United States v. Steam Vessels of War Seaboard, Texas, Beaufort/Opinion of the Court

Two objections are made to the recovery of the bounty claimed by the libelants: one, that the destruction of the confederate vessels was effected by the joint action of the army and navy; the other that it took place on the inland waters of the United States. For the determination of the first of these objections it will be necessary to consider the movements of the fleet under command of Admiral Porter, immediately preceding the capture of Richmond. The record enables us to do this, although officers present on the vessels differ in their recollection of dates.

On the morning of April 2, 1865, Gen.Lee commanding the enemy's forces around Richmond, informed the confederate authorities that he should immediately withdraw his lines and evacuate the city. The withdrawal and evacuation took place on the evening of that day. Information of his purpose was undoubtedly communicated to Admiral Porter soon after it was generally known in Richmond, which was before noon. At that time there were in James river, for some miles below Richmond, obstructions which the confederates had placed to prevent the ascent of the Union fleet. Vessels filled with stone had been sunk and numerous torpedoes planted in the stream. Batteries had also been erected along the river. Some of the obstructions were just above the lower end of what was known as Dutch Gap canal, about 16 miles by the river from Richmond, which were originally placed there by the confederates, and afterwards maintained by the forces of the United States. Two miles above them was Howlett's confederate battery. Eight miles above the Dutch Gap canal was Chaffin's bluff, and one mile above that on the opposite side of the river was Drury's bluff, seven miles below Richmond. Gen. Lee's lines extended across the river between the two bluffs, and below them. Above the obstructions near Dutch Gap canal several confederate vessels of war were stationed. When Gen. Lee was compelled to abandon his lines, orders were given that the batteries on James river should be withdrawan and the confederate vessels destroyed.

As soon as Admiral Porter, on the second of April, was informed, or had reason to believe that Gen. Lee intended to retreat from Richmond, he gave orders for the removal of the obstructions in the river, and for his vessels to open fire on the confederate batteries within range and to push on through the obstructions as fast as they were carried away, first sending boats ahead to remove the torpedoes. These orders were carried out with great gallantry and spirit; a heavy fire was opend on the batteries, and during the following night a channel was cut through the obstructions. Soon after the fleet opened fire, the enemy, to prevent the capture of his vessels, commenced destroying them, setting fire to some of them and blowing up others. On the next day, the 3d, the fleet passed through the obstructions and moved up to Drury's bluff, capturing one of the enemy's vessels which had not been destroyed-the iron-clad ram Texas. Another of the enemy's vessels-the Beaufort-was subsequently captured further up the river. At Drury's bluff the vessels were detained by the obstructions until the 4th. On that day the admiral, accompanied by President Lincoln, proceeded up to Richmond. Although in the movements of the admiral's fleet in its ascent of James river and in its attack on the batteries he was not assisted by the actual presence of any portion of the army of the United States, so that the capture of the two vessels-the Texas and the Beaufort-and the destruction of the other vessels may, in that sense, be said to have been effected by his fleet alone, yet without the aid of the army the result mentioned would not probably have been accomplished. Certainly, its movements contributed most essentially to the success of the fleet. For several months it had been lying near Richmond under the command of Gen. Grant, with the avowed purpose of capturing that city and of destroying the confederate forces. The result of the battle of Five Forks, on the first of April, satisfied the confederate commander that he could not hold his lines and protect Richmond. The withdrawal of his troops and the evacuation of Richmond followed. Had they not been thus forced to retire and his lines had continued to cross James river between Chaffin's bluff and Drury's bluff, it would have been almost if not quite impossible for the fleet of Admiral Porter to ascend the river. The fire of the shore batteries, with the assistance of the confederate troops near by, would have checked any advance, supported as they would have been by the confederate vessels and the torpedoes in the stream. It is plain, therefore, that whatever was accomplished by the fleet of the admiral in James river on the second and third days of April, 1865, must be considered as the result of the co-operative action of both the army and the navy. It matters not that the movements of the army were miles distant from the operations of the fleet; they relieved that fleet from resistance which might and probably would have defeated any attempt to ascend the river above the shore batteries, and destroy the armed vessels of the enemy.

Prize money, or bounty in lieu of it, is not allowed by the laws of congress where vessels of the enemy are captured or destroyed by the navy with the co-operation of the army. To win either the navy must achieve its success without the direct aid of the army, by maritime force only. No pecuniary reward is conferred for anything taken or destroyed by the navy when it acts in conjunction with the army in the capture of a fortified position of the enemy, though the meritorious service and gallant conduct of its officers and men may justly entitle them to honorable mention in the history of the country. The Siren, 13 Wall. 389.

The second objection to a recovery, that the destruction of the confederate vessels was effected upon inland waters of the United States, is equally clear if the term 'property,' used in the seventh section of the act of 1864, can be construed-as counsel seem to take for granted-to embrace public vessels of the enemy. That act provides, among other things, for the collection of captured and abandoned property, and is in addition to the act on that subject of March 12, 1863. 13 St. at Large, 377; 12 St. at Large, 320. The seventh section declares—

'That no property seized or taken upon any of the inland     waters of the United States by the naval forces thereof,      shall be regarded as maritime prize; but all property so      seized or taken shall be promptly delivered to the proper      officers of the curts, or as provided in this act and in the      said act approved March 12, 1863.'

The term 'inland,' as here used, was evidently intended to apply to all waters of the United States upon which a naval force could go, other than bays and harbors on the sea-coast. In most instances property of the enemy on them could be taken, if at all, by an armed force without the aid of vessels of war. These were seldom required on such waters, except when batteries or fortified places near them were to be attacked in conjunction with the army. As observed by the court in the case of The Cotton Plant, congress probably anticipated, in vie of the state of the war when the act was passed, that most of the captures on the rivers would be made by the army. 10 Wall. 577. James river is an inland water in any sense which can be given to the term 'inland.' It lies within the body of counties in Virginia. For miles below Richmond and below the obstructions mentioned a person can see from one of its banks what is done on the other. Rivers across which one can thus see are inland waters. It matters not that the tide may ebb and flow miles above their mouths; that fact does not make them any part of the sea or bay into which they may flow, though they may be arms of both. U.S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290.

Decree affirmed.