United States v. Villalonga/Opinion of the Court

No doubt a factor who has made advances upon goods consigned to him, may be regarded, in a limited sense, and to the extent of his advances, as an owner. Yet, in reality, he has but a lien with a right of possession of the goods for its security. He may protect that possession by suit against a trespasser upon it, and he may sell the property to reimburse advances; remaining, however, accountable to his consignor for any surplus. But after all he is not the real owner. He is only an agent of the owner for certain purposes. The owner may, at any time before his factor has sold the goods, reclaim the possession upon paying the advances made, with interest and expenses. He has not lost his ownership by committing the custody of the goods to a factor and by receiving advances upon them. He is still entitled to the proceeds of any sale which may be made, even by his agent, the factor, subject only to a charge of the advances and expenses. A factor, therefore, notwithstanding he may have made advances upon the property consigned to him, has but a limited right. That right is sometimes called a special property, but it is never regarded as a general ownership. At most, it is no more than ownership of a lien or charge upon the property. Such is unquestionably the doctrine of the common law. And there is nothing in any statute affecting this case that changes the doctrine. Certainly the statutes of Georgia, whence this case comes, have no such effect. In the code of that State of 1861, while a factor's lien is recognized and declared to extend to all balances on general account, and to attach to the proceeds of sale of goods consigned as well as to the goods themselves, there is nothing that declares he has anything more than a lien protected by his possession. Injuries to that possession may indeed be redressed by action in his name, and it may be assumed that upon contracts of sale made by him he may sue, but all this is perfectly consistent with the continuance of the general ownership in his consignors until he has made a sale. And there is a very significant clause in the statutes of the State which shows that a factor there has not the general property. In section 2969, of the article respecting injuries to personalty generally, it is enacted that 'in cases of bailments, where the possession is in the bailee, a trespass committed during the existence of the bailment will give a right of action to the bailee for the interference with his special property, and a concurrent right of action to the bailor for interference with his general property.' If this applies to the case of bailment to a factor, as is supposed by the defendant in error, it is a clear declaration that the factor's right does not extend beyond a special property, a mere right to hold for a particular purpose, and that it does not amount to ownership of the property consigned to him. And there is nothing in the new code of Georgia, or in any of the decisions of the Supreme Court, that is variant from this. Admit that a factor may maintain an action when his possession is disturbed, still it is a question what may he recover? Under the statutes of Georgia he can recover only for the injury which his special property, namely, his lien, has sustained. For all beyond that, the general owner may sue. The property of that owner is not vested in his factor.

If, then, it be, as was said by the Chief Justice in Klein's case, that the government constituted itself the trustee of captured or abandoned property for the original owners thereof, it is hard to see how the trust can exist for the benefit of the owner of a special property therein beyond the extent of his interest, which, as we have seen, in case of a factor, is measured by the amount of his advances and expenses.

For all beyond that, by the law of Georgia, the original owner who consigned the goods to the factor might sue, and for that original owner the government became a trustee of all beyond the factor's interest, according to the doctrine of Klein's case.

In this view of the case in hand it is clear that the claimant is not the 'owner of the' captured 'property,' 'having a right to the proceeds thereof,' within the meaning of the Captured or Abandoned Property Act. He owns of the cotton consigned to him nothing but a lien for his advances and expenses, and he is, therefore, not entitled to the entire proceeds of the sale of the property.

There are other considerations that support this conclusion. Plainly it was the intention of Congress, manifested in the statute, that no person should be permitted to recover out of the treasury any of the proceeds of sale of the property captured or abandoned, except those who had given no aid or comfort to the rebellion. But if a factor who has made advances, no matter how small, may recover the entire proceeds of a consignment made to him, not only what he has advanced, but the share of his principal, the intention of the law may be wholly defeated. He may have received consignments from persons most active in promoting the rebellion, and he may have advanced only one dollar on each bale of cotton consigned. If, now, he can recover the entire net proceeds of the sale of such cotton paid into the treasury, his consignors, through him, using him as a cover, escape entirely from the operation of the provision of the statute-that no one hall have a standing in the Court of Claims who has given aid and comfort to the rebellion. A construction of the law which admits of such a consequence cannot be correct. The intention of Congress is not thus to be evaded.

There is yet another consideration not to be overlooked. Under the act of March 3d, 1863, amending the act to establish the Court of Claims, that court has power to consider and determine all set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, or other claims which the government may have against any claimant in the court, and render judgment against such claimant if he be found indebted to the government. Can a debtor to the United States evade his liability to a judgment against him by consigning his property to a factor and obtaining some advances? May the factor recover all that is in the treasury, though the government may have large claims against his principals, who are the real parties in interest? We cannot think the acts of Congress admit of such an interpretation. These considerations show that the 'owner,' spoken of in the third section of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, 'having a right to the proceeds thereof,' is he who has the legal interest in those proceeds, and that a factor who made advances before the capture can, at most, recover only to the extent of his lien.

The court below rested their judgment upon Carroll's case, but that case, in our opinion, has little analogy to this. There, an administratrix of a deceased person was the claimant, and it was held to be no bar to the suit that the decedent gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, the property having been taken after his death from the administratrix, and not from him, and the administratrix was declared to be the owner within the meaning of the statute. Undoubtedly she was the full legal owner, entitled both in law and in equity to the entire property. Hers was the only title which existed at the time of the capture. Through whom she acquired it was deemed immaterial. It was sufficient that no other person had a definite right. This is no such case. Here there are owners, both in law and in equity, other than the claimant, and the statute has opened the Court of Claims for them, if they have never given aid or comfort to the rebellion. The present claimant, at most, is entitled to no more than the net proceeds of sale of his own cotton, one hundred and ninety-six bales, and the amount of his advances on the other cotton, reducing those advances to their worth in the money of the United States at the time the advances were made.

JUDGMENT REVERSED, and the cause REMITTED with instructions to proceed.

IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS OPINION.