United States v. Green (350 U.S. 415)/Opinion of the Court

An indictment was found in the Southern District of Illinois against appellees Green and a local union. The jury adjudged them guilty under counts one and two thereof. The court sustained their separate motions in arrest of judgment, setting out in its order that its action was 'solely' on the following grounds:

'2. This court is without jurisdiction of the offense.

'(b) The facts alleged in the Indictment failed to set forth     an offense against the United States such as to give this      Court jurisdiction.

'(c) A proper construction of the statute in question clearly     indicates that it does not cover the type of activity charged      in this indictment; to interpret the Act in question as      covering the type of activity charged in this Indictment is      to extend the jurisdiction of this Court and the power of      Congress beyond their Constitutional limits.'

Appeal was taken by the United States directly to this Court under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731. We noted probate jurisdiction. 350 U.S. 813, 76 S.Ct. 44.

The two counts in question were based upon alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951, popularly known as the Hobbs Act. The pertinent statutory provisions are subsections (a) and (b)(2) thereof, reading as follows:

'(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or     affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or      attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens      physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of      a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section      shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more      than twenty years, or both.

'(b) * *  *

'(2) The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of property     from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of      actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color      of official right.'

Each of the two counts charged appellees with acts of extortion under § 1951 directed against a different employer. The extortions alleged consisted of attempts to obtain from the particular employer

'his money, in the form of wages to be paid for imposed,     unwanted, superfluous and fictitious services of laborers      commonly known as swampers, in connection with the operation      of machinery and equipment then being used and operated by      said (employer) in the execution of his said contract for      maintenance work on said levee, the attempted obtaining of      said property from said (employer) as aforesaid being then      intended to be accomplished and accomplished with the consent      of said (employer), induced and obtained by the wrongful use,      to wit, the use for the purposes aforesaid, of actual and      threatened force, violence and fear made to said (employer),      and his employees and agents then and there being: in      violation of Section 1951 of Title 18, United States Code.'

Appellees each filed motions for acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial. These the trial court specifically denied. The opinion of the trial court, 135 F. Supp. 162, says nothing as to failure of evidence to support the allegations of the indictment, or as to trial errors. Instead the court relied upon the absence of criminality in the acts charged, and it was therefore logical for the trial court to deny acquittal and new trial. The court thought persuasive our recent cases which held union efforts to secure 'made work' for their members were not unfair labor practices. From its view that extortion as defined in the Hobbs Act covers only the taking of property from another for the extortioner's personal advantage, the necessity to arrest the judgment followed. Rule 34, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc., 18 U.S.C.A.

We do not agree with that interpretation of the section. The Hobbs Act was passed after this Court had construed § 2 of the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979, in United States v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 62 S.Ct. 642, 86 L.Ed. 1004. Subsection (a) of § 2 barred, with respect to interstate commerce, exaction of valuable considerations by force, violence or coercion, 'not including, however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee'. We held in Local 807 that this exception covered members of a city truck drivers' union offering superfluous services to drive arriving trucks to their city destination with intent, if the truck owners refused offer, to exact the wages by violence. In the Hobbs Act, 60 Stat. 420, carried forward as 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951, which amended the Anti-Racketeering Act, the exclusion clause involved in the Local 807 decision was dropped. The legislative history makes clear that the new Act was meant to eliminate any grounds for future judicial conclusions that Congress did not intend to cover the employer-employee relationship. The words were defined to avoid any misunderstanding.

Title II of the Hobbs Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall not affect the Clayton Act, §§ 6 and 20, 38 Stat. 731, 738, 15 U.S.C.A. § 17, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52; the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.; the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.; or the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. There is nothing in any of those Acts, however, that indicates any protection for unions or their officials in attempts to get personal property through threats of force or violence. Those are not legitimate means for improving labor conditions. If the trial court intended by its references to the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts to indicate any such labor exception, which we doubt, it was in error. Apparently what the court meant is more clearly expressed by its statement, set out in the last paragraph of note 2 above, that the charged acts would be criminal only if they were used to obtain property for the personal benefit of the union or its agent, in this case Green. This latter holding is also erroneous. The city truckers in the Local 807 case similarly were trying by force to get jobs and pay from the out-of-state truckers by threats and violence. The Hobbs Act was meant to stop just such conduct. And extortion as defined in the statute in no way depends upon having a direct benefit conferred on the person who obtains the property.

It is also stated in the opinion below that to interpret the Act as covering the activity charged would 'extend the jurisdiction of the Court, and the power of Congress beyond their Constitutional limits.' 135 F.Supp. at page 162. The same language is in the order. Since in our view the legislation is directed at the protection of interstate commerce against injury from extortion, the court's holding is clearly wrong. We said in the Local 807 case that racketeering affecting interstate commerce was within federal legislative control. 315 U.S. at page 536, 62 S.Ct. 648. Cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19, 67 S.Ct. 13, 15, 91 L.Ed. 12; Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 75 S.Ct. 860, 99 L.Ed. 1196.

On this appeal the record does not contain the evidence upon which the court acted. The indictment charges interference with commerce by extortion in the words of the Act's definition of that crime. We rule only on the allegations of the indictment and hold that the acts charged against appellees fall within the terms of the Act. The order in arrest of judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACK concur, dissenting.