st. That the appellant was engaged in a lawful business; that he exercised ordinary prudence in the prosecution of his voyage on the night in question; and that the collision was the result of an accident, and not from negligence, misconduct, or want of skill; and that he is in no way responsible for the loss sustained by the appellees. Va. In. Co. v. Millaudon, 11 L. R., 115; Stainbeach v. Rea, 14 Howard U.S. R., 532.

2d. That if there was any fault or want of care on the part of the appellant, there was also fault or want of care on the part of the appellees, inasmuch as they failed to make use of that common care and prudence which is required of all, in the public interest, by neglecting to keep any watch on the flat-boat, or to expose a light upon it, and that therefore they have no right to recover. Delaware v. Osprey, 2 Wallace, 273; Ward v. Armstrong, 14 Ill., 283, 285; Innis v. Steamer Senator, 1 Cal., 459, 460; Simpson v. Hand, 6 Wharton, 324; Murphy v. Diamond, 3 An., 441; Lesseps v. Pontchartrain R. R., 17 L. R., 261; Fleytas v. Pontchartrain R. R., 18 L., 339; Carlisle v. Holton 3 An., 48; The Alival, 25 Eng. Law and Equity, 604; 5 Statutes at Large, 306, sec. 10; Act of Louisiana of 1832.

3d. That if the appellant was at all in fault, and responsible in some degree because of that fault, then the appellees are only entitled to recover one-half of the amount of the damages occasioned by the collision. Brickell v. Frisby, 2 R., 205; Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 17 Howard U.S. R., 170.

Mr. Benjamin made the following points:

The claimants and appellants do not deny that they ran into and sank the flat-boat, whilst she was lying tied up to the bank at night, but they seek to excuse themselves by urging:

First. That the flat was lying moored to the bank of the river, at a distance of only fifty feet below a wood-yard, in the way of steamboats taking wood, and in the way of steamboats landing freight or passengers, at the usual landing of Madame Trudeau, the owner of the plantation on which the wood-yard was situated; and

Secondly. That the flat-boat had no light out, and was so concealed by the shadows of the bank that she could not be seen.

I. To this first excuse, the short and ready answer is, that the Gipsey was not engaged in any attempt to land at the wood-yard, or at Mrs. Trudeau's landing place, when she ran into the flat-boat; but, on the contrary, was bound up the river for a landing at George Mather's plantation.

Yet the night was so dark and foggy, that whilst they thought they were running up the river, they ran directly into the bank, sinking the flat-boat.

They pretend that the night was not too dark to run, and that it was quite light enough for them to pursue their voyage with safety. The testimony is somewhat conflicting on this point; but on their own evidence they are in a fatal dilemma. By the evidence of her own officers, the Gipsey would have run directly into the bank of the river, if the flat-boat had not intervened. Now, if it was light enough to navigate with safety, the fact proves the grossest carelessness and negligence, sufficient to make the steamer responsible.

If, on the contrary, it was not light enough to navigate with safety, there was criminal imprudence in continuing the voyage, instead of lying up till the darkness was dissipated.

The district judge puts the dilemma very clearly in his opinion, and there is no escape from it.

II. To the second excuse, the answer is, that there was no obligation on the part of the flat-boat to exhibit a light.

She was moored in a nook or recess of the bank where it had caved, so as to leave a point of land jutting out into the river above and below her.

Whether near a wood-yard, or not, is a matter of no consequence. She was not at the wood-yard. She was nestled securely, as her owners had every reason to believe, beyond the possibility of harm from ascending or descending boats, and she was not harmed by any boat that was ascending or descending by a proper course, but by a boat which, whilst its officers declare they were bound up the river, run straight across it, to a spot where they had no intention of going.

A steamboat running at night is bound to have lights, (act July, 1838, 5 Stat. at Large, 306,) and it would no doubt be held imprudent for a flat-boat, under the same circumstances, to neglect the same precaution; but it never has been even pretended, before, that a vessel of any kind, tied to the bank of a river, not in any port or harbor, or usual place of landing, is bound to show a light, still less when, as in the present case, the vessel was lying in a nook or recess of the bank, entirely out of the usual course of ascending or descending vessels.

Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.