United States v. Shirey/Opinion of the Court

On July 23, 1954, an information was filed in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania charging appellee with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 214, 18 U.S.C.A. § 214 (originally § 1 of the Act of December 11, 1926, 44 Stat. 918). That statute provides:

'Whoever pays or offers or promises any money or thing of     value, to any person, firm, or corporation in consideration of the use or promise to use any influence      to procure any appointive office or place under the United      States for any person, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or      imprisoned not more than one year, or both.'

The information alleged that appellee had offered S. Walter Stauffer, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania to contribute $1,000 a year to the Republican Party in consideration of Stauffer's use of influence to procure for appellee the postmastership of York, Pennsylvania. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States. 168 F.Supp. 382. The Government appealed directly to this Court, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 358 U.S. 806, 79 S.Ct. 22, 3 L.Ed.2d 53, to determine whether the allegations of the information constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 214, 18 U.S.C.A. § 214.

We turn first to the language of the statute. There are alternative constructions of its language. One sensible reading is to say that even though the Republican Party was to be the ultimate recipient of the money, this was a promise to Stauffer of money (which it plainly was) in consideration of his use of influence. Since Stauffer is a 'person,' the statute covers the alleged offense. It may be urged that although a promise was made to Stauffer it was not a promise of money to him. Since the word 'to' immediately follows the words 'money or thing of value' and not the word 'promises,' it is possible to read the statute as requiring that the recipient of the money or thing of value be the 'person, firm, or corporation' which the statute describes. But either construction of the statute covers the classic three-party case: e.g., A tells X he will give $1,000 to Y if X will use influence to get him a job. Under the first construction this is a promise of $1,000 to X in consideration of the use of influence. Under the second construction this is a promise to give money to Y in consideration of a promise to use influence; a standard third-party beneficiary situation. The only difficulty with this second construction in the context of this case is the necessity of finding that the Republican Party is a 'person fi rm, or corporation,' as those words are used in the statute. The Republican Party is not a legal entity. It is an amorphous group of individuals that acts and only can act through persons. Its funds are received and managed by persons. Certainly the word 'person' in the statute is broad enough to include the Republican Party, and since the content and manifest purpose of the statute confirm, as we shall see, such a construction, it would unjustifiably contract the law to withdraw gifts to the Republican Party from its scope. Thus, no matter how the statute is read, one thing is clear-its terms cover this case. Shirey's endeavor to purchase himself a postmastership as alleged has been interdicted by the Congress. Awkwardness is not ambiguity, nor do defined multiple meanings, each of which is satisfied by the allegations of the information, constitute a want of definiteness.

Not only does the compulsion of language within the statutory framework seem clear, but the purpose and history of the enactment powerfully reaffirm the meaning yielded by its language. The bill was first introduced in Congress with a Committee Report which stated:

'This bill seeks to punish the purchase and sale of public     offices. Certain Members of Congress have brought to the     attention of the House both by speeches on theflo or and      statements before the Judiciary Committee a grave situation,      disclosing corruption in connection with postal appointments      in Mississippi and South Carolina. It is believed that this     bill will prevent corrupt practices in connection with      patronage appointments in the future.' H.R.Rep. No. 1366,     69th Cong., 1st Sess.

The information in this case deals with the very kind of situation that gave rise to the provision under scrutiny. In the years preceding the enactment of this legislation members of Congress referred to contributions to party treasuries and to campaign funds, as well as direct payments to those in charge of patronage, as among the corrupt methods of obtaining postmasterships. See, e.g., 65 Cong.Rec. 1408-1413. These revelations on the floor of the Congress, as disclosed by the authoritative history of enactment, indicate the aim of Congress to proscribe payments to political parties in return for influence. Indeed this form of payment was a major concern of Congress. Certainly we cannot infer that Congress expressed this concern in self-defeating terms.

Statutes, including penal enactments, are not inert exercises in literary composition. Thy a re instruments of government, and in construing them 'the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.' United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143, 25 S.Ct. 406, 408, 49 L.Ed. 696. This is so because the purpose of an enactment is embedded in its words even though it is not always pedantically expressed in words. See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399, 50 S.Ct. 167, 168, 74 L.Ed. 508. Statutory meaning, it is to be remembered, is more to be felt than demonstrated, see United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496, 31 S.Ct. 627, 55 L.Ed. 823, or, as Judge Learned Hand has put it, the art of interpretation is 'the art of proliferation a purpose.' Brooklyn Nat. Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 Cir., 157 F.2d 450, 451. In ascertaining this purpose it is important to remember that no matter how elastic is the use to which the term scientific may be put, it cannot be used to describe the legislative process. That is a crude but practical process of the adaptation by the ordinary citizen of means to an end, except when it concerns technical problems beyond the ken of the average man.

Applying these generalities to the immediate occasion, it is clear that the terms, the history, and the manifest purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 214, 18 U.S.C.A. § 214, coalesce in a construction of that statute which validates the information against Shirely. The evil which Congress sought to check and the mischief wrought by what it proscribed are the same when the transaction is triangular as when only two parties are involved. It is incredible to suppose that Congress meant to prohibit Shirey from giving $1,000 to Stauffer, to be passed on by the latter to the Party fund, but that Shirey was outside the congressional prohibition for securing the same influence by a promise to deposit $1,000 directly in the Party's fund. That is not the kind of finessing by which this Court has heretofore allowed penal legislation to be construed. See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904, 59 L.Ed. 1355, and United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 64 S.Ct. 1101, 88 L.Ed. 1341.

he judgment is reversed.

Reversed.