United States Army Field Manual 7-93 Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations/Chapter 5

CHAPTER 5 - LRS IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Operations other than war are the military activities during peacetime and conflicts that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces. Typical peacetime operations include disaster relief nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug operations, arms control, treaty verification, support to domestic civil authority and peacekeeping. (FM 100-5.)

5-1. ACTIVITIES
The range of situations requiring the employment of military forces is as great as the variety of peoples nursing grievances in the world and the possibility of natural and man-made disasters. The training, leadership, equipment, and dedication of hostile groups are all key factors in how US military power is applied. LRSUs can expect to encounter any of the following tasks in support of insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peace enforcement, or peacetime contingency operations.

a. Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. These tasks include intelligence operations, joint-combined exercises, populace and resource control operations; counterdrug operations; and tactical operations.

b. Combating Terrorism. These tasks include intelligence, surveillance, and security.

c. Peace Enforcement. These tasks include observation, surveillance, and information gathering.

d. Peacetime Contingency Operations. These tasks include shows of force and demonstrations, noncombatant evacuation operations, rescue and recovery operations, attacks and raids, peacemaking, counter-narcotics actions, and support to US civil authorities.

5-2. PLANNING FACTORS FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Planning factors for operations other than war include intelligence, rules of engagement, combined operations, OPSEC, demography, deception, technology, and COMSEC.

a. Intelligence. The nature of operations other than war require more detailed intelligence. Teams should have this intelligence before infiltration. This intelligence should be the target location and description, enemy equipment and capabilities; any civilian personnel in the area; and a variety of terrain, weather, and other related facts. Often, this intelligence is not available for the target folders. LRS teams must be given flexibility and latitude to react to situations as they develop. The duration of the mission, the size of the area of operations, and the information requirements should be flexible to makeup for inadequate information during the planning phase.

b. Rules of Engagement. Rules of engagement must be monitored to ensure that all teams know when and how to apply force to meet specific situations. Commanders must avoid rules of engagement that are vague or detailed. Each soldier must understand the rules as they apply to him. LRS teams must adjust rapidly to changes in the rules of engagement.

c. Combined Operations. LRSUs must be prepared to coordinate and work with the host country's military and paramilitary forces. Every situation is unique and depends on the extent of involvement of US forces and the nature of the operations. Chief considerations when planning combined operations are command and control, intelligence, operational procedures, and CSS.

d. Operational Security. OPSEC is critical for LRS in operations other than war. Due to the potential for other forces (US or host nation) to operate near LRS teams, LRS commanders must carefully coordinate to reduce the risk of fratricide. This requirement poses an equally dangerous risk to OPSEC for the teams.

e. Demography. LRS commanders must ensure that all aspects of the local population are studied to understand the effect that local civilians may have on teams operating in the area. Information may be obtained from a variety of sources to include area studies, G2 channels, local government, and even the media.

f. Deception. To reduce the risk to LRS teams, commanders should consider deception, particularly during insertion of the teams. False landing zones and dummy radio transmissions are two techniques to deceive the enemy. Deception is limited only by the imagination but should be coordinated through the G2.

g. Technology. Technology is a proven combat multiplier. Advanced optics, thermal sights, and remote sensors are available and can increase the capabilities of the LRS teams. Commanders must weigh advantages against the inherent disadvantages, such as increased weight and signature from different types of equipment.

h. Communications Security. The threat of interception and direction finding exists in all levels of conflict. Foreign purchases of threat equipment and relatively inexpensive off-the-shelf technology have enabled many Third World countries and indigenous forces to equip themselves with the ability to take advantage of poor COMSEC. LRS commanders and team leaders must take appropriate measures to ensure COMSEC procedures are enforced.

5-3. LRS MISSIONS IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
The primary differences between the activities of a LRSU in operations other than war and war consist of the targets it observes and the information it reports. It may observe a coca or marijuana field to discover who comes to tend or harvest the crop. It may observe a terrorist group's safe-house to identify people who meet there. It may observe and report on economic activity such as land use, flooding, drought, salinization, forest-clearing, and similar activity. It may report on demographic activity such as migration of peoples, legally or illegally, or the racial or religious makeup of a political subdivision. Like all other military organizations, and especially other MI assets, the LRSU should contribute its capabilities for observing and reporting to whatever is required of the total joint, combined, and interagency effort. There are legal requirements and restrictions on some of this activity. Therefore, any list of target types should be accompanied by a warning that the commander should consult his staff judge advocate before beginning any mission.