United States v. Johnson (390 U.S. 563)/Dissent Stewart

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice HARLAN join, dissenting.

I regret that I cannot join the opinion of the Court. There is, of course, no question of the reprehensibility of the appellees' alleged conduct. But the issue is whether Congress has subjected this conduct to federal criminal prosecution.

Section 201 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, secures the right to equal enjoyment of places of public accommodation. Section 203 prohibits interference with that right in any of three ways:

'No person shall(a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or     deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any      right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b)      intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any      person with the purpose of interfering with any right or      privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or      attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to      exercise any right or privilege sucured by section 201 or      202.'

Section 204 authorizes private injunctive actions against violations of § 203. Section 206 provides for injunctive actions by the Attorney General against patterns or practices of resistance to enjoyment of Title II rights. Finally § 207(b) states:

'The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive     means of enforcing the rights based on this title *  *  * .'

The plain language of the exclusive remedies clause of § 207 thus clearly precludes a criminal prosecution for interfering with rights secured by Title II. And the very legislative history cited by the Court leaves no doubt that a specific purpose of that clause was to prevent criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 241. It was upon that understanding that Congress enacted the legislation.

The Court's effort to distinguish between refusal of service by a proprietor and violent interference by third parties is not only without any support in the language of § 207 but also is belied by § 203 of the Title, quoted above. That section clearly prohibits intimidation and coercion by third persons as well as refusal of service by a proprietor. Congress, therefore, was explicitly aware of the kind of conduct alleged in this case when it enacted Title II, and Congress provided in § 207 that the exclusive remedy to prohibit such conduct must be by injunction.

The exclusive remedies provided by Congress to protect the rights secured by Title II of the 1964 Act are undoubtedly ineffective in a case like this. But I cannot, for that reason, join in rewriting the law that Congress so clearly enacted.

I respectfully dissent.