United Nations Emergency Force: Second Report of the Secretary-General (A/3694)

Introduction
1. This report on the United Nations Emergency Force, submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1125 (XI), undertakes to present, in addition to financial aspects, essential data about the Force and its functioning, particularly since the last report of the Secretary-General on this subject (A/3568) on 8 March, when full compliance with General Assembly resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February as to withdrawal was reported. Prior to that date, the Force had been concerned mainly with taking over from the foreign troops, following the successive stages of their withdrawals from the Suez Canal area, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. Since 6 March, the force, interposed between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel, has concentrated on its basic function of maintaining quiet in the area through deployment and patrolling in the Gaza Strip, along the eastern border of the Sinai Peninsula and in the region of Sharm el Sheikh.

2. The three sections of the report deal, respectively, with organizational and operational matters, the role and functioning of the Force and administrative and financial arrangements affecting it.

1. Strength and Composition
3. The original estimate by the Commander of the Force of the manpower needs of UNEF to perform the tasks assigned by the General Assembly was for the equivalent of two combat brigades, or about 6,000 men. This target was reached with the arrival in Egypt of the Brazilian contingent in early February of this year. Since then UNEF has maintained an appropriate strength of 6,000 officers and other ranks, comprising contingents from the ten contributing countries: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

4. The numerical strength of each national contingent on 15 September was as follows:

5. The determination of the numerical strength of the Force and its components is based upon assessments of need by the Commander of the Force, which have been reviewed from time to time. The main considerations weighed in determining the size and composition of the Force have been: the needs of the Force on the basis of its functions and responsibilities, at first in the Suez Canal region and, later, in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip areas; the desirability of balance in the Force with regard to considerations of both geographical distribution and military organization; the comparative utility, in the light of assessed needs, of the troops offered; and the relative availability and economy of transport for the troops offered, together with their essential gear and vehicles.

6. On the basis of the most recent appraisal by the Commander, a reduction before long in the size of the Force by some 400 officers and men may be anticipated. As in any military organization, though perhaps to a lesser degree in UNEF, a substantial part of the personnel is necessarily engaged in vital support functions such as administration, signals, engineering, supply and transport, workshop, ordnance, medical, dental, postal, pay, provost and movement control. Elements of the Force engaged in such activities, as the Commander has pointed out, are neither suitable nor available for patrol and guard duties. Thus, of the total force on 1 September of nearly 6,000, only seventy-four platoons, each of strength varying from thirty to forty-five all ranks - a total of less than 3,500 officers and men - were at the Commander's disposition for the regular patrol and guard duties of UNEF. The departure of the Indonesian contingent in mid-September reduced the number of platoons for such duty to sixty-five.

7. The Commander has emphasized in his reports that, for the task it is called upon to perform, UNEF's ground deployment is "very thin", even with the present numbers. He urges that the Force be maintained at a strength permitting a minimum of seventy-one duty platoons, which takes into account necessary allowances for leave, rotation, sickness, training and essential reserve. Through planned reorganization and adjustments in support units, however, it is expected that a force reduced from its present total of 5,977 o about 5,600 officers and men would permit this minimum need for deployment to be satisfied.

2. Organization
8. The ten national contingents are the components of the Force and each of them, under the commanding officer of the unit, who is directly responsible to the Commander of the Force, retains its identity and organizational unity. The demands of service made upon the Force, however, frequently require the deployment of elements of a contingent, whether companies or platoons, in separate sectors. The Danish and Norwegian contingents, by voluntary arrangement between them, constitute a single battalion, commanded in rotation by officers of the two nationalities. The Norwegian Medical Company, which serves the entire Force, is under exclusively Norwegian command.

9. The "Chief of the Command", Major General E.L.M. Burns, who is Commander of the Force, was appointed by action of the General Assembly (resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956). The chain of command runs directly from the Commander of the Force to the commanding officers of each of the national contingents. The Force is subject to orders and instructions only from its Commander and, through him, from the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

10. The headquarters of UNEF is located in the town of Gaza. There is a Chief of Staff, who is also Deputy Commander; a Headquarters Staff consisting of Personnel, Operations and Logistics Sections, each of which is headed by a Lieutenant Colonel; and a Special Staff consisting of officers responsible for legal, provost, engineer, signals, air staff and medical matters. The Chief Administrative Officer and his staff are civilians, drawn almost entirely from the United Nations Secretariat. In addition, a number of locally recruited civilians are deployed.

11. Communications traffic between United Nations Headquarters and UNEF stations in the area, which is of substantial volume, is efficiently handled by experienced United Nations Field Service communications personnel. The UNEF communications network is coordinated with the established United Nations communications system.

3. UNEF Air Support
12. As of 15 September 1957, air support for UNEF consists of two Royal Canadian Air Force flights, 114 and 115. The 114 communication flight, based in Naples, has four C-119 aircraft. It is responsible for the heavy lift of mails, priority cargo and passengers between Egypt and Italy. In the early period of the operation, twelve C-119s were employed. The 115 communication flight is based at the UNEF air station at El Arish (which was at Abu Suweir prior to 5 September) and has 4 Otter and two DC-3 aircraft. This flight provides reconnaissance, medical evacuation and internal transport support for UNEF.

4. Deployment
13. The major deployment of UNEF is along the Egypt-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line and along the international frontier to the south of the Gaza Strip. This involves a line of quite considerable total length which, for the most part, runs in rugged terrain. The perimeter of the Gaza Strip, from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the international frontier in the south, is sixty kilometres long. The international frontier, extending from the sea southwards to the Gulf of Aqaba, measures 213 kilometres. UNEF is deployed, on the Egyptian side only, along these two lines, totalling 273 kilometres, and patrols them constantly. The distance from the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba to Sharm el Sheikh, where UNEF is also deployed, is another 187 kilometres.

14. The positions and assignments of units of the Force are changed from time to time. As of 15 September, the deployment was as follows:


 * Along the Armistice Demarcation-Gaza Strip Line: Danish-Norwegian (Danor), Brazilian, Indian and Colombian battalions, and a Swedish company.


 * Along the international frontier-East Central Sinai Line: one Canadian reconnaissance squadron; one Yugoslav reconnaissance battalion.


 * In the Sharm el Sheikh and Ras Nasrani area: the Finnish company.


 * In Gaza town: UNEF headquarters staff, the Swedish battalion, except one company; the Norwegian Medical Company.


 * At Rafah: Canadian and Indian administrative and other support units in the UNEF maintenance area; a Finnish guard detachment.


 * At Naples: an RCAF communication flight, consisting of thirty-three officers and 150 other ranks; UNEF liaison staff and a movement control detachment.


 * At El Arish: an RCAF communication flight, consisting of thirteen officers and forty-five other ranks; a small detachment of the Brazilian battalion for guard duty; twenty-one officers and men for movement control.


 * At Port Said: one platoon, on monthly rotation among contingents, as security guard, together with a permanent movement control and port detachment required for port clearance and storage.


 * At Beirut, Lebanon: a leave centre detachment of nineteen officers and men.

15. Resolution 1125 (XI) calls for placing the Force "on the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line" but no stationing of UNEF on the Israel side has occurred to date through lack of consent by Israel.

5. Rotation
16. The status of the troops varies in the several contingents comprising UNEF. In some instances, they are drawn from the regular army and are professional soldiers. In other cases, they are volunteers or conscripts who are enrolled for specific terms of service. Most of the officers in all contingents are regular military personnel.

17. The terms of service of the men, of course, have a direct bearing on the length of time they may serve with UNEF. What is described as the "rotation" prevailing in UNEF had its first application in April, when the terms of service of the men in one contingent were about to expire. They had been taken into service in regular course, not specifically for duty with UNEF. It became necessary, therefore, to return them to their homeland shortly before the date they were to be discharged. Subsequently, when the terminal dates approached of the terms of service of volunteers, of those called from reserve status, or of conscripts, other contingents were replaced by new men, or "rotated". The nature of the climate and the terrain in which the Force is deployed, and the monotony of the duties they are called upon to perform also lend strong support to the principle and practice of periodic rotation. The tendency among the contingents has been towards rotation after a period of service of approximately six months. Transportation for the rotation has been by air in some cases and by sea in others, and in Egypt also involves rail and bus. Its cost are met by the United Nations.

18. To date, all the contingents have been rotated in whole or in part, except those of India and Canada, and these two rotations are to take place in the autumn, the Canadian replacement beginning in September and the Indian occurring in November. The withdrawn Indonesian contingent did not rotate.

19. In general, the contingents are rotated on a strength-for-strength basis, with the new troops arriving as the veterans depart. The rotations have resulted in no appreciable change in the numerical strength of the contingents. Significantly, 400 men among six of the contingents thus far rotated have volunteered to remain with UNEF for a second six-month tour of duty.

6. Well-Being of the Force
20. The general state of well-being of the Force is excellent. In health and morale it has fared well.

21. The health of the Force has been consistently good, through the cold of the Sinai winter, the rainy Gaza spring, and the intense heat of the summer. From 22 November 1956 to 15 September of this year, seventy-four officers and 968 other ranks have been hospitalized in UNEF hospitals. Cases requiring hospitalization for more than a fortnight are taken out of the Force's field hospitals, usually to Naples. There have been fifty-two such cases. There are two UNEF hospitals, the Base Hospital at Gaza, staffed by the Norwegian medical unit, and a Canadian-manned hospital in the Rafah maintenance area. The Base Hospital has sub-units attached to contingents and outposts. Some of the national contingents have their own medical officers and maintain their own medical inspection rooms. A dental clinic is available at the UNEF maintenance area and this, together with certain national dental clinics attached to units, operates under the Senior Dental Officer. The main causes of hospitalization have been stomach disorders, injuries, burns, hepatitis, heat exhaustion, sand fly fever and appendicitis.

22. There have been thirteen fatalities distributed among eight of the ten contingents, resulting mainly from accidental shootings, encounters with mines and traffic accidents.

23. In view of the duration of UNEF's assignment and the difficult physical conditions under which the Force operates, a leave policy has been developed and a leave centre has been established in the mountains near Beirut, Lebanon. The leave granted is three days for each month of service with UNEF, with the proviso that leaves cannot be granted when to do so will reduce the strength of a unit below 75 per cent of its authorized establishment. The leave centre in Lebanon was decided upon following careful investigation of all possibilities and their probable costs. It was considered essential to have the centre in an area affording change of scenery, climate and altitude. The centre was opened on 1 May and is to operate until 31 October. Costs of the centre are borne by the United Nations.

24. The morale of the Force has been high throughout. Contributing factors have been the realization by the troops that they are making history through participation in a unique and pioneering peace effort, and the fact that this has been a first visit to the area for practically all members of the Force. The mail arrangements have worked well, which always boosts morale. Members of the Force are entitled to mail, free of charge through use of a UNEF cancellation stamp, five air letters per week to their home countries. There is also an effective welfare programme which has built up a steady flow of books, magazines, sports equipment, games and phonograph records, and especially motion-picture films, which constitutes the backbone of the entertainment activities. Live entertainment, thus far, for reasons of the relative inaccessibility of the Force, the costs involved and the varies languages and cultural tastes of the personnel in the Force, has been on a quite limited basis and, for the most part, has had to be provided by the men themselves.

7. Logistics
25. In view, particularly, of the emergency nature of the operation and the international character of the Force, the supple and provisioning of UNEF was a crucial problem from the very beginning. Over the months, however, this problem has been met quite satisfactorily by systematic procurement from a variety of sources, including those in the area. The UNEF maintenance area at Rafah now maintains a sixty-day reserve and maintenance stock of pack and dry rations, with a thirty-day reserve backing this up in Naples. In addition to this, up to ninety days rations may also be held at Rafah. However, this figure will vary as the stocks are consumed during the quarter. Supply needs are calculated on the basis of a total Force personnel of 6,000. Most of the supplies are now shipped by sea to Port Said and from there by rail to Rafah. The small movement control and port detachment at Port Said handles all such traffic.

26. Although the nature of the ration poses a challenging supply problem for an international force, a comprehensive ration scale, based on Canadian, British and Indian scales, and supplemented to meet some national dietary demands, caters adequately to all tastes.

27. Approximately 1,100 vehicles and trailers of forty different types and makes provide the ground transport to UNEF. The main types are the reconnaissance vehicles such as scout cars, light armored cars and jeeps; the load carriers, consisting of 3/4-ton to 3-ton lorries; and the technical vehicles, such as engineer and workshop. Some of these vehicles accompanied the national contingents; others have been purchased for UNEF from various sources. All have clear United Nations markings. The acquisition of spare parts for certain of these vehicles presents great difficulties. As far as practicable, a reserve of gasoline, oils and lubricants equal to one month's maintenance stock is held on the ground at the maintenance area.

28. From the beginning of the operation of November 1956 through 31 August 1957, the cargo carried to UNEF has approximated 18,750 tons by sea and 4,690 tons by air.

29. The members of the Force wear their national uniforms, which are provided by their countries. Casual and inexpensive hot-weather uniforms, however, have been provided by the United Nations for the entire Force. The troops are also provided with and wear for easy identification UNEF blue plastic helmets, blue wool berets, blue desert caps and blue shoulder patches.

1. Responsibilities Vested in the Force
30. By mid-September of this year, UNEF will have completed ten months of duty, during which it has been called upon to undertake important responsibilities involving a considerable variety of tasks. The United Nations Command for the Force, established by General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I) was to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I)...". The General Assembly, in resolution 1001 (ES-I), approved guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the Force as set forth, in the Secretary-General's report of 6 November 1956 (A/3302), whereby, as must follow from its status under the Charter, the Force could not be stationed or operate on a country's territory without that country's consent.

31. The Force, which has an international character as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, as affirmed in its regulations, was not established to undertake enforcement actions. While UNEF has a military organization, it does not use all normal military methods in achieving the objectives defined for it by the General Assembly. As indicated in the Secretary-General's report mentioned above, the functions foreseen for UNEF when the cease-fire was being established, were to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order "to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops".

32. In the case of each withdrawal operation, the Commander of the Force, in close consultation with the Secretary-General, negotiated the technical arrangements with the Commanders of the British, French and Israeli forces.

33. Since the withdrawals of Israeli troops from the Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh sectors on 7 and 16 March, respectively, the activities of UNEF has centered on the fulfillment of Assembly resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February. The resolution called for "the placing of the... Force on the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line". In partial fulfillment of that resolution, UNEF is deployed, on the Egyptian side, along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the international frontier.

34. More specifically, UNEF has been called upon for varied services in the several areas in which it has operated, as indicated below.

(a) In the Suez area

 * The initial activity of UNEF centered in the Suez Canal area, mainly during the period between the arrival of UNEF in Egypt of 12 November and the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces on 22 December 1956. Within that period it:


 * (i) Was interposed between the Anglo-French and Egyptian forces through occupation of a buffer zone south of El Cap, extending northwards to Port Said as the Anglo-French troops moved in that direction;


 * (ii) Rendered assistance in Port Said and Port Fuad in maintaining calm between the civilian population and the Anglo-French forces, through stationing and patrolling, and also shared responsibility with local authorities for keeping the peace among the civilian population;


 * (iii) Guarded the power station in Port Fuad;


 * (iv) Maintained a safety cordon around areas in Port Said and Port Fuad from which Anglo-French forces were embarking in the final stage of their withdrawal;


 * (v) Assisted, at the request of Egypt, in avoiding sabotage of the oilfields at Sadar and El Balayin;


 * (vi) Cleared mine fields;


 * (vii) Arranged and carried out the exchange in the buffer zone of approximately 850 prisoners, detainees and internees, between the Egyptian Government and the Anglo-French Command;


 * (viii) Provided protection for British and French ships engaged in the Suez Canal salvage operation;


 * (ix) Conducted investigations of various complaints and inquiries by Egyptian authorities and the Anglo-French Command concerning such matters as violations of cease-fire, smuggling activities and missing personnel;


 * (x) Guarded the off-loading of stores and vehicles for UNEF from ships at Port Said, and continues to do so.

(b) In the Sinai Peninsula

 * The second period of UNEF activity, from December 1956 to March 1957, centered in the Sinai Peninsula after the Anglo-French withdrawals and the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces, by steps. In this stage it:


 * (i) Took over from the Israeli forces in the successive stages of their withdrawal from Sinai, including the Sharm el Sheikh region;


 * (ii) Took over from Israeli forces the Saint Catherine's Monastery, in southern Sinai, accompanied, on entry, by a UNESCO representative to ascertain the condition of the Monastery's cultural treasures. Prior to the Israeli withdrawal, a UNEF supply convoy to the Monastery was arranged at the request of Egypt and with the consent of Israel;


 * (iii) Has been interposed between the forces of Egypt and Israel east of the Canal, from 3 December 1956 onwards;


 * (iv) Arranged and carried out the exchange of all prisoners of war between Egypt and Israel;


 * (v) Cleared many Sinai mine fields;


 * (vi) Cleared and repaired portions of damaged roads and rough tracks crossing the Sinai;


 * (vii) Investigated, at Egyptian request, the Romani railroad incident.

(c) In the Gaza Strip

 * UNEF's heaviest responsibilities and most difficult duties have been in the Gaza Strip since 8 March, viz.:


 * (i) On Israeli withdrawal and in the absence of any organized of responsible local administration, UNEF troops took up positions in all centers of population and camps in the area, controlled all entry and exit into the Strip, and with the assistance of UNRWA officials temporarily assumed responsibility for some essential services in the Strip, including internal security functions mainly relating to guard and check post duty and patrolling with a view to preventing mob disorders, violence and looting;


 * (ii) Assumed temporary control of the prisons;


 * (iii) Guarded key installations, such as all public utilities;


 * (iv) Took in safe keeping local vital records which it found;


 * (v) Manned temporarily the telephone switchboard of the town of Gaza;


 * (vi) In view of the shortage in Gaza of petroleum products, arranged for loan of diesel oil from UNRWA supply to maintain essential electric service;


 * (vii) Assisted efforts to determine whereabouts of deportees from Gaza while it was under Israel's control;


 * (viii) Through deployment around the perimeter of the Gaza Strip and constant patrolling, UNEF, assisted by orders of the Gaza Administration to the people not to cross the line nor, after darkness, to enter a zone extending 500 meters from it, prevents infiltration and crossings of the Demarcation Line for any purpose;


 * (ix) Continues, with regard to UNEF personnel and affairs, to man joint Egyptian-UNEF check posts controlling entry into and exit from the Gaza Strip, from and into Egypt;


 * (x) Cleared extensive and thickly sown mine fields.

(d) General

 * In addition to the above, UNEF:


 * (i) Airlifted seventy-two Egyptian prisoners of war from Djibouti (French Somaliland) to Cairo;


 * (ii) Arranged for repatriation to Egypt of two persons under treatment in a hospital on the Israeli side of Jerusalem.

2. Arrangements Affecting the Operation of UNEF
35. The cooperation of the Gaza Administration, and an awareness of the people in the area that the mission of UNEF is friendly and has the support of the Administration, are essential to the effective discharge by UNEF of its responsibilities.

36. Information from the Commander of the Force is to the effect that the population of the Gaza Strip has been made to know that Egyptian policy is opposed to infiltration across the Demarcation Line. Egyptian regulations against infiltration, including penalties, have been put into force and the people of Gaza have been made aware of the role of UNEF in the prevention of infiltration. The Commander has been informed that the CID (police) in Gaza has been instructed to act vigorously with the object of finding persons responsible for mining and other serious incidents and to prevent recurrence. Moreover, Gaza inhabitants are forbidden to approach within 500 meters of the Demarcation Line during darkness, and the Mukhtars (local headmen) have been warned that they are responsible for preventing infiltration in their areas. Severe sentences may be awarded against violators of regulations against infiltration.

37. There is an understanding whereby a unit of the Palestine Police would be assigned specific duty in the prevention of infiltration and would cooperate closely with UNEF in such function, particularly in acting on UNEF requests relating to actual or apprehended infiltration and the free exchange of information concerning actual or potential infiltrators. In practice, thus far, this has meant mainly the Palestine Police receiving from UNEF the persons apprehended in the zone near the Demarcation Line. Patrolling along the Line is by UNEF along. The Commander is of the view that the absence of incidents, and in recent months particularly those with mines, reflects more effective local police and CID action. He also reports that a re-grouping of the Force so that battalion boundaries will generally correspond to administrative sub-districts in the Strip, which are also the police sub-districts, may facilitate police cooperation with UNEF at the battalion level.

38. UNEF is authorized to apprehend infiltrators, and the Commander reports that accepted practice is for UNEF to take infiltrators into custody in a zone extending 500 meters from the Demarcation Line, and hand them over to the local police.

39. No serious difficulties are reported with regard to (a) the enjoyment by personnel and vehicles of UNEF of full freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip, and in the Sinai Peninsula between the bases and headquarters of UNEF and the elements of its troops deployed along the Demarcation Line; (b) UNEF aircraft flying freely over the Sinai and the Gaza Strip; or (c) the manning of the Gaza Airport by UNEF.

40. The relations between UNEf and the local population are said by the Commander to be good, generally speaking. He finds that the presence of UNEF under its existing terms of reference, despite occasional minor difficulties, is accepted as a good development by the majority of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.

3. Incidents
41. Since the Force was deployed along the Gaza line and to the south of it there has been a steady reduction in both the number and the severity of incidents along that line. Indeed, as of 15 September, no report of any serious incident had been received since 14 July when a UNEF patrol was fired at, without casualties. There have been no raids from either side, whether in retaliation or of the fedayeen type. Military elements of Egypt and Israel are never in sight of each other.

42. The monthly figures on numbers and types of incident involving the Egyptian-Israeli line and UNEF, including the reports of incidents presented by Egypt and Israel, reveal the significant trend, particularly marked since June, towards fewer and less serious incidents. All nine incidents reported in August and September, for example, were of a minor nature.

43. As reported from all sources, the type and number of incidents of all kinds other than alleged violations of territorial waters (of which there have been only two - in May) and of airspace (which are difficult to establish) are as shown below.

Total incidents for the six and one half months: 184.

4. The Effectiveness of UNEF
44. UNEF was designed to meet a particular need in an acute emergency. The authority given to it was limited, as it could only be. The demands upon which might arise from specific situations could not all be foreseen. The basic purposes and role, however, as defined by the General Assembly, have been clear enough from the beginning, and the orders and directives of its Commander on its functions and authority are precise. It often has had to move and act swiftly, but has done so always with the restraint required by the very nature of its status and role. In the course of its functioning, many issues have arisen, for most of which satisfactory solutions have been found. A few issues are unresolved but still open. These include the completion of UNEF's deployment; authority for UNEF to fire during darkness at infiltrators approaching the line from either direction, which would be somewhat broader than its unquestioned right to fire in self-defense - a right which it has, on occasion, exercised; and the idea of a protective fence along a part or the whole of the Demarcation Line.

45. Despite its limited authority and some unsettled questions, there would seem to be no good reason to doubt that UNEF has been effective. It has earned acceptance as a significant pioneering effort in the evolution of methods of peace-making.

46. The prevailing quiet and generally satisfactory conditions along the line, so far as UNEF is concerned, should not, however, as the Commander of the Force has warned, be considered as obviating the need to find, when the time is propitious, satisfactory solutions for the main unresolved issues noted above. The line under present conditions is vulnerable and the quiet, at any moment, could be abruptly broken.

47. Looking back to November of last year, it may be recalled that UNEF was, in the first place, a pre-condition set by France, Israel and the United Kingdom for the cease-fire. Subsequently, it was a pre-condition for the withdrawals from Egypt of the Anglo-French and Israeli forces. Upon completion of the withdrawals, preservation of quiet along the line between Egypt and Israel. Such quiet, in turn, it indispensable to fruitful effort towards the removal of the major obstacles to peace in the Near East.

''Note: This report includes financial arrangements is not included. If interested, the full report is located at the [| United Nations Online Document System (ODS)] under symbol A/3694.''

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