United States v. Fruehauf/Dissent Stewart

Mr. Justice STEWART, dissenting.

The dismissal of the indictment in this case was placed squarely upon the district court's construction of a criminal statute. Specifically, the court ruled that a loan of money did not fall within the prohibition of § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (before its amendment in 1959). In bringing the appeal directly here, the Government eliminated from the case any possible questions other than the correctness of the district court's construction of the underlying statute-to which this Court's jurisdiction is limited under the Criminal Appeals Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3731, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731. United States v. Keitel, 211 U.S. 370, 397-398, 29 S.Ct. 123, 131, 53 L.Ed. 230; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 535, 540, 33 S.Ct. 141, 142, 57 L.Ed. 333; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 301, 306, 39 S.Ct. 465, 466, 63 L.Ed. 992; United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 192-194, 60 S.Ct. 182, 185, 84 L.Ed. 181. '(I)n reviewing a direct appeal from a District Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, supra, our review is limited to the validity or construction of the contested statute. For 'The Government's appeal does not open the whole case." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 5, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 1541, 91 L.Ed. 1877.

I think the issue whether a loan of money came within the proscriptions of the statute is before us now and should be decided. I further think this is the only issue properly before us. However, since the Court thinks otherwise, I am persuaded that an expression of my views on the subject would not be appropriate.