United States v. Covilland/Opinion of the Court

Covilland and four others petitioned to have confirmed to them two tracts of land, as joint owners, assuming to derive title from John A. Sutter. His claim was confirmed for eleven leagues by the decision of this court, in 1858, and which judgment is reported in 21 How., 170. It appeared, in that case, that Sutter had assigned to others a great portion of his original grant; nevertheless, the suit against the United States seeking a confirmation was prosecuted in his name, regardless of that fact.

That a confirmation in the name of the original grantee, divesting the legal title of the United States, is binding on the Government and on the assignees, is the established doctrine of this court. It was so held in the case of Percheman, (7 Peters, 56,) which decision has been adhered to, and was recognised in Sutter's case, (21 How., 182,) of which this case is, in fact, a part.

To this course of decision the courts adjudicating titles to lands situate in California are requested to conform by the 11th section of the act of March 3, 1851; nor can their decisions affect injuriously the rights of assignees. The 15th section of the act so provides.

The decree made by this court in 1858, in favor of Sutter, remanded the proceeding to the surveyor general's office in California, to have a survey made of the land conformably to our decree, to the end of having a patent founded on the survey, divesting the title of the United States. In executing the survey, Sutter's assignees may intervene and protect their rights, according to the act of June 14, 1860.

We are not aware that the survey has been executed; but when it is finally completed, and a patent issued to Sutter, his assignees can assert their rights against him in the ordinary courts of the country. But the extraordinary tribunals, proceeding by force of the act of 1851, cannot order a second patent to issue for a portion of Sutter's grant. Such judgment could have no effect against the Government; and as between Sutter and the petitioners, would be a nullity, being prohibited by the 15th section of the act of 1851.

It is ordered that the judgment be reversed, and the petition be dismissed.