United Steelworkers of America v. United States/Opinion of the Court

The Attorney General sought and obtained in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania an injunction against the continuation of an industry-wide strike of workers in the basic steel industry pursuant to § 208 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 155, 29 U.S.C. § 178, 29 U.S.C.A. § 178. We granted certiorari, 361 U.S. 878, 80 S.Ct. 143, to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 271 F.2d 676, affirming the District Court, 178 F.Supp. 297. In pertinent part, § 208 provides that if the District Court-

'finds that * *  * (a) threatened or actual strike or lockout-

'(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof     engaged in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or      communication among the several States or with foreign      nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce;      and

'(ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the     national health or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to      enjoin any such strike or lockout, or the continuing thereof,      and to make such other orders as may be appropriate.'

The arguments of the parties here and in the lower courts have addressed themselves in considerable part to the propriety of the District Court's exercising its equitable jurisdiction to enjoin the strike in question once the findings set forth above had been made. These arguments have ranged widely into broad issues of national labor policy, the availability of other remedies to the Executive, the effect of a labor injunction on the collective bargaining process, consideration of the conduct of the parties to the labor dispute in their negotiations, and conjecture as to the course of those negotiations in the future. We do not believe that Congress in passing the statute intended that the issuance of injunctions should depend upon judicial inquiries of this nature. Congress was not concerned with the merits of the parties' positions or the conduct of their negotiations. Its basic purpose seems to have been to see that vital production should be resumed or continued for a time while further efforts were made to settle the dispute. To carry out its purposes, Congress carefully surrounded the injunction proceedings with detailed procedural devices and limitations. The public report of a board of inquiry, the exercise of political and executive responsibility personally by the President in directing the commencement of injunction proceedings, the statutory provisions looking toward an adjustment of the dispute during the injunction's pendency, and the limited duration of the injunction, represent a congressional determination of policy factors involved in the difficult problem of national emergency strikes. This congressional determination of the policy factors is of course binding on the courts.

The statute imposes upon the courts the duty of finding, upon the evidence adduced, whether a strike or lockout meets the statutory conditions of breadth of involvement and peril to the national health or safety. We have accordingly reviewed the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. Petitioner here contests the findings that the continuation of the strike would imperil the national health and safety. The parties dispute the meaning of the statutory term 'national health'; the Government insists that the term comprehends the country's general well-being, its economic health; petitioner urges that simply the physical health of the citizenry is meant. We need not resolve this question, for we think the judgment below is amply supported on the ground that the strike imperils the national safety. Here we rely upon the evidence of the strike's effect on specific defense projects; we need not pass on the Government's contention that 'national safety' in this context should be given a broader construction and application.

The petitioner suggests that a selective reopening of some of the steel mills would suffice to fulfill specific defense needs. The statute was designed to provide a public remedy in times of emergency; we cannot construe it to require that the United States either formulate a reorganization of the affected industry to satisfy its defense needs without the complete reopening of closed facilities, or demonstrate in court the unfeasibility of such a reorganization. There is no room in the statute for this requirement which the petitioner seeks to impose on the Government.

We are of opinion that the provision in question as applied here is not violative of the constitutional limitation prohibiting courts from exercising powers of a legislative or executive nature, powers not capable of being conferred upon a court exercising solely 'the judicial power of the United States.' Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 43 S.Ct. 445, 67 L.Ed. 731; Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 50 S.Ct. 389, 74 L.Ed. 969. Petitioner contends that the statute is constitutionally invalid because it does not set up any standard of lawful or unlawful conduct on the part of labor or management. But the statute does recognize certain rights in the public to have unimpeded for a time production in industries vital to the national health or safety. It makes the United States the guardian of these rights in litigation. Cf. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370, 9 S.Ct. 90, 98, 32 L.Ed. 450; Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352. The availability of relief, in the common judicial form of an injunction, depends on findings of fact, to be judicially made. Of the matters decided judicially, there is no review by other agencies of the Government. Cf. Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561, 17 L.Ed. 921, 117 U.S. 697. We conclude that the statute entrusts the courts only with the determination of a 'case or controversy,' on which the judicial power can operate, not containing any element capable of only legislative or executive determination. We do not find that the termination of the injunction after a specified time, or the machinery established in an attempt to obtain a peaceful settlement of the underlying dispute during the injunction's pendency, detracts from this conclusion.

The result is that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming that of the District Court, is affirmed. Our mandate shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice HARLAN: In joining the Court's opinion we note our intention to file in due course an amplification of our views upon the issues involved which could not be prepared within the time limitations imposed by the necessity of a prompt adjudication in this case. See 80 S.Ct. 177.

Separate opinion of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring in the opinion of the Court dated November 7, 1959.