United States v. Johnson (390 U.S. 563)/Opinion of the Court

The question in this case is whether conspiracies by outside hoodlums to assault Negroes for exercising their right to equality in public accommodations under § 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, are subject only to a civil suit for an injunction as provided in § 204 of that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3, or whether they are also subject to criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which provides fine and imprisonment for a conspiracy 'to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same * *  * .'

The indictment charged a conspiracy to injure and intimidate three Negroes in the exercise of their right to patronize a restaurant. The defendants, who were outsiders, not connected with the restaurant, are charged with having used violence against these Negroes for having received service at the restaurant, the purpose of the conspiracy being in part 'to discourage them and other Negro citizens from seeking service' there 'on the same basis as white citizens.'

The facts are not developed because the District Court granted a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that s 207(b) of the Act makes the provision for relief by injunction the exclusive remedy under the Act. The case is here on appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3731. We noted probable jurisdiction. 389 U.S. 910, 88 S.Ct. 241, 19 L.Ed.2d 258.

The legislative history contains language which to the District Court seemed to preclude remedy by indictment. Senator Humphrey, floor manager of the bill, explained § 207(b):

'This would mean, for example, that a proprietor who, in the     first instance, legitimately-but erroneously-believes his      establishment is not covered by section 201 or 202 need not      fear a jail sentence or a damage action if his judgment as to      coverage of title II is wrong.' 110 Cong.Rec. 9767.

'The enforcement provisions of title II are based on the     specific prohibition in section 203 against denying or      interfering with the right to the nondiscriminatory use of      facilities covered by the title. In case of a violation, the     aggrieved person would be able to sue for an injunction to      end the denial or interference *  *  * The prohibitions of      title II would be enforced only by civil suits for an      injunction. Neither criminal penalties nor the recovery of     money damages would be involved.' 110 Cong.Rec. 7384.

'Moreover, in every case, a judicial determination of     coverage must be made prior to the entry of any order      requiring the onwer to stop discrimination. Thus, no one     would become subject to any contempt sanctions-the only      sanctions provided for in the act, until after it has been      judicially determined that his establishment is subject to      the act and he has been ordered by the Court to end this      discrimination, and he has violated that Court order.' 110      Cong.Rec. 7405.

That legislative history makes clear that the 'proprietor' or 'owner' is not to be subjected to criminal liability, where he had not had a chance to litigate whether his facilities are subject to the Act. But no proprietor or owner is here involved. Outside hoodlums are charged with the conspiracy; and the history of federal law, as applicable to them, is clear. 18 U.S.C. § 241 is derived from the Enforcement Act of 1870, § 6, 16 Stat. 141, and, as noted, protects the citizen 'in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.' The right to service in a restaurant is such a 'right,' at least by virtue of the 1964 Act. We said in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1160, 16 L.Ed.2d 267, in reference to 18 U.S.C. § 241. 'We think that history leaves no doubt that, if we are to give § 241 the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.'

We have over the years given protection to many federal rights under § 241. We refuse to believe that hoodlums operating in the fashion of the Ku Klux Klan, were given protection by the 1964 Act for violating those 'rights' of the citizen that § 241 was designed to protect.

Immediately after the provision in § 207(b) stating that the remedies provided 'shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title,' is a further provision stating that 'nothing in this title shall preclude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title * *  * or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.' There is, therefore, within the four corners of § 207(b) evidence that it was not designed as preempting every other mode of protecting a federal 'right' or as granting immunity to those who had long been subject to the regime of § 241.

It is, of course, true that § 203(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2(b), bars the use of violence against those who assert their rights under the Act, and that therefore a remedy by way of an injunction could be obtained by the party aggrieved under § 204(a). A like remedy is available to the Attorney General by reason of § 206(a). But as we read the Act, the exclusive-remedy provision of § 207(b) was inserted only to make clear that the substantive rights to public accommodation defined in § 201 and § 202 are to be enforced exclusively by injunction. Proprietors and owners are not to be prosecuted criminally for mere refusal to serve Negroes. But the Act does not purport to deal with outsiders; nor can we imagine that Congress desired to give them a brand new immunity from prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241-a statute that encompasses 'all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United States.' United States v. Price, supra, at 800, 86 S.Ct. at 1160.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice HARLAN join, dissenting.