Union Trust Company of New York v. Souther/Opinion of the Court

It seems to us that the question certified is fully disposed     of by the case of Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 251, where it      was said: 'We have no doubt that when a court of chancery is      asked by railroad mortgagees to appoint a receiver of      railroad property, pending proceedings for foreclosure, the      court, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, may,      as a condition of issuing the necessary order, impose such      terms in reference to the payment from the income during the      receivership of outstanding debts for labor, supplies,      equipment, or permanent improvement of the mortgaged property      as may, under the circumstances of the particular case,      appear to be reasonable.' To this we adhere, and, in our      opinion, the right to impose terms does not depend alone on      whether current earnings have been used to pay the mortgage      debt, principal or interest, instead of current expenses. Miltenberger v. ''Logansport, C. & P. Ry. Co.'' decided at the     present term, [1 SUP. CT. REP. 140.] Many other circumstances     may make such an order reasonable, and this case furnishes a      striking example. The first default in the payment of     interest under the mortgage occurred in October, 1873. The     bondholders did not see fit to take possession, as they had      the right to do, when the default had continued for six      months. On the contrary, notwithstanding no payments of     interest were made, they allowed the company to operate the      road and incur obligations therefor until December, 1877. This was evidently in the hope that their condition would be     improved by the delay, for, to effect the forbearance they      established an agency and incurred expenses to an amount much      larger than the $3,000 reimbursed by the company. Prior to     the appointment of the receiver the gross earnings do not      appear to have been enough to pay expenses, but afterwards      they yielded a very considerable surplus. There cannot be a     doubt that it was for the interest of the bondholders that      the road should be kept in operation, and as they did not see      fit to take possession while it could only be operated at a      loss, it was certainly not an abuse of judicial discretion      for the court to order, as a condition of granting their      application for a receiver, that debts incurred by the      company in thus protecting the security should be paid from the income of the receivership, if, in consequence of an increase of revenue, it could be done.

The income of the receivership, instead of being applied in accordance with the order to pay the debts for the supplies and labor, was used with the consent, and, it may fairly be inferred, at the request, of the bondholders, to buy additional grounds, rolling stock, etc., and to make permanent improvements, thus adding to the value of the property, which was afterwards sold. There is nothing whatever to indicate that in thus using the income it was the intention of the court to revoke the original order. It seems to have been found, in the administration of the cause, that by using the income to add to the value of the fixed property the interests of all parties would be promoted, and so the fund, which in equity belonged to the labor and supply creditors, was for the time being diverted from them and put into improvements and additions, the proceeds of which are now in court. It is not to be presumed that this diversion would have been authorized if the value of the property added to and improved was not to be correspondingly increased. Clearly, therefore, on the face of the transaction, the fund in court represents in equity the income which belongs to the labor and supply creditors as well as the mortgage security, and there was no impropriety in appropriating it as far as necessary to pay the creditors specially provided for when the receiver was appointed. Such a practice, under proper circumstances, was approved in Fosdick v. Schall, ubi supra, and seems to us eminently just.

There were other questions certified in the case, but as we answer the one which has been particularly stated in the affirmative, and nothing more is needed to sustain the decree, the others will not be considered further than has already been done incidentally.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.