United States v. Rider (163 U.S. 132)/Opinion of the Court

The appellate jurisdiction of this court is defined by the acts of congress. By section 6 of the act of April 29, 1802 (2 Stat. 159, c. 31), whenever there was a division of opinion in the circuit court upon a question of law, the question might be certified to this court for decision, provided that the case might proceed in the circuit court if, in its opinion, further proceedings could be had without prejudice to the merits, and that no imprisonment should be allowed or punishment inflicted upon which the judges were divided in opinion.

In U.S. v. Daniels, 6 Wheat. 542, 547, Chief Justice Marshall explained that, 'previous to the passage of that act, the circuit courts were composed of three judges, and the judges of the supreme court changed their circuits. If all the judges were present, no division of opinion could take place. If only one judge of the supreme court should attend, and a division should take place, the cause was continued till the next term, when a different judge would attend. Should the same division continue, there would then be the opinion of two judges against one; and the law provided that in such case that opinion should be the judgment of the court.' Act March 2, 1793 (1 Stat. 333, c. 22, § 2); Davis v. Braden, 10 Pet. 286. But, continued the chief justice, the act of 1802 made the judges of the supreme court stationary, so that the same judges constantly attended the same circuit; and, the court being always composed of the same two judges, any division of opinion would remain, and the question continue unsettled. 'To remedy this inconvenience, the clause under consideration was introduced.' 6 Wheat. 548; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.

The act of April 10, 1869 (16 Stat. 44, c. 22), provided for the appointment of a circuit judge in each circuit, but this did not repeal the act of 1802, as the same necessity existed as before for the power to certify questions. Insurance Co. v. Cunham, 11 Wall. 1.

By the act of June 1, 1872 (17 Stat. 196, c. 255), whenever, in any proceedings or suit in a circuit court, there occurred any difference of opinion between the judges, the opinion of the presiding judge was to prevail for the time being; but upon the entry of a final judgment, decree, or order, and a certificate of division of opinion as under the act of 1802, either party might remove the case to this court on writ of error or appeal, according to the nature of the case. This act continued in force about two years, when it was supplanted by sections 650, 652, and 693 of the Revised Statutes, by which its provisions were restricted to civil suits and proceedings; and by sections 651 and 697 the provisions of section 6 of the act of 1802 were re-enacted as to criminal cases. U.S. v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 321, 12 Sup. Ct. 609. These sections are printed in the margin.

In civil cases, prior to March 3, 1891, the appellate jurisdiction was limited by the sum or value of the matter in dispute; but the jurisdiction on certificate was not dependent thereon, and after final judgment or decree, if the amount in controversy reached the jurisdictional amount, the whole case was open for consideration on error or appeal, while, if it fell below that, only the questions certified could be examined. Allen v. Bank, 120 U.S. 30, 7 Sup. Ct. 460; Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158. It has always been held that the whole case could not be certified. Jewell v. Knight, 123 U.S. 433, 8 Sup. Ct. 193.

In short, under the Revised Statutes, as to civil cases, the danger of the wheels of justice being blocked by difference of opinion was entirely obviated, and the provision for a certificate operated to give the benefit of review where the amount in controversy was less than that prescribed as essential to our jurisdiction, while as to criminal cases a certificate of division was the only mode in which alleged errors could be reviewed.

The first act of congress which authorized a criminal case to be brought from the circuit court of the United States to this court, except upon a certificate of division of opinion, was the act of February 6, 1889 (chapter 113, § 6), by which it was enacted that, 'in all cases of conviction' of a 'capital crime in any court of the United States,' the final judgment 'against the respondent' might, on his application, be re-examined, reversed, or affirmed by this court on writ of error. Up to that time this court had no general authority to review on error or appeal the judgments of the circuit courts of the United States in cases within their criminal jurisdiction. U.S. v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 319, 12 Sup. Ct. 609; Cross v. U.S., 145 U.S. 571, 574, 12 Sup. Ct. 842.

By section 4 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c. 517), it was provided that 'the review, by appeal, by writ of error or otherwise, from the existing circuit courts shall be had only in the supreme court of the United States, or in the circuit courts of appeals hereby established, according to the provisions of this act regulating the same.'

By section 5, appeals or writs of error might be taken from the circuit court directly to this court in certain enumerated classes of cases, including 'cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime.' And, by section 6, the judgments or decrees of the circuit courts of appeals were made final 'in all cases arising under the criminal laws,' and in certain other classes of cases, unless questions were certified to this court, or the whole case ordered up by writ of certiorari, as therein provided. American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 380, 13 Sup. Ct. 758. Thus, appellate jurisdiction was given in all criminal cases by writ of error either from this court or from the circuit courts of appeals, and in all civil cases by appeal or error, without regard to the amount in controversy, except as to appeals or writs of error to or from the circuit courts of appeals in cases not made final, as specified in section 6.

By section 14 it was provided that 'all acts and parts of acts relating to appeals or writs of error inconsistent with the provisions for review by appeals or writs of error in the preceding sections five and six of this act are hereby repealed', and the particular question before us is whether sections 651 and 697 of the Revised Statutes, in relation to certificate of division of opinion in criminal cases, though not expressly repealed, still remain in force. If so, and such division of opinion can be certified before final judgment, then all criminal cases, including those in which the judgments and decrees of the circuit courts of appeals are made final (of which the case at bar is one), as well as those which may be brought directly to this court, might, at preliminary stages of the proceedings, be brought before us on certificate; and, after judgment, the whole subject be re-examined on writ of error from one or the other court. This result, in itself, we think, could not have been intended, and it is wholly inconsistent with the object of the act of March 3, 1891, which was to relieve this court, and to distribute between it and the circuit courts of a peals, substantially, the entire appellate jurisdiction over the circuit courts of the United States. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118; Lau Ow Bew's Case, 144 U.S. 47, 12 Sup. Ct. 517; American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co., supra.

We are of opinion that the scheme of the act of March 3, 1891, precludes the contention that certificates of division of opinion may still be had under sections 651 and 697 of the Revised Statutes.

Review by appeal, by writ of error, or otherwise must be as prescribed by the act, and review by certificate is limited by the act to the certificate by the circuit courts, made after final judgment, of questions raised as to their own jurisdiction, and to the certificate by the circuit courts of appeals of questions of law in relation to which our advice is sought as therein provided; and these certificates are governed by the same general rules as were formerly applied to certificates of division. Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U.S. 324, 14 Sup. Ct. 353; Watch Co. v. Robbins, 148 U.S. 266, 13 Sup. Ct. 594.

It is true that repeals by implication are not favored, but we cannot escape the conclusion that, tested by its scope, its obvious purpose, and its terms, the act of March 3, 1891, covers the whole subject-matter under consideration, and furnishes the exclusive rule in respect of appellate jurisdiction on appeal, writ of error, or certificate.

Its provisions and those of the Revised Statutes in this regard cannot stand together, and the argument ab inconvenienti that, in cases of doubt below, the remedy by certificate ought to be available, is entitled to no weight in the matter of construction. The result is that the certificate must be dismissed, and it is so ordered.

Mr. Justice BREWER did not hear the argument, and took no part in the decision of this case.