United States v. Welden/Opinion of the Court

This appeal presents the question of whether a person who has testified under subpoena before a congressional committee investigating the operation of the Antitrust Acts has testified in a 'proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts' thereby acquiring immunity from prosecution under the Act of February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904.

The facts are undisputed. On September 6, 1962, appellee, along with other individuals and corporations, was indicted on charges of conspiring to fix milk prices and to defraud the United States, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Conspiracy Act, 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that the prosecution was barred under the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, because he had previously testified before a subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small Business concerning matters covered by the indictment. The Government opposed the motion to dismiss contending that the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, extends only to judicial proceedings and not to hearings before congressional committees. The District Court for the District of Massachusetts, rejecting the Government's contention, dismissed the indictment against appellee. The Government appealed the dismissal directly to this Court pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, 62 Stat. 844, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 375 U.S. 809, 84 S.Ct. 63, 11 L.Ed.2d 46.

We hold, for the reasons stated below, that the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, applies only to persons testifying in judicial proceedings, not to persons testifying before committees or subcommittees of Congress.

The immunity provision in question was enacted as part of an appropriations act which declared:

'That for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act     entitled 'An Act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven,      and all Acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, and      of the Act entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce      against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' approved July      second, eighteen hundred and ninety, and all Acts amendatory      thereof or supplemental thereto, and sections seventy-three,      seventy-four, seventy-five, and seventy-six of the Act      entitled 'An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for      the Government, and other purposes,' approved August      twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, the sum of      five hundred thousand dollars, to be immediately available,      is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not      heretofore appropriated, to be expended under the direction      of the Attorney-General in the employment of special counsel      and agents of the Department of Justice to conduct      proceedings, suits, and prosecutions under said Acts in the      courts of the United States: Provided, That no person shall      be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture      for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing      concerning which he may testify or produce evidence,      documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or      prosecution under said Acts *  *  * ' 32 Stat. 903-904.     (Emphasis added.)

By any common-sense reading of this statute, the words ' ny proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts' in the proviso plainly refer to the phrase 'proceedings, suits, and prosecutions under said Acts in the courts of the United States,' in the previous clause. The words 'under said Acts' confirmed that the immunity provision is limited to judicial proceedings, which are brought 'under' specific existing acts, such as the Sherman Act or the Commerce Act. Congressional investigations, although they may relate to specific existing acts, are not generally so restricted in purpose or scope as to be spoken of as being brought 'under' these Acts.

In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 decided only three years after the passage of the Act of February 25, 1903, this Court construed that Act in accordance with the plain meaning of its words as follows:

'While there may be some doubt whether the examination of     witnesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution, we      have no doubt that it is a 'proceeding' within the meaning of      this proviso. The word should receive as wide a construction     as is necessary to protect the witness in his disclosures,      whenever such disclosures are made in pursuance of a judicial      inquiry, whether such inquiry be instituted by a grand jury,      or upon the trial of an indictment found by them.' Id., 201      U.S. at 66, 26 S.Ct. at 375, 50 L.Ed. 652. (Emphasis added.)

We conclude, therefore, that as enacted the Act of February 25, 1903, applies only to judicial proceedings.

Appellee does not really dispute this. His basic contention, which is not accepted by any member of the Court, is that the 1906 immunity statute amended the Act of February 25, 1903, to extend immunity to persons who testified in nonjudicial as well as judicial proceedings. He does not contend that the 1906 statute, by its terms, so amended the 1903 Act. He offers the following interpretation of the events leading up to the enactment of the 1906 statute in support of the contention that the 1903 Act was amended by implication to extend to nonjudicial proceedings. In the case of United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808, decided three years after the enactment of the 1903 Act, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that certain defendants had been immunized from prosecution under the Antitrust Laws by giving unsubpoenaed and unsworn testimony in a nonjudicial investigation conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations, an official of the Department of Commerce and Labor. Congressional reaction to this decision was immediate and adverse, and within four months Congress enacted the 1906 immunity statute. This statute specifically limited immunity under existing immunity statutes to persons testifying under oath and in obedience to subpoena. Appellee contends that the purpose of Congress in enacting the 1906 statute was to remedy the objectionable features of the Armour decision, and that since the statute did not 'remedy' the court's holding that immunity could be obtained by testifying in a nonjudicial proceeding, it follows that Congress did not regard that holding as objectionable. He asks us to conclude, therefore, that 'proceeding' as used in the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, must now be read to include nonjudicial as well as judicial proceedings.

This argument erroneously assumes that the Armour decision rested on a construction of 'proceeding, suit, or prosecution' in the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903. A reading of that decision reveals, however, that it rested primarily on the Commerce and Labor Act, which contained a specific grant of immunity to persons who testified in investigations, admittedly nonjudicial, conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations. In deciding the Armour case, the court felt it 'necessary to look into the purp ses of Congress in passing the commerce and labor act in order that the court may determine what construction will best carry out the legislative intent.' 142 F. at 819. After a detailed analysis of that statute and its history, the court concluded that the Commerce and Labor Act was dispositive of the case and that defendants were entitled to immunity thereunder. Following this conclusion, the judge added a brief paragraph in which he said, without analyzing (or even quoting) the language or history of the Act of February 25, 1903, that he was 'of opinion' that the defendants would also be entitled to immunity under that Act as well. Id., 142 F. at 826. In the very next paragraph, however, the judge again described the opinion as resting on 'the construction here given to the commerce and labor law * *  * .' Ibid.

The controversial feature of the Armour decision, and the only one which Congress was interested in remedying, was the holding that unsubpoenaed and unsworn testimony came within 'the purposes of Congress in passing the commerce and labor act * *  * .' 142 F. at 819. Congress wanted to be certain that persons anticipating indictment could not immunize themselves from prosecution by volunteering to give unsworn testimony. There was nothing controversial about the court's holding that immunity could result from testimony given in an investigation conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations, since the Commerce and Labor Act specifically granted immunity for testimony given in such an investigation.

It is not at all significant, therefore, that Congress, while 'remedying' the Armour holding that immunity could be obtained from testimony which was unsworn and voluntary, did not 'remedy' the holding that immunity could result from testimony given in nonjudicial investigations conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations.

Congress, in enacting the 1906 statute, did not manifest any intent to enlarge the reach of the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial proceedings. The purpose of the 1906 statute was not to define the type of proceeding in thich immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. Its sole purpose was to define the type of testimony for which immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. This is all Congress was asked to do by President Theodore Roosevelt in his message recommending the legislation which became the 1906 statute. In his message the President said:

'It has hitherto been supposed that the immunity conferred by     existing laws was only upon persons who, being subpoenaed,      had given testimony or produced evidence *  *  *.

'But Judge Humphrey (the district judge who decided the     Armour case) holds that if the Commissioner of Corporations      (and therefore if the Interstate Commerce Commission), in the      course of any investigations prescribed by Congress, asks any      questions of a person, not called as a witness, or asks any      questions of an officer of a corporation, not called as a      witness, with regard to the action of the corporation on a      subject out of which prosecutions may subsequently arise,      then the fact of such questions having been asked operates as      a bar to the prosecution of that person or of that officer of      the corporation for his own misdeeds. Such interpretation of     the law comes measurably near making the law a farce, and I      therefore recommend that the Congress pass a declaratory act      stating its real intention.' H.R.Doc. No. 706, 59th Cong.,     1st Sess.

The limited purpose of the 1906 Act is also apparent from the response made by Senator Knox, the manager of the bill which became the 1906 Act, to a statement made by Senator Daniel, a ritic of immunity legislation. Senator Daniel said:

'I suppose that the bill under consideration as it reads now     applies only to persons who testify in a judicial proceeding      or to those who are responding to some body such as a      Congressional committee that has the right to enforce an      answer from a witness.

'I should like very much to hear from the patron of this bill     some statement as to the present state of the law and as to      the benefits to be derived from the bill.'

'Mr. President, the purpose of this bill is clear, and its     range is not very broad. It is not intended to cover all     disputed provisions as to the rights of witnesses under any      circumstances, except those enumerated in the bill itself. *     *  *

'Mr. President, the whole purpose of this bill is to define     the right of the witness as we thought it was defined in the      statute which I have read, and to say, as the statute said,      but to say it even more clearly and emphatically, that the      immunity shall only extend to witnesses who have been subpoenaed to produce      books and papers or subpoenaed to give testimony. The essence     of the whole act is found in lies 18, 19, and 20, on page 2,      which read that these immunity provisions-only the immunity      provisions under the interstate commerce act and under the      Commerce and Labor act, not the general immunity that the      citizen enjoys in judicial proceedings, but merely in      relation to the proceedings of these two great bureaus of the      Government-'shall extend only to a natural person.' That is,      that a corporation is not to have the benefit of the immunity      provisions, but they-shall extend only to a natural person      who, in obedience to a subpoena, given testimony under oath      or produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath.'      40 Cong.Rec. 7657-7658.

This Court in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 429-430, 63 S.Ct. 409, 411, 412, 87 L.Ed. 376, recognized that 'the sole purpose' of the 1906 statute was to limit immunity to persons 'who, in obedience to a subpoena, testified or produced evidence under oath,' so that the decision whether or not to grant immunity would be that of the appropriate 'Government officials,' rather than of private citizens anticipating indictment.

We conclude, therefore, that the 1906 statute did not, either expressly or implicitly, extend the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial proceedings. The 1906 Act simply limited immunity to persons testifying under oath and in response to subpoena.

Our decision today is based solely on the language and legislative history of the relevant congressional enactments. Congress has extended immunity, with careful safeguards, to persons testifying before congressional committees in certain limited situations not here involved. Where Congress, however, has limited immunity to persons testifying in judicial proceedings, as it has plainly done here, it is not for the courts to extend the scope of the immunity.

The District Court erred, therefore, in holding that appellee's testimony before a congressional subcommittee had immunized him from prosecution. The judgment dismissing the indictment is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.