United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Sullivan/Opinion of the Court

Claiming to have been injured (October, 1918) while employed by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation as a motor truck driver, defendant in error Sullivan presented a claim for compensation to the Workmen's Compensation Bureau, Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry. The corporation answered; denied that the injury was of a permanent nature, and asserted that it was not liable for the further reason 'that claimant was a direct employee of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and accordingly is a civil employee of the United States of America, and will be compensated for injury under the federal Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to sustaining proof of disability.'

The referee found that, while employed by the Fleet Corporation as a chauffeur, Sullivan suffered injuries from a collision in Philadelphia; that neither party had served notice rejecting article 3 of the Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, §§ 21924-21927); and awarded compensation.

The Bureau heard the matter de novo, and affirmed the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed the appeal. It said:

'In the case at bar there is no evidence that claimant was a     civil employee of the United States or that he received his      wages through the United States Treasury. We cannot infer     that such was the case. * *  * While it might be difficult to      draw the exact line of demarcation as to when the defendant      is acting as a private corporation or is acting for the      United States, the burden would be on the defendant to prove      if it were acting for the United States that it would be      exempt-there is no defense of this kind interposed in this      case. We only have the question of law raised by defendant     that the Pennsylvania workmen's compensation board has no      jurisdiction. We cannot agree with this. In conclusion we     hold: That we have jurisdiction, on the ground that the      defendant doing business as a corporation in the state of      Pennsylvania, an employer of labor in the state of      Pennsylvania, is liable for compensation to the claimant in      this case under our act. It is neither our duty nor privilege to make a collateral investigation as to the ownership of the     defendant's capital stock.'

Successive appeals, limited by statute to matters of law, were dismissed by the court of common pleas and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Sullivan v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 30. The latter court-the highest where decision in the proceeding could be had said—

'In the present case, the workmen's compensation board and     the court are bound to take judicial notice of acts of      Congress and executive orders and regulations authorized by      acts of Congress which have the force of statutes (Caha v.      United States, 152 U.S. 211), as well as general acts of      assembly affecting the defendant. Anything else must be     averred and proved as by any other litigant. * *  *

'On its face we have here a claim for workmen's compensation     presented against a corporation of the District of Columbia,      doing business in this state, engaged in performing certain      important matters committed to it by the Shipping Board      relative to the purchase, construction, equipment, etc., of      merchant vessels in the commerce of the United States, and      answer made that it is not liable because the injured man was      a civil employee of the United States. No evidence was     presented to support this answer. * *  * As the case was      presented before the referee and the board, we are satisfied      that the award was fully justified, and it is accordingly      confirmed and the appeal dismissed at the costs of the      appellant.'

The writ of error (No. 124) must be dismissed. The record fails affirmatively to disclose that there was drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, or the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States within the requirements of section 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916 (Comp. St. § 1214). Considering the whole record, it is clear that there was no controversy over the validity of any treaty, statute, or authority, federal or state. Plaintiff in error by its answer claimed a right or immunity under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The state tribunals held that there was no evidence to establish the facts necessary to show that it was within the class to which exemption might extend. Champion Lumber Co. v. Fisher, 227 U.S. 445, 451, 452, 33 Sup. Ct. 329, 57 L. Ed. 591; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U.S. 265, 276, 33 Sup. Ct. 858, 57 L. Ed. 1179; Straus v. American Publishers' Association, 231 U.S. 222, 233, 34 Sup. Ct. 84, 58 L. Ed. 192, L. R. A. 1915A, 1099, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 36.

Considering the character of the record, we think it unwise to bring up the cause by certiorari with a view to considering the questions said to be involved. The petition therefor (No. 93) is accordingly denied.

Writ of error dismissed.

Petition for certiorari denied.