United States v. Champlin Refining Company/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice BURTON concur, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The term 'common carrier' has but one meaning in the Act-the meaning given it by § 1. That definition was held in Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29, 67 S.Ct. 1, 91 L.Ed. 22, sufficiently broad to include appellee. Section 19a was involved there and § 6 is involved here. That may make a constitutional difference; but there can be none so far as the statute is concerned. Since § 6, like § 19a, can reach appellee only through § 1, if § 1 is broad enough for the one section it is broad enough for the other. As the Court in its several decisions has not been consistent in its interpretation of the scope of the Act as applied to private pipe lines, I feel free to follow the precedent of the Pipe-Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 561 562, 34 S.Ct. 956, 58 L.Ed. 1459, and the view expressed in the dissent in Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29, 67 S.Ct. 1, 91 L.Ed. 22, that pipe lines carrying only the commodities of their owners from the owners' refineries to the owners' storage tanks for marketing have not been made by Congress subject to the Act. Consequently, I agree that § 1 is not broad enough to bring appellee under the regulatory power of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Therefore, neither § 6 nor § 20 applies.