United States v. Columbia Steel Company/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice MURPHY, and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, concur, dissenting.

This is the most important antitrust case which has been before the Court in years. It is important because it reveals the way of growt of monopoly power-the precise phenomenon at which the Sherman Act was aimed. Here we have the pattern of the evolution of the great trusts. Little, independent units are gobbled up by bigger ones. At times the independent is driven to the wall and surrenders. At other times any number of 'sound business reasons' appear why the sale to or merger with the trust should be made. If the acquisition were the result of predatory practices or restraints of trade, the trust could be required to disgorge. Schine Chain Theatres Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 68 S.Ct. 947. But the impact on future competition and on the economy is the same though the trust was built in more gentlemanly ways.

We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now have been burned into our memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows how size can become a menace-both industrial and social. It can be an industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities against existing or putative competitors. It can be a social menace- because of its control of prices. Control of prices in the steel industry i powerful leverage on our economy. For the price of steel determines the price of hundreds of other articles. Our price level determines in large measure whether we have prosperity or depression-an economy of abundance or scarcity. Size in steel should therefore be jealously watched. In final analysis, size in steel is the measure of the power of a handful of men over our economy. That power can be utilized with lightning speed. It can be benign or it can be dangerous. The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it should not exist. For all power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and social minded is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great that only a government of the people should have it.

The Court forgot this lesson in United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U.S. 417, 40 S.Ct. 293, 64 L.Ed. 343, 8 A.L.R. 1121, and in United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 47 S.Ct. 748, 71 L.Ed. 1302. The Court today forgets it when it allows United States Steel to wrap its tentacles tighter around the steel industry of the West.

This acquisition can be dressed up (perhaps legitimately) in terms of an expansion to meet the demands of a business which is growing as a result of superior and enterprising management. But the test under the Sherman Act strikes deeper. However the acquisition may be rationalized, the effect is plain. It is a purchase for control, a purchase for control of a market for which United States Steel has in the past had to compete but which it no longer wants left to the uncertainties that competition in the West may engender. This in effect it concedes. It states that its purpose in acquiring Consolidated is to insure itself of a market for part of Geneva's production of rolled steel products when demand falls off.

But competition is never more irrevocably eliminated than by buying the customer for whose business the industry has been competing. The business of Consolidated amounts to around $22,000,000 annually. The competitive purchases by Consolidated are over $5,000,000 a year. I do not see how it is possible to say that $5,000,000 of commerce is immaterial. It plainly is not de minimis. And it is the character of the restraint which § 1 of the Act brands as illegal, not the amount of commerce affected. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 24 S.Ct. 307, 48 L.Ed. 608; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225, n. 59, 60 S.Ct. 811, 846, 84 L.Ed. 1129; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 1564, 91 L.Ed. 2010. At least it can be said here, as it was in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, 68 S.Ct. 12, 15, that the volume of business restrained by this contract is not insignificant or insubstantial. United States Steel does not consider it insignificant, for the aim of this well-conceived r oject is to monopolize it. If it is not insubstantial as a market for United States Steel, it certainly is not from the point of view of the struggling western units of the steel industry.

It is unrealistic to measure Consolidated's part of the market by determining its proportion of the national market. There is no safeguarding of competition in the theory that the bigger the national market the less protection will be given those selling to the smaller components thereof. That theory would allow a producer to absorb outlets upon which small enterprises with restricted marketing facilities depend. Those outlets, though statistically unimportant from the point of view of the national market, could be a matter of life and death to small, local enterprises.

The largest market which must be taken for comparison is the market actually reached by the company which is being absorbed. In this case Consolidated's purchases of rolled steel products are a little over 3 per cent of that market. By no standard-United States Steel's or its western competitors-can that percentage be deemed immaterial. Yet consideration of the case from that viewpoint puts the public interest phase of the acquisition in the least favorable light. A surer test of the impact of the acquisition on competition is to be determined not only by consideration of the actual markets reached by Consolidated but also by the actual purchases which it makes. Its purchases were predominantly of plates and shapes-76 per cent from 1937-1941. This was in 1937 13 per cent of the total in the Consolidated market. That comparison is rejected by the Court or at least discounted on the theory that competitors presently selling to Consolidated can probably convert from plates and shapes to other forms of rolled steel products. But a surer test of the effect on competition is the actual business of which competitors will be deprived. We do not know whether they can be sufficiently resourceful to recover from this strengthening of the hold which this giant of the industry now has on their markets. It would be more in keeping with the spirit of the Sherman Act to give the benefits of any doubts to the struggling competitors.

It is, of course, immaterial that a purpose or intent to achieve the result may not have been present. The holding of the cases from United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543, 33 S.Ct. 141, 145, 57 L.Ed. 333, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 325, to United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S.Ct. 941, is that the requisite purpose or intent is present if monopoly or restraint of trade results as a direct and necessary consequence of what was done. We need not hold that vertical integration is per se unlawful in order to strike down what is accomplished here. The consequence of the deliberate, calculated purchase for purpose of control over this substantial share of the market can no more be avoided here than it was in United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57, 40 S.Ct. 425, 432, 64 L.Ed. 760, and in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra. I do not stop to consider the effect of the acquisition on competition in the sale of fabricated steel products. The monopoly of this substantial market for rolled steel products is in itself an unreasonable restraint of trade under § 1 of the Act.

The result might well be different if Consolidated were merging with or being acquired by an independent west coast producer for the purpose of developing an integrated operation. The purchase might then be part of an intensely practical plan to put together an independent western unit of the industry with sufficient resources and strength to compete with the gaints of the industry. Approval of this acquisition works in precisely the opposite direction. It makes dim the prospects that the western steel industry will be free from the control of the eastern giants. United States Steel, now that it owns the Geneva plant, has over 51 per cent of the rolled steel or ingot capacity of the Pacific Coast area. Thi acquisition gives it unquestioned domination there and protects it against growth of the independents in that developing region. That alone is sufficient to condemn the purchase. Its serious impact on competition and the economy is emphasized when it is recalled that United States Steel has one-third of the rolled steel production of the entire country. The least I can say is that a company that has that tremendous leverage on our economy is big enough.