United States v. Vallejo (66 U.S. 541)/Dissent Grier

Mr. Justice GRIER.

I cannot consent, by my silence, that an inference should be drawn that I concur in the opinion just delivered. I cannot agree to confiscate the property of some thousand of our fellow-citizens, who have purchased under this title and made improvements to the value of many millions, on suspicions first raised here as to the integrity of a grant universally acknowledged to be genuine in the country where it originated. I do not intend to enter into any argument with my brethren of the majority. If they are satisfied with the conclusion, the presumption is, that the minority is mistaken. And I would not wish to weaken any arguments that may be urged to justify this wholesale confiscation. I shall merely mention a few of the facts and principles n which I have been constrained to dissent.

This Government has bound itself by a solemn treaty to respect all just claims which the citizens of California held at its date. I shall not comment upon the good faith with which this obligation has been observed, or whether it was acting in good faith to these new citizens to compel every owner of a grant or title under Mexico to enter into a long and expensive litigation, beginning at home and ending here; a litigation, too, with one who paid no costs, while it was ruinous to the claimant, who, if he retained one-half for himself, when successful, was considered fortunate. Instead of protection of their possessions, they were, in many instances, left a prey to squatters and champertons' attorneys. This was a great evil, but perhaps a necessary one. The change of sovereignty from Mexico to this Government at once gave value to lands which before had none, and which Mexico was glad to give away to colonists for nothing. There unit of measurement was a square league, and eleven of these (nearly equal to 50,000 acres) was the only maximum. The sudden affluence of those of the former settlers who had retained any considerable proportion of their square leagues, and of those who purchased their titles for a trifle, caused not only a mania for land speculation, but a system of extensive frauds, with forged grants and perjured witnesses, such as the world has seldom witnessed. If a large grant of land in California, like the one before us, were suddenly produced from the pocket of some obscure person, such as Jos e de la Rosa or Santillan, it should excite suspicion and be scrutinized with the utmost rigor. But where a grant is public and notorious, without suspicion of fraud or forgery-where a large consideration was paid to the Mexican Government-where possession has been taken and held for sixteen years where numerous purchasers have made improvements worth millions, it is the duty of the court to deal with it according to the rules of equity and justice, instead of applying sharp rules of decision to inflict a forfeiture.

In a country where land had no value, where it was freely given to all who asked, without money and without price, in amounts not to exceed fifty thousand acres, it will be supposed that there are few cases to be found where the Government could raise money by the sale of it. This is, perhaps, the only case to be found where such a sale has been made. The laws of 1824 and 1828 were colonization laws; they regulated grants of land made for this purpose, and restrained the power of the local government as to the amount to be given to one person. They prescribed the proceedings and forms necessary to the validity of such grants. This sale to Vallejo was not a colonization grant, nor were the regulations of 1824 and 1828 applicable to it, nor the decisions of this court in the ratification of grants under them.

That there was a sale by the Governor to Vallejo for a consideration paid, when the Governor could find no other way to raise funds for the support of the Government, is satisfactorily proved. It was a matter of general notoriety at the time. The copy of a letter from the Governor to the grantee accompanying the title is found among the archives. The first title being defective in form, another was given confirming the sale and acknowledging a consideration paid. Possession has followed in pursuance of it. Its authenticity was admitted in the court below. But we are about to forfeit the title on the ground that the Governor, though he might give away land to any amount, had no authority to sell it for money. It is assumed, that because there was a special power given by statute to grant to colonists, therefore he had no other power. This court has frequently decided that the authority of a Governor to make such a grant will be presumed from the fact that he did make it, and that it lay upon those who deny the power to prove the want of it.

But it is assumed that the power did not exist since the regulations of 1824, because it was not exercised. It is a much better reason for the want of a precedent that land would not be sold where it had so little value that it might be had as a gift to the extent of 50,000 acres.

If this treaty is to be executed in good faith by this Government, why should we forfeit property for which a large price has been paid to the Mexican Government, on the assumption that the Mexican Government would not have confirmed it, but would have repudiated it for want of formal authority? Vallejo was an officer of the army, high in the confidence of the Government. His salary as an officer had been in arrear. In a time of difficulty he furnishes provisions and money to the Government of the Territory. How do we know that Mexico would have repudiated a sale of 80,000 acres as a robbery of its territory, when any two decent colonists, having a few horses and cows, could have 100,000 for nothing?

I believe the Mexican Government would have acted honestly and honorably with their valued servant, and that the same obligation rests on us by force of the treaty.

Now that the land under our Government has become of value these grants may appear enormous; but the court has a duty to perform under the treaty, which gives us no authority to forfeit a bona fide grant because it may not suit our notions of prudence or propriety.

We are not, for that reason, to be astute in searching for reasons to confiscate a man's property because he has too much. Believing, therefore, that in the case before us the claimant has presented a genuine grant for a consideration paid, which the Mexican Government would never have disturbed for any of the reasons now offered for confiscating it, I must express, most respectfully, my dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court, with the hope that Congress will not suffer the very numerous purchasers to forfeit the millions expended on the faith of treaty obligations.