United States v. Lee Kaufman/Opinion of the Court

These are two writs of error to the same judgment, one prosecuted by the United States, eo nomine, and the other by the attorney general of the United States in the names of Frederick Kaufman and Richard. P. Strong, the defendants against whom judgment was rendered in the circuit court. The action was originally commenced in the circuit court for the county of Alexandria, in the state of Virginia, by the present defendant in error, against Kaufman and Strong and a great number of others, in the names of the real parties under which the pleadings to recover possession of a parcel of land of about 1,100 acres, known as the Arlington estate. It was an action of ejectment in the form prescribed by the statutes of Virginia, under which the pleadings are in the names of the real parties plaintiff and defendant. As soon as the declaration was filed in that court the case was removed into the circuit court of the United States by writ of certiorari, where all the subsequent proceedings took place. It was tried by a jury, and during the progress of the trial an order was made, at the request of the plaintiff, dismissing the suit as to all of the defendants except Kaufman and Strong. Against each of these a judgment was rendered for separate parcels of the land in controversy, namely, against Kaufman for about 200 acres of it, constituting the national cemetery and included within its walls, and against Strong for the remainder of the tract, except 17 acres in the possession of Maria Syphax. As the United States was not a party to the suit below, and, while defending the action by its proper law officers, expressly declined to submit itself as a defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, there may exist some doubt whether it has a right to prosecute the writ of error in its own name; but as the judgment against Kaufman and Strong is here on their writ of error, and as under that writ all the questions are raised which can be raised under the other, their writ being prosecuted in the interest of the United States, and argued here by the solicitor general, the point is immaterial, and the question has not been mooted. The first step taken in the case, after it came into the circuit court of the United States, was the filing in the clerk's office of that court of the following paper by the attorney general: 'George W. C. Lee v. Frederick Kaufman, R. P. Strong,  and others. (In ejectment.)

'And now comes the attorney general of the United States and     suggests to the court and gives it to understand and be      informed (appearing only for the purpose of this motion) that      the property in controversy in this suit has been for more      than 10 years and now is held, occupied, and possessed by the      United States, through its officers and agents, charged in      behalf of the government of the United States with the      control of the property, and who are in the actual possession      thereof, as public property of the United States, for public      uses, in the exercise of their sovereign and constitutional      powers, as a military station, and as a national cemetery      established for the burial of deceased soldiers and sailors,      and known and designated as the 'Arlington Cemetery,' and for      the uses and purposes set forth in the certificate of sale, a      copy of which, as stated and prepared by the plaintiff, and      which is a true copy thereof, is annexed hereto and filed      herewith, under claim of title, as appears by the said      certificate of sale, and which was executed, delivered, and      recorded as therein appears.

'Wherefore, without submitting the rights of the government     of the United States to the jurisdiction of the court, but      respectfully insisting that the court has no jurisdiction of      the subject in controversy, he moves that the declaration in      said suit be set aside, and all the proceedings be stayed and      dismissed, and for such other order as may be proper in the      premises.

'CHAS. DEVENS, Atty. Gen. U.S.'

The plaintiff demurred to this suggestion, and, on hearing, the demurrer was sustained. The case was thereupon tried before a jury on the general issue pleaded by defendants Kaufman and Strong, in the course of which the question raised by this suggestion of the attorney general was again presented to the court by prayers for instruction, which were rejected and exceptions taken.

The plaintiff offered evidence establishing title in himself by the will of his grandfather, George Washington Parke Curtis, who devised the Arlington estate to his daughter, the wife of Gen. Robert E. Lee, for life, and after her death to the plaintiff. This, with the long possession under that title, made a prima facie right of recovery in plaintiff. The title relied on by defendants was a tax-sale certificate made by the commissioners appointed under the act of congress of June 7, 1862, 'for the collection of direct taxes in the insurrectionary districts within the United States,' as amended by the act of February 6, 1863. At this sale the land was bid in by said commissioners for the United States, and a certificate of that fact was given by these commissioners and introduced on the trial as evidence by defendants. If this sale was a valid sale, and the certificate conveyed a valid title, then the title of plaintiff was thereby divested, and he could not recover. If the proceedings evidenced by the tax sale did not transfer the title of the property to the United States, then it remained in the plaintiff, and, so far as the question of title was concerned, his recovery was a rightful one.

We have then two questions presented to the court and jury below, and the same questions arise in this court on the record: (1) Could any action be maintained against the defendants for the possession of the land in controversy under the circumstances of the relation of that possession to the United States, however clear the legal right to that possession might be in plaintiff? (2) If such an action could be maintained, was the prima facie title of plaintiff divested by the tax sale and the certificate given by the commissioners? It is believed that no division of opinion exists among the members of this court on the proposition that the rulings of law under which the latter question was submitted by the court to the jury was sound, and that the jury were authorized to find, as they evidently did find, that the tax certificate and the sale which it recited did not divest the plaintiff of his title to the property.

For this reason we will consider first the assignment of errors on that subject. No substantial objection is seen on the face of the certificate to its validity, and none has been seriously urged. It was admitted in evidence by the court, and, unless impeached by extrinsic evidence offered by the plaintiff, it defeated his title. When this tax sale was made the act of February 6, 1863, which amended the original act of June 7, 1862, by substituting a new section 7 for that of the former, was in force. It declares that the certificate of the commissioners given to the purchaser at such sale 'shall be received in all courts and places as prima facie evidence of the regularity and validity of said sale, and of the title of the said purchaser or purchasers under the same;' and that it 'shall only be affected as evidence of the regularity and validity of sale by establishing the fact that said property was not subject to taxes, or that the taxes had been paid previous to sale, or that the property had been redeemed according to the provisions of this act.' It is in reference to the clause which permits the certificate to be impeached by showing that the taxes had been paid previous to sale that the plaintiff in the present case introduced evidence. This court has in a series of cases established the proposition that where the commissioners refused to receive such taxes, their action in thus preventing payment was the equivalent of payment in its effect upon the certificate of sale. Bennett v. Hunter, 9 Wall. 326; Tacey v. Irwin, 18 Wall. 549; Atwood v. Weems, 99 U.S. 183. There are exceptions to the ruling of the court on the admission of evidence, and instructions to the jury given and refused on this subject, which are made the foundation of several assignments of error.

All that is necessary to be considered in this matter is presented in the instructions granted and refused. The point in issue is fairly raised by the following, given at the request of plaintiff, and against the objection of defendants:

'If the jury believe from the evidence that the     commissioners, prior to January 11, 1864, established,      announced, and uniformly followed a general rule, under which      they refused to receive on property which had been advertised      for sale from any one but the owner, or a party in interest,      in person, when offered, the amount chargeable upon said      property by virtue of the said acts of congress, then said      rule dispensed with the necessity of a tender, and in the absence of proof to the      contrary the law presumes that said amount would have been      paid, and the court instructs the jury that, upon such a      state of facts, the sale of the property in controversy, made      on the eleventh day of January, 1864, was unauthorized, and      conferred no title on the purchaser;' and by instructions six      and seven, given at the request of defendants, in the      following language:

'6. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish     the fact that the tax commissioners, before the sale of this      property, made a general rule not to receive taxes except      from the owner in person after the advertisement and before      the sale; and if the jury believe that only two such      instances occurred before the sale of this property, and if      there is no evidence that the other two commissioners, or      either of them, ever acted under such rule or practice,      except Commissioner Hawxhurst, or that they or either of them      ever concurred in such action before the sale of this      property, then the said two instances in which Mr. Hawxhurst      alone acted do not establish the said practice by the board      of commissioners before the sale of this property in a      sufficient manner to render the certificate of sale of this      property invalid.

'7. In order to establish a general practice or rule of the     board of commissioners not to receive taxes except from the      owner in person, after advertisement and before sale,-before      the date of the sale of the property in controversy,-the jury      must find from evidence produced on this trial that a      majority of such board adopted such practice or rule, or      concurred therein, before the date of the sale of this      property, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the      law presumes that a majority of such board did not adopt such      practice or rule, or concur therein before such date.'

We think these presented correctly to the jury the principle established by the cases in this court above referred to; that is, that the commissioners themselves, having established and acted upon a rule that payment of the taxes after advertisement would be received from no one but the owner of the land appearing in person to pay them,-that if offered by his tenant, his agent, or his attorney in fact duly appointed, it would be rejected,-it would be an idle ceremony for any of these to make the offer; and an actual tender by such persons, as it would certainly not be accepted, need not be made. That the commissioners, having in the execution of the law acted upon a rule which deprived the owner of the land of an important right,-a right which went to the root of the matter, a right which has in no instance known to us, or cited by counsel, been refused to a tax-payer,-the sale made under such circumstances is invalid, as much so as if the tax had been actually paid or tendered. The proposition is thus expressed by this court at its last term in the case of Hills v. Albany Exchange Bank, as the result of the cases above cited: 'It is a general rule that when the tender or performence of an act is necessary to the establishment of any right against another party, this tender or offer to perform is waived or becomes unnecessary when it is reasonably certain that the offer will be refused.'

The application of these decisions to the case before us is denied by counsel on two grounds. The first of these is that the case of Bennett v. Hunter was decided on the language of the act of 1862, and that due attention was not given to the peculiar language of the substituted section 7 of the act of 1863, which says that 'when the owner of the land shall not on or before the day of sale appear in person before said board of commissioners and pay the amount of the tax, with 10 per centum interest thereon, with the costs of advertising the same, or request the same to be struck off to a purchaser for a less sum than two-thirds of the assessed value of said several lots or parcels of ground, the said commissioners shall be authorized at said sale to bid off the same for the United States at a sum not exceeding two-thirds of the assessed value thereof.' It is argued from this that no right to pay the tax under this statute existed except by the owner in person.

The reply to this is that in the cases of Bennett v. Hunter and Tacey v. Irwin, the sales that were under consideration are clearly shown by the reports to have been made after the act of 1863, and it is believed that no sale for taxes was made under the original tax law until after that amendment was passed, and that all the officers charged with the duty of collecting that tax were aware of the language of the new seventh section. It is quite apparent from the opinion of Chief Justice CHASE, who spoke for the court in the case of Bennett v. Hunter, and who was secretary of the treasury when both statutes were enacted, that he understood well that he was deciding the very question raised by the requirement to appear in person in the latter act, and intended to decide that, notwithstanding this, the owner had a right to pay the tax before sale by an agent or a friend. Besides, there was no other provision of either the act of 1862 or the amendment of 1863 which gave the owner the right to pay at all between the advertisement and the sale. The third section of the original act gave the right to pay for 60 days after the tax commissioners had fixed the amount of the tax, and no longer; and the seventh section of that act, as well as its substitute of 1863, gave the right to redeem after the sale was made.

It is clear, therefore, that Bennett v. Hunter, Tacey v. Irwin, and Atwood v. Weems were decisions construing the substituted seventh section of 1863.

In the case of Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall. 553, this court, in construing the change in the language of the seventh section, held that its object was to authorize the United States, by its commissioner, to bid more than the tax and costs, which they could not do before, and to limit them to two-thirds of its value, and that after the amount of costs and tax had been bid the United States should not bid against a purchaser named by the owner. It was probably in reference to this that the act required the personal presence of the owner before the commissioners to name a purchaser against whom the United States should not compete after it was secured by a bid which covered the tax, interest, and costs.

The other point raised is, that the right to pay the taxes between the advertisement and day of sale in any other mode than by personal appearance of the owner before the commissioners, did not exist in cases where the United States became the purchaser. As it could never be known until the day of sale whether the United States would become the purchaser or not, it would seem that the duty of the commissioners to receive the taxes was to be exercised without reference to the possibility of the land being struck off to the United States.

In the case of Cooley v. O'Connor, 12 Wall. 391, it was held that the act contemplated that a certificate of sale should be given when the United States became the purchaser, as in other cases, and no reason is shown why that certificate should have any greater effect as evidence of title than in the case of a private purchaser, nor why it should not be subject to the same rules in determining its validity, nor why the payment or tender of the tax, interest, and costs, should not be made by an agent in the one case as in the other. It is proper to observe that there was evidence, uncontradicted, to show that Mr. Fendall appeared before the commissioners in due time and offered on the part of Mrs. Lee, in whom the title then was, to pay the taxes, interest, and costs, and was told that the commissioners could receive the money from no one but the owner of the land in person. In all this matter we do not see any error in the rulings of the court, nor any reason to doubt that the jury were justified in finding that the United States acquired no title under tax-sale proceedings. In approaching the other question which we are called on to decide, it is proper to make a clear statement of what it is.

The counsel for plaintiffs in error, and in behalf of the United States, assert the proposition, that though it has been ascertained by the verdict of the jury, in which no error is found, that the plaintiff has the title to the land in controversy, and that what is set up in behalf of the United States is no title at all, the court can render no judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants in the action, because the latter hold the property as officers and agents of the United States, and it is appropriated to lawful public uses. This proposition rests on the principle that the United States cannot be lawfully sued without its consent in any case, and that no action can be maintained against any individual without such consent, where the judgment must depend on the right of the United States to property held by such persons as officers or agents for the government. The first branch of this proposition is conceded to be the established law of this country and of this court at the present day; the second, as a necessary or proper deduction from the first, is denied.

In order to decide whether the inference is justified from what is conceded, it is necessary to ascertain, if we can, on what principle the exemption of the United States from a suit by one of its citizens is founded, and what limitations surround this exemption. In this, as in most other cases of like character, it will be found that the doctrine is derived from the laws and practices of our English ancestors; and while it is beyond question that from the time of Edward the First until now the king of England was not suable in the courts of that country, except where his consent had been given on petition of right, it is a matter of great uncertainty whether prior to that time he was not suable in his own courts and in his kingly character as other persons were. We have the authority of Chief Baron COMYN, 1 Dig. 132, 'Action, C 1,' and 6 Dig. 67, 'Prerogative;' and of the Mirror of Justices, c. 1, § 3, and c. 5, § 1, that such was the law; and of BRACTON and Lord HOLT, that the king never was suable of common right. It is certain, however, that after the establishment of the petition of right about that time, as the appropriate manner of seeking relief where the ascertainment of the parties' rights required a suit against the king, no attempt has been made to sue the king in any court except as allowed on such petition. It is believed that this petition of right, as it has been practiced and observed in the administration of justice in England, has been as efficient in securing the rights of suitors against the crown in all cases appropriate to judicial proceedings, as that which the law affords in legal controversies between the subjects of the king among themselves.

'If the mode of proceeding to enforce it be formal and ceremonious, it is, nevertheless, a practical and efficient remedy for the invasion by the sovereign power of individual rights.' U.S. v. O'Keefe, 11 Wall. 178.

There is in this country, however, no such thing as the petition of right, as there is no such thing as a kingly head to the nation, or to any of the states which compose it. There is vested in no officer or body the authority to consent that the state shall be sued except in the law-making power, which may give such consent on the terms it may choose to impose. The Davis, 10 Wall. 15. Congress has created a court in which it has authorized suits to be brought against the United States, but has limited such suits to those arising on contract, with a few unimportant exceptions.

What were the reasons which forbid that the king should be sued in his own court, and how do these reasons apply to the political body corporate which we call the United States of America? As regards the king, one reason given by the old judges was the absurdity of the king's sending a writ to himself to command the king to appear in the king's court. No such reason exists in our government, as process runs in the name of the president and may be served on the attorney general, as was done in the case of Chisholm v. State of Georgia. #fn-s-s Nor can it be said that the dignity of the government is degraded by appearing as a defendant in the courts of its own creation, because it is constantly appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its rights as against the citizens to their judgment.

Mr. Justice GRAY, of the supreme court of Massachusetts, in an able and learned opinion which exhausts the sources of information on this subject, says: 'The broader reason is that it would be inconsistent with the very idea of supreme executive power, and would endanger the performance of the public duties of the sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits as a matter of right, at the will of any citizen, and to submit to the judicial tribunals the control and disposition of his public property, his instruments and means of carrying on his government in war and in peace, and the money in his treasury.' Briggs v. The Light Boats, 11 Allen, 162. As we have no person in this government who exercises supreme executive power or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests. It seems most probable that it has been adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists, that the supreme power in every state, wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to defend itself from assaults in those courts.

It is obvious that in our system of jurisprudence, the principle is as applicable to each of the states as it is to the United States, except in those cases where by the constitution a state of the Union may be sued in this court. Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, Id. 832.

That the doctrine met with a doubtful reception in the early history of this court may be seen from the opinions of two of its justices in the case of Chisholm v. State of Georgia, where Mr. Justice WILSON, a member of the convention which framed our constitution, after a learned examination of the laws of England and other states and kingdoms, sums up the result by saying: 'We see nothing against, but much in favor of, the jurisdiction of this court over the state of Georgia, a party to this cause.' 2 Dall. 461. Chief Justice JAY also considered the question as affected by the difference between a republican state like ours, and a personal sovereign, and held that there is no reason why a state should not be sued, though doubting whether the United States would be subject to the same rule. 2 Dall. 78.

The first recognition of the general doctrine by this court is to be found in the case of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 380.

The terms in which Chief Justice MARSHALL there gives assent to the principle does not add much to its force. 'The counsel for the defendant,' he says, 'has laid down the general proposition that a sovereign independent state is not suable except by its own consent.' This general proposition, he adds, will not be controverted. And while the exemption of the United States and of the several states from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has since that time been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine. U.S. v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436; Same v. McLemore 4 How. 286; Hill v. U.S. 9 How. 386; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15. On the other hadn, while acceding to the general proposition that in no court can the United States be sued directly by original process as a defendant, there is abundant evidence in the decisions of this court that the doctrine, if not absolutely limited to cases in which the United States are made defendants by name, is not permitted to interfere with the judicial enforcement of the established rights of plaintiffs when the United States is not a defendant or a necessary party to the suit.

But little weight can be given to the decisions of the English courts on this branch of the subject, for two reasons: (1) In all cases where the title to property came into controversy between the crown and a subject, whether held in right of the person who was king or as representative of the nation, the petition of right presented a judicial remedy-a remedy which this court, on full examination in a case which required it, held to be practical and efficient. There has been, therefore, no necessity for suing the officers or servants of the king who held possession of such property, when the issue could be made with the king himself as defendant. (2) Another reason of much greater weight is found in the vast difference in the essential character of the two governments as regards the source and the depositaries of power.

Notwithstanding the progress which has been made since the days of the Stuarts in stripping the crown of its powers and prerogatives, it remains true to-day that the monarch is looked upon with too much reverence to be subjected to the demands of the law as ordinary persons are, and the king-loving nation would be shocked at the spectacle of their queen being turned out of her pleasure garden by a writ of ejectment against the gardener. The crown remains the fountain of honor, and the surroundings which give dignity and majesty to its possessor are cherished and enforced all the more strictly because of the loss of real power in the government. It is not to be expected, therefore, that the courts will permit their process to disturb the possession of the crown by acting on its officers or agents.

Under our system the people, who are there called subjects, are the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of loyalty to the person of the monarch. The citizen here knows no person, however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which the law secures to him when it is well administered. When he, in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has established his right to property, there is no reason why deference to any person, natural or artificial, not even the United States, should prevent him from using the means which the law gives him for the protection and enforcement of that right.

Another class of cases in the English courts, in which attempts have been made to subject the public ships and other property of foreign and independent nations found within English territory to their jurisdiction, is also inapplicable to this case; for, both by the English courts and ours, it has been uniformly held that these were questions, the decisions of which, as they might involve war or peace, must be primarily dealt with by those departments of the government which had the power to adjust them by negotiation, or to enforce the rights of the citizen by war. In such cases the judicial department of this government follows the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. Such were the cases of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 42; State of Georgia, v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 75.

The earliest case in this court in which the true rule is laid down, and which, bearing a close analogy to the one before us, seems decisive of it, is that of the U.S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115. In an admiralty proceeding commenced before the formation of the constitution, and which afterwards came into the district court of the United States for Pennsylvania, that court, after full hearing, had decided that the libelants were entitled to the proceeds of the sale of a vessel condemned as prize of war, which had come to the possession of David Rittenhouse, as treasurer of the state of Pennsylvania. The district judge had declined to issue any process to enforce his decree against the representatives of Rittenhouse, on the ground that the funds were held as the property of that state, and that as the state could not be subjected to judicial process, neither could the officer who held the money in her right. The analogy to the case before us will be seen when it is further stated that the examination of the case and the decree of the court had passed upon this claim of the state to the money, which had been fully presented, and had decided that the libelants and not the state were legally entitled to it. In that case, as in this, it was argued that the suit was in reality against the state. But on an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the judge of the district court to proceed in the execution of his decree, it was granted. In delivering the opinion, MARSHALL, C. J., says: 'The stare cannot be made a defendant to a suit brought by an individual, but it remains the duty of the courts of the United States to decide all cases brought before them by citizens of one state against citizens of a different state, when a state is not necessarily a defendant. In this case the suit was not instituted against the state or its treasurer, but against the executrixes of David Rittenhouse for the proceeds of a vessel condemned in the court of admiralty, which were admitted to be in their possession. If these proceeds had been the actual property of Pennsylvania, however wrongfully acquired, the disclosure of that fact would have presented a case on which it was unnecessary to give an opinion; but it certainly can never be alleged that a mere suggestion of title in a state to property in possession of an individual must arrest the proceedings of the court, and prevent their looking into the suggestion and examining the validity of the title.'

The case before us is a suit against Strong and Kaufman, as individuals, to recover possession of property. The suggestion was made that it was the property of the United States, and that the court, without inquiring into the truth of this suggestion, should proceed no further; and in this case, as in that, after a judicial inquiry had made it clear that the property belonged to plaintiff and not to the United States, we are still asked to forbid the court below to proceed further, and to reverse and set aside what it has done, and thus refuse to perform the duty of deciding suits properly brought before us by citizens of the United States.

It may be said, in fact it is said, that the present case differs from the one in 5 Cranch, because the officers who are sued assert no personal possession, but are holding as the mere agents of the United States, while the executors of Rittenhouse held the money until a better right was established. But the very next case in this court of a similar character (Meigs v. McClung's Lessee, 9 Cranch, 11) shows that this distinction was not recognized as sound. The property sued for in that case was land on which the United States had a garrison erected at a cost of $30,000, and the defendants were the military officers in possession, and the very question now in issue was raised by these officers, who, according to the bill of exceptions, insisted that the action could not be maintained against them, 'because the land was occupied by the United States troops, and the defendants as officers of the United States, for the benefit of the United States, and by their direction.' They further insisted, says the bill of exceptions, that the United States had a right by the constitution to appropriate the property of the individual citizen. The court below overruled these objections, and held that the title being in plaintiff he might recover, and that 'if the land was private property the United States could not have intended to deprive the individual of it without making him compensation therefor.' Although the judgment of the circuit court was in favor of the plaintiff, and its result was to turn the soldiers and officers out of possession and deliver it to plaintiff, Chief Justice MARSHALL concludes his opinion in this emphatic language: 'This court is unanimously and clearly of opinion that the circuit court committed no error in instructing the jury that the Indian title was extinguished to the land in controversy, and that the plaintiff below might sustain his action.' We are unable to discover any difference whatever in regard to the objection we are now considering between this case and the one before us. Impressed by the force of this argument, counsel say that the question of the objection arising out of the possession of the United States was not considered in that case because it was not urged in argument by counsel. But it is manifest that it was so set out in the bill of exceptions, and so much relied on in the court below that it could not have escaped the attention of the court and of the eminent man who had only six years before delivered the opinion in the case of the U.S. v. Peters. Nor could the case have been decided as it was if the doctrine now contended for be sound, since the effect of the judgment was to dispossess the United States of an occupied garrison by the judgment against the officers in charge of it.

In the case of Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, the contest was over a fort of the United States which had been in its continued possession for over 30 years, and was so occupied when the suit was brought against its officers to dispossess them. The case came from the supreme court of Illinois to this court on writ of error, and the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed. The question now under consideration was not passed upon directly by this court. But a long examination of the question whether the plaintiff had proved title in himself, and a decision that while the state courts of Illinois held a certificate of purchase from the United States to be a legal title under her statute, that statute was invalid, might all have been avoided by the simple declaration that the United States, being in possession of the property as a fort, no action at law against its officers could be maintained. But no such proposition was advanced by counsel on either side, or considered by the court. There is a very satisfactory reason for this. The cases of U.S. v. Peters, of Meigs v. McClung, and of Osborn v. United States Bank, had all involved the same question, and in the first and last of these cases the principle was fully discussed, and in the other necessarily decided in the negative. And in the case of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, the court had referred to these cases, and again asserted the principle, quoting the language of them. Counsel were not justified in asking the court to reconsider it while most of the judges were still on the bench, including the chief justice, who had made those decisions.

The case of Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, is a leading case, remarkable in many respects, and in none more than in those resembling the one before us. The case was this: The state of Ohio having levied a tax upon the branch of the Bank of the United States located in that state, which the bank refused to pay, Osborn, auditor of the state of Ohio, was about to proceed to collect said tax by a seizure of the money of the bank in its vaults, and an amended bill alleged that he had so seized $100,000, and while aware that an injunction had been issued by the circuit court of the United States on the prayer of the bank, the money so seized had been delivered to the treasurer of the state, Curry, and afterwards came to the possession of Sullivan, who had succeeded Curry as treasurer. Both Curry and Sullivan were made defendants as well as Osborn and his assistant, Harper.

One of the objections pressed with pertinacity all through the case to the jurisdiction of the court was the conceded fact that the state of Ohio, though not made a defendant to the bill, was the real party in interest. That all the parties sued were her officers, her auditor, her treasurer, and their agents concerning acts done in their official character, and in obedience to her laws. It was conceded that the state could not be sued, and it was earnestly argued there as here, that what could not be done directly could not be done by suing her officers. And it was insisted that while the state could not be brought before the court, it was a necessary party to the relief sought, namely, the return of the money and obedience to the injunction, and that the bill must be dismissed. A few citations from the opinion of MARSHALL, C. J., will show the views entertained by the court on the question thus raised. At page 842 of the long report of the case he says:

'If the state of Ohio could have been made a party defendant,     it can scarcely be denied that this would be a strong case      for an injunction. The objection is that, as the real party     cannot be brought before the court, a suit cannot be      sustained against the agents of that party; and cases have      been cited to show that a court of chancery will not make a      decree unless all those who are substantially interested be      made parties to the suit. This is certainly true where it is     in the power of the plaintiff to make them parties, but if      the person who is the real principal, the person who is the      true source of the mischief, by whose power and for whose      advantage it is done, be himself above the law, be exempt      from all judicial process, it would be subversive of the best      established principles to say that the laws could not afford      the same remedies against the agent employed in doing the      wrong which they would afford against him could his principal      be joined in the suit.'

'The process is substantially, though not in form, against     the state, *  *  * and the direct interest of the state in the      suit as brought is admitted; and had it been in the power of      the bank to make it a party, perhaps no decree ought to have      been pronounced in the cause until the state was before the      court. But this was not in the power of the bank, * *  * and the very difficult question is to be      decided, whether, in such a case, the court may act upon      agents employed by the state and on the property in their      hands.'

'A denial of jurisdiction forbids all inquiry into the nature     of the case. It applies to cases perfectly clear in     themselves; to cases where the government is in the exercise      of its best established and most essential powers, as well as      to those which may be deemed questionable. It asserts that     the agents of a state, alleging the authority of a law void      in itself because repugnant to the constitution, may arrest      the execution of any law in the United States.'

'The bank contends that in all cases in which jurisdiction     depends on the character of the party, reference is made to      the party on the record, not to one who may be interested,      but is not shown by the record to be a party.' 'If this      question were to be determined on the authority of English      decisions, it is believed that no case can be adduced where      any person can be considered as a party who is not made so in      the record.'

'In cases where a state is a party on the record the question     of jurisdiction is decided by inspection. If jurisdiction     depend not on this plain fact, but on the interest of the      state, what rule has the constitution given by which this      interest is to be measured? If no rule is given, is it to be     settled by the court? If so, the curious anomaly is presented     of a court examining the whole testimony of a cause,      inquiring into and deciding on the extent of a state's      interest, without having a right to exercise any jurisdiction      in the case. Can this inquiry be made without the exercise of     jurisdiction?'

The supreme court affirmed the decree of the circuit court for the district of Ohio, ordering a restitution of the money.

The case of Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363, was an action in the circuit court against General McDowell to recover possession of property held by him as an officer of the United States which had been set apart and reserved for military purposes. Though this was set up by him as part of his defense, it does not appear that in the argument of counsel for the government, or in the opinion of the court, any importance was attached to this circumstance; but the opinion of Mr. Justice FIELD in this court examines the case elaborately on the question whether plaintiff or the government had the title to the land. If the doctrine now contended for is sound, the case should have proceeded no further on the suggestion, not denied, that the property was held for public use by a military officer under orders from the president.

The case of Brown v. Huger, 21 How. 305, is of a precisely similar character, for the possession of the military arsenal at Harper's Ferry, in which, while the fact of its possession by the United States was set out in the bill of exceptions, no attention is given to that fact in the opinion of this court, which consists of an elaborate examination of plaintiff's title, held to be insufficient.

These decisions have never been overruled. On the contrary, as late as the case of Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 204, the case of Osborn v. Bank is cited with approval as establishing these among other propositions:

'Where the state is concerned, the state should be a made a     party, if it can be done. That it cannot be done is a     sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court      may proceed to decree against the officers of the state in      all respects as if the state were a party to the record.

'In deciding who are parties to the suit, the court will not     look beyond the record. Making a state officer a party does     not make the state a party, although her law may have      prompted his action, and the state may stand behind him as a      real party in interest. A state can be made a party only by     shaping the bill expressly with that view, as where      individuals or corporations are intended to be put in that      relation to the case.'

Though not prepared to say now that the court can proceed against the officer in 'all respects' as if the state were a party, this may be taken as intimating in a general way the views of the court at that time.

The cases of The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, are instances where the court has held that property of the United States may be dealt with by subjecting it to maritime liens where this can be done without making the United States a party. This examination of the cases in this court establishes clearly this result: that the proposition that when an individual is sued in regard to property which he holds as officer or agent of the United States, his possession cannot be disturbed when that fact is brought to the attention of the court, has been overruled and denied in every case where it has been necessary to decide it, and that in many others where the record shows that the case as tried below actually and clearly presented that defense, it was neither urged by counsel nor considered by the court here, though, if it had been a good defense, it would have avoided the necessity of a long inquiry into plaintiff's title and of other perplexing questions, and have quickly disposed of the case. And we see no escape from the conclusion that during all this period the court has held the principle to be unsound, and in the class of cases like the present, represented by Wilcox v. Jackson, Brown v. Huger, and Grisar v. McDowell, it was not thought necessary to reexamine a proposition so often and so clearly overruled in previous well-considered decisions.

It is true that there are expressions in the opinion of the court in the case of Carr v. U.S. 98 U.S. 433, which are relied on by counsel with much confidence as asserting a different doctrine.

That was a case in which the United States had filed a bill in the circuit court for the district of California to quiet title to the land on which a marine hospital had been built. To rebut the evidence of title offered by the plaintiffs, the defendant had relied on certain judgments rendered in the state courts, in which the unsuccessful parties set up title in the United States, under which they claimed. It appeared that the person who was district attorney of the United States had defended these actions, and the question under discussion was whether the United States was estopped by the proceedings so as to be unable to sustain the suit to quiet title. After stating the general doctrine that the United States cannot be sued without her consent, and the further proposition that no such consent can be given except by congress, which is a sufficient reason why they cannot be concluded by an action to which they are not parties, the learned justice who delivered the opinion proceeded to make some remarks as to cases in which actions would or would not lie against officers of the government in relation to property of the United States in their possession. As these remarks were not necessary to the decision of tht point then in question, as the action was equally inconclusive against the United States whether the persons sued were officers of the government or not, these remarks, if they have the meaning which counsel attribute to them, must rest for their weight as authority on the high character of the judge who delivered them, and not on that of the court which decided the case. That the United States are not bound by a judgment to which they are not parties, and that no officer of the government can, by defending a suit against private persons, conclude the United States by the judgment in such case, was sufficient to decide that case, and was all that was decided.

The fact that the property which is the subject of this controversy is devoted to public uses, is strongly urged as a reason why those who are so using it under the authority of the United States shall not be sued for its possession even by one who proves a clear title to that possession. In this connection many cases of imaginary evils have been suggested, if the contrary doctrine should prevail. Among these are a supposed seizure of vessels of war, invasions of forts and arsenals of the United States. Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particularly fruitful imagination in regard to almost every law upon which depends the rights of the individual or of the government, and if the existence of laws is to depend upon their capacity to withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of the law must fail.

The cases already cited of Meigs v. McClung, Wilcox v. Jackson, Georgia v. Madrazo, Grisar v. McDowell, Brown v. Huger, and Osborn v. Bank of the United States, necessarily involved this question, for the property recovered by the plaintiff in the case of Meigs v. McClung was a garrison and barracks then in use for such purposes by the officers of the United States who were sued. In the case of Wilcox v. Jackson, an action was brought to recover, among other things, a fort which had been in the occupation of the United States for 30 years, and which was then occupied by an officer of the army of the United States and his command. In the case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, the money sued for and recovered by the final decree of this court was money claimed by the state of Ohio as part of its public funds and devoted by the laws of that state to public uses in all the exigencies of the public service; so that the authorities we have examined, if they are worth anything, meet this objection as they meet the others which we have considered.

The objection is also inconsistent with the principle involved in the last two clauses of article 5 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, whose language is: 'That no person * *  * shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.' Conceding that the property in controversy in this case is devoted to a proper public use and that this has been done by those having authority to establish a cemetery and a fort, the verdict of the jury finds that it is and was the private property of the plaintiff, and was taken without any process of law and without any compensation. Undoubtedly those provisions of the constitution are of that character which it is intended the courts shall enforce, when cases involving their operation and effect are brought before them. The instances in which the life and liberty of the citizen have been protected by the judicial writ of habeas corpus are too familiar to need citation, and many of these cases, indeed indeed almost all of them, are those in which life or liberty was invaded by persons assuming to act under the authority of the government. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2. If this constitutional provision is a sufficient authority for the court to interfere to rescue a prisoner from the hands of those holding him under the asserted authority of the government, what reason is there that the same courts shall not give remedy to the citizen whose property has been seized without due process of law and devoted to public use without just compensation?

Looking at the question upon principle, and apart from the authority of adjudged cases, we think it still clearer that this branch of the defense cannot be maintained. It seems to be opposed to all the principles upon which the rights of the citizen, when brought in collision with the acts of the government, must be determined. In such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by the officers of the government, professing to act in its name. There remains to him but the alternative of resistance, which may amount to crime. The position assumed here is that, however clear his rights, no remedy can be afforded to him when it is seen that his opponent is an officer of the United States, claiming to act under its authority; for, as Chief Justice MARSHALL says, to examine whether this authority is rightfully assumed is the exercise of jurisdiction, and must lead to the decision of the merits of the question. The objection of the plaintiffs in error necessarily forbids any inquiry into the truth of the assumption that the parties setting up such authority are lawfully possessed of it, for the argument is that the formal suggestion of the existence of such authority forbids any inquiry into the truth of the suggestion. But why should not the truth of the suggestion and the lawfulness of the authority be made the subject of judicial investigation? In the case supposed the court has before it a plaintiff capable of suing, a defendant who has no personal exemption from suit, and a cause of action cognizable in the court-a case within the meaning of that term, as employed in the constitution and defined by the decisions of this court. It is to be presumed in favor of the jurisdiction of the court that the plaintiff may be able to prove the right which he asserts in his declaration. What is that right as established by the verdict of the jury in this case? It is the right to the possession of the homestead of plaintiff-a right to recover that which has been taken from him by force and violence, and detained by the strong hand. This right being clearly established, we are told that the court can proceed no further, because it appears that certain military officers, acting under the orders of the president, have seized this estate, and converted one part of it into a military fort and another into a cemetery. It is not pretended, as the case now stands, that the president had any lawful authority to do this, or that the legislative body could give him any such authority except upon payment of just compensation. The defense stands here solely upon the absolute immunity from judicial inquiry of every one who asserts authority from the executive branch of the government, however clear it may be made that the executive possessed no such power. Not only that no such power is given, but that it is absolutely prohibited, both to the executive and the legislative, to deprive any one of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to take private property without just compensation.

These provisions for the security of the rights of the citizen stand in the constitution in the same connection and upon the same ground as they regard his liberty and his property. It cannot be denied that both were intended to be enforced by the judiciary as one of the departments of the government established by that constitution. As we have already said, the writ of habeas corpus has been often used to defend the liberty of the citizen, and even his life, against the assertion of unlawful authority on the part of the executive and the legislative branches of the government. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, and the case of Kilbourn, discharged from the custody of the sergeant-at-arms of the house of representatives by Chief Justice CARTER. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168.

No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.

Courts of justice are established, not only to decide upon the controverted rights of the citizens as against each other, but also upon rights in controversy between them and the government, and the docket of this court is crowded with controversies of the latter class. Shall it be said, in the face of all this, and of the acknowledged right of the judiciary to decide in proper cases, statutes which have been passed by both branches of congress and approved by the president to be unconstitutional, that the courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights. It cannot be, then, that when in a suit between two citizens for the ownership of real estate, one of them has established his right to the possession of the property according to all the forms of judicial procedure, and by the verdict of a jury and the judgment of the court, the wrongful possessor can say successfully to the court, 'Stop, here; I hold by order of the president, and the progress of justice must be stayed.' That, though the nature of the controversy is one peculiarly appropriate to the judicial function, though the United States is no party to the suit, though one of the three great branches of the government to which by the constitution this duty has been assigned has declared its judgment after a fair trial, the unsuccessful party can interpose an absolute veto upon that judgment by the production of an order of the secretary of war, which that officer had no more authority to make than the humblest private citizen.

The evils supposed to grow out of the possible interference of judicial action with the exercise of powers of the government essential to some of its most important operations will be seen to be small indeed compared to this evil, and much diminished, if they do not wholly disappear, upon a recurrence to a few considerations. One of these, of no little significance, is that during the existence of the government for now nearly a century under the present constitution, with this principle and the practice under it well established, no injury from it has come to that government. During this time at least two wars so serious as to call into exercise all the powers and all the resources of the government have been conducted to a successful issue. One of these was a great civil war, such as the world has seldom known, which strained the powers of the national government to their utmost tension. In the course of this war persons hostile to the Union did not hesitate to invoke the powers of the courts for their protection as citizens in order to cripple the exercise of the authority necessary to put down the rebellion, yet no improper interference with the exercise of that authority was permitted or attempted by the courts. Mississippi v. The President, 4 Wall. 475; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; Same v. Grant, Id. 241; Ex parte Tarble, 13 Wall. 397.

Another consideration is that since the United States cannot be made a defendant to a suit concerning its property, and no judgment in any suit against an individual who has possession or control of such property can bind or conclude the government, as is decided by this court in the case of Carr v. U.S., already referred to, the government is always at liberty, notwithstanding any such judgment, to avail itself of all the remedies which the law allows to every person, natural or artificial, for the vindication and assertion of its rights. Hence, taking the precent case as an illustration, the United States may proceed by a bill in chancery to quiet its title, in aid of which, if a proper case is made, a writ of injunction may be obtained. Or it may bring an action of ejectment, in which, on a direct issue between the United States as plaintiff and the present plaintiff as defendant, the title of the United States could be judicially determined. Or, if satisfied that its title has been shown to be invalid, and it still desires to use the property, or any part of it, for the purposes to which it is now devoted, it may purchase such property by fair negotiation, or condemn it by a judicial proceeding, in which a just compensation shall be ascertained and paid according to the constitution.

If it be said that the proposition here established may subject the property, the officers of the United States, and the performance of their indispensable functions to hostile proceedings in the state courts, the answer is that no case can arise in a state court where the interests, the property, the rights, or the authority of the federal government may come in question, which cannot be removed into a court of the United States under existing laws. In all cases, therefore, where such questions can arise, they are to be decided, at the option of the parties representing the United States, in courts which are the creation of the federal government. The slightest consideration of the nature, the character, the organization, and the powers of these courts will dispel any fear of serious injury to the government at their hands. While by the constitution the judicial department is recognized as one of the three great branches among which all the powers and functions of the government are distributed, it is inherently the weakest of them all. Dependent as its courts are for the enforcement of their judgments upon officers appointed by the executive, and removable at his pleasure, with no patronage and no control of purse or sword, their power and influence rests solely upon the public sense of the necessity for the existence of a tribunal to which all may appeal for the assertion and protection of rights guarantied by the constitution and by the laws of the land, and on the confidence reposed in the soundness of their decisions and the purity of their motives. From such a tribunal no well-founded fear can be entertained of injustice to the government or purpose to obstruct or diminish its just authority.

The circuit court was competent to decide the issues in this case before the parties that were before it. In the principles on which these issues were decided no error has been found, and its judgment is affirmed.