United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp./Dissent Stewart

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join, dissenting.

This case stirs large questions-questions that go to the moral foundations of the criminal law. Whether postulated as a problem of 'mens rea,' of 'willfulness,' of 'criminal responsibility,' or of 'scienter,' the infliction of criminal punishment upon the unaware has long troubled the fair administration of justice. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288; Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228; Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782. Cf. Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862. But there is no occasion here for involvement with this root problem of criminal jurisprudence, for it is evident to me that Congress made punishable only knowing violations of the regulation in question. That is what the law quite clearly says, what the federal courts have held, and what the legislative history confirms.

The statutory language is hardly complex. Section 834(a) of Title 18, U.S.C., gives the regulatory agency power to 'formulate regulations for the safe transportation' of, among other things, 'corrosive liquids.' Section 834(f) provides that '(w)hoever knowingly violates any such regulation shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.' In dismissing the information in this case because it did not charge the appellee shipper with knowing violation of the applicable labeling regulation, District Judge Porter did no more than give effect to the ordinary meaning of the English language.

It is true, as the Court today points out, that the issue now before us was not directly involved in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367, which dealt with a claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. But in holding the statute valid, the Court bottomed its reasoning upon the proposition that 'the presence of culpable intent (is) a necessary element of the offense.' Id., at 342, 72 S.Ct., at 332. Other federal courts, faced with the precise issue here presented, have held that the statute means exactly what it says-that the words 'knowingly violates any such regulation' mean no more and no less than 'knowingly violates any such regulation.' St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (CA1 1955); United States v. Chicago Express, 235 F.2d 785 (CA7 1956). Chief Judge Magruder filed a concurring opinion in the St. Johnsbury case, and he put the matter thus:

'If it be thought that the indicated requirement of proof     will seriously hamper effective enforcement of the Interstate      Commerce Commission regulations, the answer is that Congress      is at liberty to fix that up by striking out *  *  * the      prescribed element of mens rea-'knowingly'-as applied to      violation of regulations of the sort here involved. * *  *

'If a statute provides that it shall be an offense     'knowingly' to sell adulterated milk, the offense is complete      if the defendant sells what he knows to be adulterated milk,      even though he does not know of the existence of the criminal      statute, on the time-honored principle of the criminal law      that ignorance of the law is no excuse. But where a statute     provides, as does 18 U.S.C. § 835, that whoever knowingly      violates a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission      shall be guilty of an offense, it would seem that a person could not knowingly violate a      regulation unless he knows of the terms of the regulation and      knows that what he is doing is contrary to the regulation. Here again the definition of the offense is within the     control and discretion of the legislature.' Id., 220 F.2d, at      398.

In 1960 these judicial decisions were brought to the attention of the appropriate committees of Congress by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which asked Congress to overcome their impact by amending the law, either by simply deleting the word 'knowingly' or, alternatively, by substituting therefor the words 'being aware that the Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles.' The Senate passed a bill adopting the second alternative, based on a committee report that stated:

'Prosecution for violations of the Commission's     transportation of explosives regulations has been extremely      difficult because of the requirement in section 835 of the      act that violators must have knowledge that they violated the      Commission's regulations. While the committee believes that     every reasonable precaution should be taken to provide for      punishing those violating a statute whose purpose is to      promote safety, the creation of an absolute liability is      deemed too stringent.'

The House, however, refused to accept the Senate's language and resubstituted the word 'knowingly,' its committee report stating:

'The present Transportation and Explosives Act requires that     a violation 'knowingly' be committed before penalty may be      inflicted for such violation.

Under the present law there is judicial pronouncement as to     the standards of conduct that make a violation a 'knowing'      violation. The instant bill would change substantially the     quantum of proof necessary to prove a violation since it      provides that 'any person who being aware that the Interstate      Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for the safe      transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles' is      guilty if there is a noncompliance with the regulations. Such     language may well create an almost absolute liability for      violation. * *  * Since the penalties prescribed for violation      of the Explosives Act are substantial and since proof      required to sustain a charge of violation of such regulations      under the bill would require little more than proof that the      violation occurred, it is the considered opinion of the      committee that such a substantial departure in present law is      not warranted. It is the purpose of this amendment to retain     the present law by providing that a person must 'knowingly'      violate the regulations.'

Three days later the Senate agreed to the resubstitution of the word 'knowingly' by passing the House version of the bill.

The Court today thus grants to the Executive Branch what Congress explicitly refused to grant in 1960. It effectively deletes the word 'knowingly' from the law. I cannot join the Court in this exercise, requiring as it does such a total disregard of plain statutory language, established judicial precedent, and explicit legislative history.

A final word is in order. Today's decision will have little practical impact upon the prosecution of interstate motor carriers or institutional shippers. For interstate motor carriers are members of a regulated industry, and their officers, agents, and employees are required by law to be conversant with the regulations in question. As a practical matter, therefore, they are under a species of absolute liability for violation of the regulations despite the 'knowingly' requirement. This, no doubt, is as Congress intended it to be. Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604. Likewise, prosecution of regular shippers for violations of the regulations could hardly be impeded by the 'knowingly' requirement, for triers of fact would have no difficulty whatever in inferring knowledge on the part of those whose business it is to know, despite their protestations to the contrary. The only real impact of this decision will be upon the casual shipper, who might be any man, woman, or child in the Nation. A person who had never heard of the regulation might make a single shipment of an article covered by it in the course of a lifetime. It would be wholly natural for him to assume that he could deliver the article to the common carrier and depend upon the carrier to see that it was properly labeled and that the shipping papers were in order. Yet today's decision holds that a person who does just that is guilty of a criminal offense punishable by a year in prison. This seems to me a perversion of the purpose of criminal law.

I respectfully dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court.