United States v. Dixon/Dissent Black

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr., Justice JACKSON and Mr. Justice MINTON concur, dissenting.

Respondent was indicted for violating §§ 3116 and 3115 of the Internal Revenue Code by having in his possession sugar, wooden barrels, a metal cap, a heater box and mash pipe, all 'intended for use' in unlawfully evading liquor taxes. The District Court dismissed the indictment for failure to charge a crime. I agree. The indictment did clearly charge a violation of § 3116 which makes it 'unlawful' to hold property for such an intended use. But § 3116 does not make 'unlawful' possession a crime; the only sanction it contains is forfeiture. This Court nevertheless holds that possession for such an 'unlawful' purpose is made a crime by § 3115(b). That section does not of itself define a crime; it merely authorizes fine or imprisonment for violations of other provisions of the Act which do not themselves prescribe a 'special penalty.' Hence the general penalties of § 3115 cannot apply to violations of § 3116, because this latter section prescribes its own 'special penalty'-seizure and forfeiture of property. This forfeiture is plainly a penalty since there is no practical difference between taking a man's property by forfeiture and taking his money by a fine. And where Congress has specifically provided a property penalty I cannot agree to add a money penalty by dubious implication.

The accepted practice of construing criminal statutes narrowly should be especially appropriate here because of the unusual nature of the 'crime' involved. The Court's interpretation of § 3115 makes possession of innocent property, such as an automobile, a crime if the possessor intends to use it illegally, even if he has not done so. Guilt is made to depend wholly on what is within the defendant's mind. Congress may well have been unwilling to apply sanctions other than forfeiture to an unexpressed intention to do something that has not even been attempted.