United States v. White (401 U.S. 745)/Dissent Brennan

Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, stated the philosophy of Katz, soon to be adopted:

'(T)here is a qualitative difference between electronic     surveillance, whether the agents conceal the devices on their      persons or in walls or under beds, and conventional police      stratagems such as eavesdropping and disguise. The latter do     not so seriously intrude upon the right of privacy. The risk     of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an      informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one      deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human      society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume     whenever we speak. But as soon as electronic surveillance     comes into play, the risk changes crucially. There is no     security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of      mitigating the risk, and so not even a residuum of true      privacy. * *  *

' * *  * Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to      eavesdropping. They make it more penetrating, more     indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police     omniscient; and police omniscience is one of the most      effective tools of tyranny.' 373 U.S., at 465-466, 83 S.Ct.,      at 1402.

It is urged by the Department of Justice that On Lee be established as the controlling decision in this field. I would stand by Berger and Katz and reaffirm the need for judicial supervision under the Fourth Amendment of the use of electronic surveillance which, uncontrolled, promises to lead us into a police state.

These were wholly pre-arranged episodes of surveillance. The first was in the informant's home to which respondent had been invited. The second was also in the informer's home, the next day. The third was four days later at the home of the respondent. The fourth was in the informer's car two days later. Twelve days after that a meeting in the informer's home was intruded upon. The sixth occurred at a street rendezvous. The seventh was in the informer's home and the eighth in a restaurant owned by respondent's mother-law. So far as time is concerned there is no excuse for not seeking a warrant. And while there is always an effort involved in preparing affidavits or other evidence in support of a showing a probable cause, that burden was given constitutional sanction in the Fourth Amendment against the activities of the agents of George III. It was designed not to protect criminals but to protect everyone's privacy.

On Lee and Lopez are of a vintage opposed to Berger and Katz. However they may be explained, they are products of the old common-law notions of trespass. Katz, on the other hand, emphasized that with few exceptions 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. * *  * ' 389 U.S., at 357, 88 S.Ct., at 514. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, put administrative searches under the Fourth Amendment. We held that administrative actions, like other searches, implicated officials in an invasion of privacy and that the Fourth Amendment was meant to guard against the arbitrariness of any such invasion. We said:

'We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the     warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad      statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized      review, particularly when those safeguards may only be      invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.' Id., at 533, 87      S.Ct., at 1733.

In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, in considering the constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest we held that, while the area in the immediate reach of an arrestee is 'reasonable' though made without a warrant a search beyond that zone may generally be made 'only under the authority of a search warrant.' Id., at 763, 89 S.Ct., at 2040. And in two 'stop and frisk' cases, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676, we held that any restraint of the person, however brief, was subject to judicial inquiry on 'reasonableness' (392 U.S., at 19, 88 S.Ct., at 1878) and that 'the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security. * *  * ' Id., at 18 n. 15, 88 S.Ct., at 1878.

We have moved far away from the rationale of On Lee and Lopez and only a retrogressive step of large dimensions would bring us back to it.

The threads of thought running through our recent decisions are that these extensive intrusions into privacy made by electronic surveillance make self-restraint by law enforcement officials an inadequate protection, that the requirement of warrants under the Fourth Amendment is essential to a free society.

Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances. Free discourse-a First Amendment value-may be frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, reactionary or revolutionary, profane or in good taste; but it is not free if there is surveillance. Free discourse liberates the spirit, though it may produce only froth. The individual must keep some facts concerning his thoughts within a small zone of people. At the same time he must be free to pour out his woes or inspirations or dreams to others. He remains the sole judge as to what must be said and what must remain unspoken. This is the essence of the idea of privacy implicit in the First and Fifth Amendments as well as in the Fourth.

The philosophy of the value of privacy reflected in the Fourth Amendment's ban on 'unreasonable searches and seizures' has been forcefully stated by a former Attorney General of the United States:

'Privacy is the basis of individuality. To be alone and be     let alone, to be with chosen company, to say what you think,      or don't think, but to say what you will, is to be yourself. Solitude is imperative, even in a high rise apartment. Personality develops from within. To reflect is to know     yourself. Character is formed through years of     self-examination. Without this opportunity, character will be     formed largely by uncontrolled external social stimulations. Americans are excessively homogenized already.

'Few conversations would be what they are if the speakers     thought others were listening. Silly, secret, thoughtless and     thoughtful statements would all be affected. The sheer     numbers in our lives, the anonymity of urban living and the      inability to influence things that are important are      depersonalizing and dehumanizing factors of modern life. To     penetrate the last refuge of the individual, the precious      little privacy that remains, the basis of individual dignity,      can have meaning to the quality of our lives that we cannot      foresee. In terms of present values, that meaning cannot be     good.

'Invasions of privacy demean the individual. Can a society be     better than the people composing it? When a government     degrades its citizens, or permits them to degrade each other,      however beneficent the specific purpose, it limits      opportunities for individual fulfillment and national      accomplishment. If America permits fear and its failure to     make basic social reforms to excuse police use of secret      electronic surveillance, the price will be dear indeed. The     practice is incompatible with a free society.' R. Clark,      Crime in America 287 (1970).

Now that the discredited decisions in On Lee and Lopez are resuscitated and revived, must everyone live in fear that every word he speaks may be transmitted or recorded and later repeated to the entire world? I can imagine nothing that has a more chilling effect on people speaking their minds and expressing their views on important matters. The advocates of that regime should spend some time in totalitarian countries and learn firsthand the kind of regime they are creating here.

The decision not to make Katz retroactive to any electronic surveillance which occurred prior to December 18, 1967 (the day we decided Katz), is not, in my view, a tenable one for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Harlan and me in our dissents in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255, 256, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 1037, 1038, 22 L.Ed.2d 248.

APPENDIX I TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING

I have agreed with the broad purpose of the Supreme Court decision relating to wire-tapping in investigations. The Court is undoubtedly sound both in regard to the use of evidence secured over tapped wires in the prosecution of citizens in criminal cases; and is also right in its opinion that under ordinary and normal circumstances wire-tapping by Government agents should not be carried on for the excellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights.

However, I am convinced that the Supreme Court never intended any dictum in the particular case which it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the nation.

It is, of course, well known that certain other nations have been engaged in the organization of propaganda of so-called 'fifth columns' in other countries and in preparation for sabotage, as well as in actual sabotage.

It is too late to do anything about it after sabotage, assassinations and 'fifth column' activities are completed.

You are, therefore, authorized and directed in such cases as you may approve, after investigation of the need in each case, to authorize the necessary investigation agents that they are at liberty to secure information by listening devices directed to the conversation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies. You are requested furthermore to limit these investigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar as possible to aliens.

[SEAL]

/s/ F.D.R.

APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

I am strongly opposed to the interception of telephone conversations as a general investigative technique. I recognize that mechanical and electronic devices may sometimes be essential in protecting our national security. Nevertheless, it is clear that indiscriminate use of those investigative devices to overhear telephone conversations, without the knowledge or consent of any of the persons involved, could result in serious abuses and invasions of privacy. In my view, the invasion of privacy of communications is a highly offensive practice which should be engaged in only where the national security is at stake. To avoid any misunderstanding on this subject in the Federal Government, I am establishing the following basic guidelines to be followed by all government agencies:

(1) No federal personnel is to intercept telephone conversations within the United States by any mechanical or electronic device, without the consent of one of the parties involved, (except in connection with investigations related to the national security).

(2) No interception shall be undertaken or continued without first obtaining the approval of the Attorney General.

(3) All federal agencies shall immediately conform their practices and procedures to the provisions of this order.

Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear non-telephone conversations is an even more difficult problem, which raises substantial and unresolved questions of Constitutional interpretation. I desire that each agency conducting such investigations consult with the Attorney General to ascertain whether the agency's practices are fully in accord with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of others.

Every agency head shall submit to the Attorney General within 30 days a complete inventory of all mechanical and electronic equipment and devices used for or capable of intercepting telephone conversations. In addition, such reports shall contain a list of any interceptions currently authorized and the reasons for them.

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson