Truth and Error or the Science of Intellection/Chapter 19

CHAPTER XIX INTELLECTIONS
I shall now review the doctrines set forth in these chapters on the five faculties and make a more comprehensive statement of certain fundamental principles.

In this volume psychology is treated only as a system of intellections, while the emotions are neglected. The subject matter is the beginning of an epistemology or theory of cognition, which will require another volume for its completion, when a volume of psychology will follow.

It has been set forth that consciousness is self-consciousness. When the self is conscious of an effect on self it infers a cause, and when it is conscious of being a cause it infers an effect. In the simplest judgment causation is involved—one of the terms being a cause, the other an effect. When consciousness is of the effect, the inference is of the cause, and we have a judgment of intellection. When the consciousness is of the cause, the inference is of the effect, and we have a judgment of emotion. When the cause and the effect are both internal we have an emotion. I use the term consciousness solely as awareness of self and not in its general signification as cognition. We cannot be conscious of an external object, but we are conscious of our judgments of external objects. In the case of the animate body, which has conscious particles acting on one another, it may be conscious of both cause and effect in the body, because the particles of the body are external to one another, and the ganglia, with their connecting fibrous nerves, constitute the organism by which the consciousness of the particles is ultimately transmitted to the cortex. Thus there is a consciousness of the cortex, a consciousness of the subordinate ganglia, and a consciousness of the particles; so that when the self acts on self there are both consciousness and inference.

The cause at one time is considered as a kind, at another time as a form, at another a force, at another a causation, and at another time as a concept, giving rise to five faculties of intellection, as follows: First, cognition of kind, which is the faculty of sensation; second, cognition of form, which is the faculty of perception; third, cognition of force, which is the faculty of apprehension; fourth, cognition of causation, which is the faculty of reflection; and, fifth, cognition of conception, which is the faculty of ideation.

If this doctrine is true then, fundamentally, we cognize by properties which we find to be concomitant in particles and bodies, and thereby reach a cognition of particles or bodies. It will be seen that judgments are fundamentally abstractions, but that comprehension gives them concrete validity. In the first stage they are judgments, in the second stage they are cognitions.

A judgment is a process of elements. First, there is a consciousness of a sense impression. Second, there is a desire to know its cause; that is, what produced it; what can the impression signify? Third, there is a guess or a choice of some external object as its cause, which revives the consciousness of the concept of the object chosen. Fourth, this second consciousness is compared with the first. Fifth, a judgment is made of likeness or unlikeness between the terms compared. The first cause, when it is sense impression, is an act of something in the environment, but when it is a reproduction it is a self-activity. The second cause is always a self-activity.

All judgments are judgments of cause and effect. The consciousness may be of the effect and the inference of the cause, or the consciousness may be of the cause and the inference of the effect, or the consciousness may be of the effect and of the cause when self acts on self, and then the inference is of their relation, one to the other. Again, both cause and effect may be external, when there will be two judgments, each one of which will contain a consciousness and an inference, and their relation to each other as cause and effect will be by inference. Thus inference may be in the second, or higher degree.

There are two of the psychic elements in a judgment that demand further consideration. These are consciousness and choice. Here consciousness is awareness of an effect, the cause of which is an act of the external world thrust upon self at the present time, or upon self at sundry past times. The inference, or interpretation, is a choice of, or guess at, the cause. Thus consciousness is of self, but choice or inference is of the object.

I have spoken of the choice as a guess or an hypothesis, but in cognition it is always an invention, and as an invention it requires the conscious time of deliberation. The mind always invents the cause, and it is because it is an invention that it must be verified; but in recognition the invention is already made and the process of judgment no longer requires deliberation. It is this absence of deliberation which makes multitudes of judgments practically instantaneous, or intuitive. No scientific man can make practical additions to knowledge who is not an inventor of hypotheses. One of the sine qua non conditions of successful research is the power of inventing hypotheses; another of these sine qua non conditions is verification, but experimental verification also requires invention.

That a primitive judgment requires much time is learned only by careful introspection. So many of our judgments are recognitional instead of being cognitional, that judgments usually appear to be instantaneous. In defense of this doctrine I may be permitted to cite my personal experience. For many years I was engaged on an exploring expedition where all the features of the landscape were new to me and my companions. Mountains, hills, rocks, plains, valleys, streams, all were new. I was constantly discovering new plants, new animals, and strange human beings, as Indians. During all these years the fundamental doctrines of psychology often constituted the theme of my thoughts and the subject with which I beguiled the weariness of travel. It was thus that I learned to distinguish the elements of a primordial judgment and to distinguish cognitional from recognitional judgments. In later years reconnoissance was developed into survey, and my time was devoted largely to structural geology. For every phenomenon there was always a hypothetical explanation, and such guesses were all found valueless unless verified. Thus it was that the doctrine of a primary judgment and the doctrine of verification grew up with me. More than that, I discovered that my associates in the work of research depended upon hypothesis and verification; and before my field work was done the universal doctrine of cognition herein presented was abundantly confirmed.

Let us look further into the judgment relating to cause and effect in the external world. A judgment about an object may be combined with another judgment about another object, and a third judgment of causation arises, which is about things objective. For example, I see a man strike another and cause pain in that other. I must make two judgments of perception to see the men, a judgment of understanding to see the force, a judgment of reflection to see the effect, and perhaps another judgment of perception to realize the pain. While this maneuver is passing in the field many other events are occurring under the eye, the ear, and other senses, and the many judgments combine in the verification of the judgment formed of the maneuver. Thus judgments are verified. See what a number of concepts are aroused in this case and how much more complex it is than a simpler judgment of sensation, or even of perception.

What we have to note here is the distinction which has to be made between a judgment of causation, which is a highly compound judgment, and the part which causation plays in all judgments—even the simplest.

A judgment of causation is a very distinct thing from the property of causation in the formation of a judgment. In a judgment of sensation I reach a conclusion about a property, say of taste, but I do not consider the cause as a cause but as a kind. So, in a judgment of perception I consider the cause as a form; in a judgment of apprehension I consider the cause as a force; but in the judgment of causation I consider the cause as a cause. Now, the very same phenomenon may be considered in any one of these lights, but the inference in the several cases will be different and the concepts aroused will be different. Which one of the judgments will be made will depend on my interest or the line of thought on which I am engaged. The reader can not be too careful in thoroughly mastering the distinctions between the five classes of judgment, and between the role of causation in making a judgment, and a judgment of causation. In the judgment of sensation I think about the kind; in the judgment of perception I think about the form; in the judgment of apprehension I think about the force; but in the judgment of reflection I think about the causation as cause or effect.

Let us now see how cognition is judgment and verification. What things are necessary that I may know that a body has touched me? First, I must be conscious of an effect on self; second, I must infer that something exercises a force that must have produced this change by collision, and the something is a cause and I have a judgment. This judgment may then be verified by my vision when I see the body. The change in self may have been produced by an irritation of the skin due to some disease. What I supposed to have been touch might have been an illusion, but seeing the body as it touched me the verification is made and a certitude is produced. Again, I might have seen the body approach and feared that it would touch me, and expectant of the touch, I might have inferred the touch when really the touch was not accomplished. In this case there was a consciousness by the sense impression in vision, but an inference which was only an illusion. Two or more acts of consciousness producing the same judgment verify one another.

How must I know that a knife has cut me? First, I am conscious of a change or effect in self; second, I infer that something has produced that effect as a force and I have a judgment. In order that the cognition may be complete this hypothesis must be verified. I may verify the cutting by seeing that the gash is made, and I may verify the knife by seeing or touching the knife. In the one case I have a certitude that I have been cut, and in the second case, a certitude that I have been cut with the knife, and these certitudes verify each other. I might have seen the knife move near to my hand and inferred that it cut me, and an illusion might thus have arisen that I was cut; but the consciousness of the effect of the knife upon my hand, together with the consciousness of the knife by vision, produce judgments that confirm each other.

How do I recognize that some one has spoken? First, I am conscious of a change in my organ of hearing. I infer that it is the sound of a voice. I see the person’s lips move, and it is confirmed and I have a certitude. I might have seen the lips move without hearing the sound, and inferred that a sound was made, which would have been an illusion; but in the hearing of the sound and the seeing of the movement of the lips, each verifies the other.

How do I cognize the flavor of an apple? My taste and my vision of the apple verify each other. How do I cognize the odor of a rose? By smelling and seeing, and the common judgment is verified.

In these cases judgments verify one another. All verification is founded on congruence of judgments. It is thus that one sense verifies another. Now, that which we have specially to note at this stage of the argument is that verification is founded on congruence of judgments. Every cognition involves a judgment and its verification, and the verification is founded on the congruence of judgments, one with another of a higher grade.

In the lower stages of the development of mind, verification is sometimes by repetition, oftener by submitting the judgment to verification by another sense; but in the higher stages of the development of mind, verification is by experimentation. We go on from generation to generation with unverified judgments and suppose that our concepts are composed of cognitions, when in fact they are composed of fallacious judgments. For untold generations men believed the earth to be flat, and that bodies fall to the earth in a line normal to this flat plain. But there were certain phenomena which were inexplicable, and men invented the hypothesis that the earth is a spheroid and that bodies fall toward the center of the earth, and it accounted for so many facts relating to the motions of the heavenly bodies that the hypothesis led to a vast amount of scientific research, and was verified. Now at last we cognize the motion of the heavenly bodies in part at least. For ages man believed the heavenly bodies to be molar, that is, to be movable by man at his will, moving from east to west along the face of a solid domed sky, and they supposed them to return from west to east under the ground, and it required ages to invent another hypothesis—that of a system of spheres revolving in orbits concentric to the sun. This hypothesis was an invention made by many men. It was a demotic, not an individual invention.

The various judgments formed about an external object are combined into a concept of that object, and this concept is aroused from memory by inference whenever a sense impression is received and attention is paid to it in judgment. One sense impression becomes an agency for reviving many judgments previously made about the object causing the sense impression. It is thus that a sense impression becomes symbolic, and judgment in such cases is symbolic. The concomitant properties of an object severally manifest themselves to different senses, and when one property is manifested by one sense impression, it becomes the symbol of all other properties inhering in the object and known by the observer. Properties can not exist apart, as the constant multitudinous experiences of each individual attest. There is no one who can form a judgment who does not take it for granted that the concomitants, however unlike they may be, can not exist apart. Symbolism is not mere poetry that obscures reason, but it is a logical method of timesaving thought. Judgment itself is by symbolism, in which the manifestation of one property is interpreted as a symbol of all the properties known about the object.

A force is manifested as a force and it is also manifested as a cause, for there can not be a force without it also being a cause, any more than there can be a force which is not a form, or a form which is not a kind. In nature forces are often observed in multitudes. There are many particles of air that stir the leaf and there are many leaves that are stirred by one wind, but in the particles of the wind one multitude follows another in succession. So there are many drops of rain that fall on many grains of soil, and a succession of a multitude of raindrops constitute the rain. Process in its simplest form is the collision of two bodies that meet and act on each other in action and reaction, but this action and reaction is also cause and effect; thus causation and force are concomitant. But in apprehension we consider only force; another intellectual faculty is engaged when we consider causation.

When one body collides with another, different things may happen. First, both may be deflected; second, both may be deformed; third, both may be broken; fourth, both may be heated; fifth, both may chemically be changed. Usually the total effect is two or more of these changes. Finally, any one of these effects may be experienced by one body and not by the other. Thus we see that although action and reaction are equal, cause and effect can not be equal, as they are not of the same kind.

Judgments of reflection seem to be especially subject to error and as such to be compounded into false concepts and to be long entertained as such. In the act of making the judgment there must be judgments of bodies impinging on one another, leading to judgments of apprehension. Then one of many effects must be considered as due to one of many causes, and the many effects referred to the many causes in turn, in order that all of the effects may properly be distributed to all of the causes. Thus reflection is an exceedingly complex subject.

The process is comparatively simple when one body collides with another, but when a multitude of bodies collide with one, the process is not so readily understood, and when a multitude of bodies collide against a multitude of bodies, as of winds against leaves, the process of disentangling causes and effects or antecedents and consequents, is still more involved. The difficulty may not appear at first glance, but an investigation into historical instances shows that frequently cause is mistaken for effect and effect for cause. It is not uncommon in savagery to attribute winds to trees. A common error of this kind is discovered in the minds of most persons, for it is widely believed that forests are the cause of rains. An interesting book has been written, widely read, and popularly approved, which is based on the assumption that the aridity of desert lands is due to the absence of forests.

A stream of judgments flow through the mind. As the ego has self-activity it changes its position in the environment at will and a different environment plays on the senses at every change in the position of the ego. Then by different senses the environment solicits the attention simultaneously by all. Thus attention is solicited by more sense impressions than it can attend to, and it chooses for attention those which serve a temporary or more sustained purpose. Those serving a temporary purpose give rise to what has been called by Kant, the practical reason; those serving a sustained purpose, the pure reason.

Presentative judgments that originate in sense impressions, are often followed by representative judgments, and these are either discursive or volitional. Hence we see that the judgments which we make are exceedingly multitudinous and heterogeneous. But all of these judgments are assembled in concepts by more temporary or more permanent purposes. What judgments can be made are determined by the environment; but what judgments the mind selects to make are determined by the purpose. Thus the ego is the creature of environment and self-activity. The stream of judgments is thought, and thought is controlled by self-activity and environment.

It may be well to further consider the process of combining judgments by reflection.

I am wandering by the river. Why should the river here suddenly pass from a narrow gorge to a wide-spread plain and be transformed from a narrow to an expansive stream? And why should the turbulent waters above become so quiet below?

I climb a rock to study the problem. The bluffs standing back from the river, converge at this point and seem as if they would join hands across the chasm through which the river plunges. Here the bluff is a cliff and the edges of sandstone strata outcrop in the escarpment, and I observe with care the succession of rocks from the bottom to the top of the cliff. But a robin flies down and perches on a willow near by, and in an instant cliff and geology vanish from my thought; I see a turkis egg and a nest in the apple-tree of my garden, and my daughter is shouting a song of childish joy in my mind’s ear, for this she did, not many weeks ago. In thought I am at home once more. Then home vanishes and I see the robin again flitting from bough to bough, and as it moves my eyes follow it until it is in a line between myself and the cliff, and the sight of the cliff brings back my geologic problem. I see the red sandstone below, the brown shales between and the white sandstones above, and recognize the succession as being similar to one seen before. If so, the summit of the cliff must be crowned by a limestone. Yes, there is the limestone with its angular outlines, in contrast with the round reliefs of the sandstone. I am one step farther in my problem. I put the facts of the succession together and say this is a Carboniferous cliff. I know these rocks.

In climbing I hear a noise. In an instant I interpret it as the voice of a friend, and turning about, find I am right. I hasten to announce my discovery, but he holds a flower aloft, waving it in triumph. That wand banishes the cliff with its succession of beds from my mind, and I see a bluebell drooping from its delicate stem and ringing a chime of cerulean beauty. In a twinkling of an eye my mind travels a thousand miles, and I am climbing the gray sandstone cliff which rises in the midst of the valley of Illinois river and is known as “Starved Rock.” The miles my soul has traveled are only equaled by the time over which it has returned. I am a young man again, and I burst into a song:

Like a bonfire frae the sea.”
 * “It’s rare to see the morning bleeze

Why do I sing that song? It was on my tongue when I found my first bluebell on “Starved Rock.”

My friend bids me follow him. At one moment I am thinking of the cove, at another I am listening to the voice of my friend, and at still another I am watching the way over which we walk; and now and then my mind wanders away home and where not. Now my attention is attracted to a footprint in the sand. From its shape I know it was made by a deer. Thus I make an inference beyond my perception. The track is the sign of something else. I see other tracks; they are arranged along our course in pairs several feet apart. By this arrangement I infer that the deer was leaping, as if fleeing from danger, and I imagine that the deer has been startled at our approach. This is an erroneous inference, for my friend tells me that he roused the deer as he came down the path some time ago. And as we still walk I study the rocks, and discover that a limestone forms the floor of the valley below; and then I discover by its contained fossils that it is the same formation as the one which crosses the summit of the cliff. The valley limestone was broken from the cliff limestone and dropped down by what geologists call a fault, and the fall or throw of the fault is more than a thousand feet. And now I discover the origin of the cascades in the canyon above and the broad and quiet flow of the river below. The last dropping of the sandstone by the fault decreased the declivity of the stream in the valley and increased the declivity of the stream above the valley, where it comes down through the canyon. All this is reasoning. It is a series of judgments controlled by will for a course of reasoning on a theme for which I have a permanent interest, interrupted by a multitude of adventitious judgments that are made by reason of temporary interest.

We sit down by the spring and my friend spreads the lunch on a fallen tree trunk, and away goes my mind to the bank of the Grand river in central Colorado, and I see a prostrate pine, and an emerald lake near by, and on the shore, cliffs of granite, and beyond, a snow-clad mountain, and about its summit the gathered clouds, and the sheen of clouds and snow-fields blends with stretches of forest and crags and peaks of towering grandeur. Years ago I was there, and the feast on this log brings back the feast on that log, with its attendant glories of mountain scenery. From that scene I am called back by the bidding of my friend to eat. Then a bird comes down to the fountain, and I am engaged in watching its coy advances to the water. And so my mind passes instantaneously from one object to another—now engaged in observing things present, now listening to the voice of my friend, now occupied in expressing my thought to him, now calling up some scene from afar; but ever thinking. On goes the stream of thought.

I eat of the turnover, and observe from the taste that it is made of blackberries; and then I think of the blackberry patches over which I strayed in childhood on the hills of southern Ohio, and of my companion, Charles Isham, who was killed at the battle of Shiloh. And I talk of battles, till my friend speaks of bread and butter. Thirst causes me to go to the spring, and I quaff from its crystal fountain, and listen to the jests hurled at me by my friend, and laugh at his wit. Still on goes the stream of thought.

We have eaten the lunch and gathered the plants, and return home. On the way a sharp, buzzing sound thrills me with horror. I know it as the warning of a rattlesnake. It is a familiar sound to me, for I have found many of these serpents in the wilderness. I look about, and there it is, coiled in the grass. With my cane I strike it a blow, and then another, until it stretches its length on the ground, dead. From the inanimate reptile I pluck the rattles. There are nine on its tail, which it was wont to ring when danger approached—discordant bells whose ringing is a symbol to the woodsman that reptilian hell is lurking near the pathway.

We have reached the river bank, and separate; I climb about it in search of fossils. Soon I discover carboniferous fossils in the rock at the foot of the cliff, and climbing up beside the stream I discover limestone rocks which have come down from the summit of the cliff, and see the same fossils. My explanation of the origin of the cliff, the rapid descent of the river from above, the narrow channel through which it runs, the valley below, and the broad expanse of quiet water, is verified. Now, in my reasoning about the fall of a river into a quiet reach, I used concepts of form in the nature of the channel, and concepts of form in the structure of the rocks. I also used concepts of time in the succession of the rocks, and I reached a conclusion or judgment as to the cause of the rapid which was a judgment of causation, and I confirmed this judgment by reaching the same conclusion from the story of the fossils that I had reached from the story of the geological structure; so concepts verify concepts. On careful examination it will always be found that judgments of causation are verified by the congruence of concepts.

The stream of thought is composed of a series of widely diverse elements, or mentations, that are judgments, all differing among themselves. Now, it is impossible for the mind to dwell on any one of these elements. You cannot think of a scratch long; the mind immediately passes to something else—another sight or sound. Consciousness, which is awareness of a change in self, is the absolute, the independent of thought and that on which inferences are founded; and consciousness is awareness of a succession of impulses on self or by self, that flow with the rapidity of thought that seems almost to vie with the rapidity of air collisions in sound. Hence consciousness is serial, and inferences are serial, and judgments are necessarily serial; but thought must go on. Gaze into the eye of my lady and think of its sapphirine hue; in a moment you think of something else—the sable curtain, the coy glance, perchance the cerulean heaven, or the deep blue sea. It is impossible to hold your mind for more than a moment on the blueness of the eye; the thought must go on. But on to what? is the question. Tell me in the case of any individual the laws which govern the procession of his thought, and I will tell his name, be it sage or fool. There is always a nexus between contiguous elements in the stream of thought. Sometimes it is mere adventitious association. The thing seen or heard has at some previous time been associated with something else. The touch is associated with the mother’s stroke on childish curls; the taste of that particular fruit is associated with an occasion of joy; the perfume of smoke is associated with the burning forest; the song is associated with some scene of glee; the robin is associated with the cottage home. But the nexus of association is not always adventitious. It is often controlled by an established design. With the fool, adventitious relation is the principal nexus of thought in the procession; with the sage, logical relation is the chief nexus.

The links of relation in the chain of thought are not always apparent to the thinker himself. Steps in the procession of reasoning are often canceled; the mind passes, by great bounds, from one to another. When the steps in the course of logical reasoning have been taken many times, the mind finds it unnecessary to tread the ground again and again, with slow and measured pace, but it springs from point to point, and the greater reasoners make the greater leaps. This is a fact well known to scientific men, but it gives to the procession of mentations those characteristics which cause the greatest wonder to men, and which have led to many of the errors of psychology.

By reflecting on the past and comparing it with the present, we prophesy of the future and often our prophecies are confirmed. By day we prophesy of the night, and the night comes; at night we prophesy of the morning, and the morning comes. As the days, weeks, months, and years go by we learn by experience of the changes wrought in self and infer changes yet to be wrought. By experience we discover the changes wrought in others, and by inference judgments are formed of changes yet to be wrought. It is by experience that we learn of all the changes in environment. The skies change; the seasons change; the river was low yesterday, it is a raging torrent today. The acorn bourgeons with leaflets, it sends rootlets into the earth and stem and branch into the air; it grows from week to week, month to month, year to year, and under our experience it becomes a tree. The child is born, it grows to be a lad, a youth, a young man, a vigorous adult, an old man, and the judgments formed are compounded into ideas of becoming. It is thus by reflection that a vast multitude of judgments are compounded into ideas of the changes wrought by time, and reflection becomes the special process of cognizing metagenesis. As on the wings of perception all lands are viewed, so on wings of reflection all times are conned. The illimitable past and the illimitable future are all painted on the canvas of now by the artist of reflection. Things that have been and things to be are emblazoned on the panorama of reflectional concept.

Thus we have ideas of sensation or classification, ideas of perception or integration, ideas of understanding or coöperation, and ideas of reflection or history, all derived from the germs of sense impression as they have been made on the mind of the individual in moments, hours, days, and years.

A boulder cannot move from the bank into the swift channel in order that it may journey down the stream, but a man may travel from the distant hill to voyage on the river. The leaf cannot flutter in the air unless the air is sweeping by, and the air cannot move as a breeze without antecedent conditions of temperature. Every action is self-action and every passion is self-passion, but the action of one must have its correlate in the action of another, and the passion of one must have its correlate in the passion, of another. In this respect animate bodies have a property which separates them from inanimate bodies, in that they perform actions which are self-directed, and in that they have passions that are self-chosen. The animal may choose to enter the current or it may choose to expose itself to the wind, and it may act for these purposes by placing itself under the proper conditions. Heretofore we have attempted to use the term activity in this sense as a chosen act. By such activities design or purpose is expressed. I see a bird fly from tree to tree and think of it as an activity prompted by design. I see a leaf blown from one tree to another and I see an act not determined by choice. All this is intended to make clear the distinction between activities and acts and to show that activities are manifestations of mind. The animate body is conscious of mind, and through the manifestations of, mind with others it is led to infer that they also have minds.

In the history of metaphysical philosophy the doctrine of presentative and representative judgments has undergone some strange vicissitudes. The distinction seems first to have been formulated by the terms impressions and thoughts, presentative judgments being called impressions and representative judgments thoughts. Spencer refers to the same distinction when he speaks of vivid impressions and faint impressions. Others have considered presentative judgments as instinctive or intuitive, for such judgments are often made instantaneously and without apparent consciousness of previous judgments. The nature of intuition we have already set forth. Kant also believes that representative judgments are controlled by forms of thought preëxisting in the mind and not derived from experience, in which all judgments are molded. He supposes the mind to be endowed with the knowledge of space as empty space and of time as empty time, and that the ego fills the empty space and empty time with forms of thought. Thus the metaphysicians have always failed to discover the nature of a judgment with its pentalogic elements, in which both consciousness and choice appear with comparison, which completes the judgment. They also fail to discover that a presentative judgment is only initiated by a sense impression, and that the ego must still recall past impressions in a concept to make the judgment complete, and they also fail to discover that the representative judgment is initiated by recalling a past concept and comparing it with another concept of past judgments.

I see a worm crawling on the ground; the worm causes a sense impression. I might stop to consider its color and have a judgment of sensation, or I might consider its form and have a judgment of perception, or I might consider its motion and have a judgment of understanding, or I might consider its cause as an egg and have a judgment of reflection, or I might consider that the motion itself is directed molar motion and hence manifests mind in the worm; then I would have a judgment of ideation. Any one of these judgments can be made from the same sense impression, and my interest, my purpose, my choice determines the nature of the judgment made. But when made it needs verification. If the judgment as a sensation is valid and there is a color, if the judgment of perception is valid and there is a form, if the judgment of understanding is valid and there is a motion, if the judgment of causation is valid and there is an object developed from an egg, then there is left for consideration the validity of the judgment of ideation, for the worm may not be moving by its own volition but it may be dragged by an ant. Its motion must be due to an animate and designing cause, which may inhere in the worm itself or in another which is unknown to me, for it is molar motion caused by mind, and in order that I may verify my judgment of mind in the worm I must determine that it is living and free to use its own judgment; such verification comes only by the comparison of concepts. As ideation is the compounding of concepts, so verification in ideation is the comparison of concepts.

In sensation, perception, understanding, and reflection, concepts are developed by the consolidation of judgments. In ideation we have a faculty by which judgments are added to judgments to constitute concepts and which then continues its power of forming judgments by combining concepts with concepts and forever forming new concepts thereby, while at the same time the power thus developed of comparing concepts with concepts is leading to a re-formation of the concepts themselves by the elimination of fallacies, for when concepts by comparison with concepts are found to be incongruous, the mind refuses to accept them as valid and seeks for the source of error. We must, therefore, discover the means by which concepts are compared with concepts.

We must now shoulder the task of explaining the laws of symbolism or association, which have been assumed from time to time and partially explained in this discussion.

It has been shown how concepts are formed as groups of judgments in sensation, perception, apprehension, and reflection, and how ideas develop simultaneously. We are now to show how they are compounded with one another, and how in this process incongruous ideas are adjusted by the elimination of judgments that are fallacies, for judgments must ultimately die if they do not fit in their proper places.

That which I have sometimes called symbolism and that which I have sometimes called association are the same thing. When a sensation which is the result of a sense impression caused by one attribute of a body, is taken as a symbol of the body itself with all its attributes, it becomes a symbol of all with which it is associated. When a sense impression gives rise to a judgment of force it recalls many other judgments of force and thus becomes a symbol of other things. When a judgment of cause is formed it also becomes a symbol of other causes. Sense impressions are directly used by the mind in this manner in sensation, perception, apprehension, reflection, and ideation, and it is thus that ideas are primarily associated. The memories of judgments are recalled by other judgments, as we have seen, so that not only do judgments which arise from sensations recall other judgments, but these other judgments recall still other judgments, and thus there is recollection in the second degree; and these revivals may go on from degree to degree to an indefinite extent. All of these facts have been illustrated.

As we judge by comparing- concepts with other concepts or with impressions, one judgment by a faculty is associated with other judgments by the same faculty, and as one property is concomitant with all the others, one property becomes a symbol of all the others, so that there is association by comparison of concepts and association by symbolism. Hence all our judgments are associated.

The quantitative properties are the reciprocals of the categoric properties, for the one is the reciprocal of the many which compose the one. The one is a kind, and the many is another kind, and the one kind is the reciprocal of the many kinds. So the one form of the body is the reciprocal of the many extensions of the particles. The one motion of the body is the reciprocal of the many motions of the particles, hence the one force of the body is the reciprocal of the many motions of the particles, for the force of the body is the reciprocal of the motion of the particles. The one time of the body is the reciprocal of the many times of a particle, hence the one causation of the body is the reciprocal of the many times of the particles. The one judgment of the body is the reciprocal of the many judgments of the particles, hence the one concept of the body is the reciprocal of the many judgments of the particles.

Judgments of quantitative bodies are reciprocal judgments of classific bodies, hence they are associated by reciprocality. Judgments of one property are concomitant with judgments of another property, therefore they are associated by concomitancy. Now judgments associated by concomitancy are often intuitive in the sense in which that term is used here; so judgments associated by reciprocality are often intuitive. But there are many judgments that are associated not by concomitancy or reciprocality, because they are chosen when we make judgments; of those chosen some are volitional, some discursive. The discursive associations are those usually recognized as such, and again we have association by kind or likeness, by form, by force, by causation, and by concept. Thus it is that the ego remembers by pentalogic properties. Thus association is the law of memory.

Units are associated with units, numbers with numbers, kinds with kinds, series with series, classes with classes, and all are associated in nature and considered in classification. Then extensions are associated with extensions, spaces with spaces, forms with forms, metamorphoses with metamorphoses, organisms with organisms, and all these are interassociated and these associations are considered in morphology. Then speeds are associated with speeds, motions with motions, forces with forces, energies with energies, powers with powers, coöperations with coöperations, and all of these modes of motion are interrelated or associated and all are considered in dynamics. Again persistencies are associated with persistencies, times with times, causations with causations, metageneses with metageneses, developments with developments, and they are all interrelated and considered in evolution. Finally, sensations are associated with sensations, perceptions with perceptions, apprehensions with apprehensions, reflections with reflections, and ideations with ideations, and all are considered in intellection and are represented by words. Then numbers, spaces, motions, times, and judgments are associated, and kinds, forms, forces, causations, and concepts are associated, and the quantitative properties are associated with the categoric properties. There is a congeries of associations in which all of the contents of the mind are associated as fast as we cognize the bodies of the universe in their properties and relations.

Certain special associations of discursive thought have received special attention and various attempts have been made to account for them, while the multitudinous associations of thought have been neglected. This partial discussion of the subject has led to the classification of the associations of memory and two laws have been formulated: the one called the law of likeness, and the other the law of contiguity. They have also been formulated as three or more; but the essential nature of association has failed to receive attention because the five associated properties of matter have not clearly been understood; all of these methods, about which scarcely two psychologists agree, have been inadequate to properly set forth the subject. Especially do we notice that contiguity in space has been confounded with immediate succession in time by the habit of using a word with two meanings, and thus, confounding succession with position. Particularly intensive associations by which striking events are recalled, because of the deep effects made on the mind, have been observed by thoughtful men for more than twenty centuries. In moods of contemplation a judgment recalls some remote judgment which was startling at the time, and as we go on from moment to moment, recalling a multitude of things by a multitude of associations, this special instance is thrust on the mind and we stop to consider it. I see a rock which more or less resembles another which I once saw and now recall, together with an event which at that time made an impression on my mind; a man fell over the cliff. I smell the odor of burning brush in the wayside field and T suddenly recall the odor of the fire which I kindled for burning brush-piles on my father’s farm. I taste the flavor of a nut and I recall the time when I threw to my shouting companions the walnuts from a wayside tree. Such startling revivals, often repeated, challenge attention, and though thoughtful men have given much attention to the phenomena, it has resulted in a very imperfect psychology of association and symbolism.

Once more the attention of the reader is called to the relations which exist between the five essentials and which are then found in the five properties, then found in the five categories, then found in the five properties of change, then in the five properties of life, then in the five properties of mind. Kinds are not alone classified, but forms, forces, qualities, and concepts are classified. Morphology considers not only forms, but it also considers kinds, forces, causes, and concepts. Dynamics considers not only forces, but it also considers kind, forms, causes, and concepts. Evolution considers not only causes, but it considers kinds, forms, forces, and concepts; and ideation considers not only concepts, but it also considers kinds, forms, forces, and causes, and the difference between these five concomitants is the point of view when every one of the essentials and its derivatives is considered abstractly. As they cannot exist abstractly, the mind cannot overtly consider an abstraction without tacitly informing 1 it with concrete existence.

The error of metaphysic is the confounding of abstraction with analysis by assuming that abstractions have separate existence. If the argument has not made this point clear it has failed of its purpose. The habits of thought engendered by the study of abstract mathematics often leads the mathematician into the very same pitfalls into which the metaphysician stumbles.

The manifestations of properties are symbols, because one becomes the representative of all the others in the body manifested. When animate beings develop the faculty of reading these symbols, they are said to be able to read the expression of the emotions and are themselves expert in the expression of emotions. Gradually these expressions become more and more artificial as animals advance in culture, until at last a conventional language is devised. This is speech, which is practiced by the lower animals, but which is much more highly developed in man. Natural symbolism thus becomes conventional symbolism, and words are signs of concepts. A wholly conventional symbolism is thus devised, the symbols being symbols of concepts. Now, men practically and overtly consider their concepts and a language is a vast reservoir of conventional symbols used for this purpose. There is no human language so crude that it does not have tens of thousands of such symbols, which, put together in propositions or sentences, have the power of expressing all the judgments which the people who use the language are able to make. We now see the enormous development of ideation which man has accomplished by the invention of language.

A judgment is expressed in a proposition by conventional language. Unfortunately, in grammar, subject and object have a different meaning from that which they have in psychology. In grammar the subject means that something about which an affirmation is made, and the predicate means that which is affirmed of the subject, while object has various meanings in grammar. Until the terms of grammar are made to conform with the terms of psychology, there must always be some confusion. Formal logic is the logic of grammar, and the purpose for which it was devised was success in disputation. Scientific logic is the logic of kinds, and it is of scientific logic that we speak in this essay. The logic of which we speak is the logic of reasoning, not the logic of grammar.

The methods of comparing judgments and concepts are innumerable, and every judgment is an act of comparison, and we are forever judging for the purposes of discovering congruities; an incongruous judgment acts upon a healthy mind as a moral irritant. If this and this judgment do not agree, it is an evidence of ignorance and a suggestion of imbecility. There is no other motive that clings to man so long as the desire for wisdom.