United States v. Smith (342 U.S. 225)/Opinion of the Court

Appellee Smith (No. 20) was indicted October 2, 1950, for having on or about July 1, 1947, forged the name of the payee on a check drawn on the Treasurer of the United States.

Appellee Dailey (No. 162) was indicted September 29, 1950, for having on or about March 14, 1947, knowingly made a false statement in connection with his application for Farmers Home Administration services.

In each case the crime charged was committed more than three years before the indictment was returned and therefore would be barred by the three-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282, unless that statute has been tolled. The prosecution argued that it was tolled by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act of 1942, as amended, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 590a. The District Court in each case disagreed with the prosecution and dismissed the indictment. The cases are here on appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3731, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731.

The Act derives from the Act of August 24, 1942, which suspended the running of the statute of limitations applicable to offenses involving frauds against the United States until June 30, 1945, or until such earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution, or the President, may designate. 56 Stat. 747. That Act was amended by the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 649, 667, to provide among other things that the term of suspension of the statute of limitations was 'until three years after the termination of hostilities in the present war as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.' Offenses in connection with the negotiation, award, termination, or settlement of contracts were included by that Act. And offenses in connection with the care, handling, and disposal of property were added by the Surplus Property Act of 1944. 58 Stat. 765, 781. At the time of the alleged offenses the Act read in relevant part: 'The running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to any offense against the laws of the United States (1) involving defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any agency thereof whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, * *  * shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities in the present war as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.'

The hostilities of World War II were declared terminated December 31, 1946, by Presidential Proclamation No. 2714, 61 Stat. (Pt. 2) 1048-1049; 12 Fed.Reg. 1, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 601 note. It is therefore clear that if the designated offenses were committed within the three-year period prior to the date of the Act or between the date of the Act and December 31, 1946, the statute of limitations would be suspended. The question is whether the Act is likewise applicable to offenses committed after December 31, 1946, the date of the proclamation of termination of hostilities.

The argument of the prosecution is that the language of the Act makes no distinction between offenses committed before and offenses committed after the termination of hostilities, the emphasis of the Act being on the suspension of the 'running' of the statutes of limitations. It is contended that the extension of the Act to offenses prescribed by the Contract Settlement Act and the Surplus Property Act-offenses of the type likely to be committed during the post-hostilities period-is persuasive indication that Congress made the Act operative after, as well as before, the termination of hostilities.

We take the contrary view. We conclude that the Suspension Act is inapplicable to crimes committed after the date of termination of hostilities. The words of the Act are that the 'running' of the statute of limitations 'shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities'. The connotation is that offenses occurring prior to the termination of hostilities shall not be allowed legally to be forgotten in the rush of the war activities. That is the gist of the Reports. The fear was that the law-enforcement officers would be so preoccupied with prosecution of the war effort that the crimes of fraud perpetrated against the United States would be forgotten until it was too late. The implicit premise of the legislation is that the frenzied activities, existing at the time the Act became law, would continue until hostilities terminated and that until then the public interest should not be disadvantaged. The prosecution would have us change the function of the date of termination of hostilities. If would be used to provide various periods of suspension for crimes committed within the three-year period commencing with the termination of hostilities. That seems to us to be an alteration in the statutory scheme, one that destroys its symmetry. Since under our construction the three-year period prescribed by the Suspension Act starts to run at the date of termination of hostilities, all crimes to which the Act is applicable are treated uniformity. The time when law-enforcement officers were busy with war activities is not counted; when the pressure was off, the time began to run again. No reasons of policy are suggested for straining the language of the Act to suspend the rumming of the statute beyond the emergency which made the suspension seem advisable.

Affirmed.