United States for the Use of Crawford v. Addison/Opinion of the Court

When the application was made to this court for a mandamus to the Circuit Court to compel the issue of process upon the judgment of ouster against the defendant, Addison, in the quo warranto proceeding, notwithstanding the writ of error and bond, the counsel of the relator contended that the case was not one in which a writ of error would lie; that to authorize the writ the matter in dispute must have a pecuniary value of at least one thousand dollars; that the matter in dispute was a public office of personal trust and confidence, which was not the subject of pecuniary estimation; that the salary annexed was not to be considered as the value of the office, but as an equivalent for the services to be rendered, and even that was payable in monthly instalments; and that a mandamus should accordingly issue, especially as the term of office would expire about the commencement of the ensuing term of the court to which the writ of error was returnable.

The counsel of the defendant, on the other hand, insisted that the pecuniary value of the office was determined by the salary annexed, and as it amounted to a thousand dollars a year the court had jurisdiction to review the judgment on writ of error, and that the bond stayed process on the judgment. And so the court held, and refused the mandamus.

When in January, 1861, the writ of error was dismissed, and the judgment of ouster against the defendant, Addison, was enforced, the relator was installed into office. He then brought the present suit on the bond.

By the judgment of ouster against Addison, his right to the office of mayor was determined. The relator thereupon became entitled to the office, ei her by virtue of the declaration of the judges who had returned him elected, or by virtue of that provision of the charter which enacts that the mayor shall hold over until his successor is elected. By the writ of error and the suspension bond the enforcement of the judgment was prevented, and until the writ was dismissed the relator was excluded from the office and deprived of the salary annexed to it. The amount of the salary received by the defendant, Addison, during the period of such deprivation, constitutes, under the decision in the mandamus case, the measure of the damages which the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the suspension bond.

The second instruction to the jury which the plaintiff requested correctly presents the law of the case, and should have been given.

The rule which measures the damages upon a breach of contract for wages or for freight, or for the lease of buildings, has no application. In these cases the party aggrieved must seek other employment, or other articles for carriage, or other tenants, and the damages recovered will be the difference between the amount stipulated and the amount actually received or paid. But no such rule can be applied to public offices of personal trust and confidence, the duties of which are not purely ministerial or clerical.

An attempt is made to avoid the liability of the defendant, Addison, by showing that on the trial of the quo warranto the jury in the first instance returned a special verdict to the effect that there was a tie in the votes cast for him and the relator respectively. This verdict is not evidence of the fact, for it was not received by the court, or in any way made matter of record. With the assent of the attorney of the defendant the court directed the jury to retire to their room and consider of their verdict. They did retire, as directed, and returned the verdict upon which the judgment of ouster was entered. The original verdict was, therefore, of no weight as evidence for any purpose, and constituted no basis for the action of the councils of the city in the proceeding to elect the defendant, Addison, as upon a tie in the votes cast by the electors. That the members of the councils did not themselves place any reliance upon the validity of their action in this respect is evident from the subsequent installation of the plaintiff after the enforcement of the judgment of ouster.

We are of opinion that the judgment should be REVERSED, and the cause remanded for a new trial, and it is

SO ORDERED.