Tioga Railroad v. Blossburg and Corning Railroad/Opinion of the Court

Some attempt has been made to show that in the suit brought in January, 1855, in the Supreme Court of New York by the Blossburg company against the Tioga company, on the contract now in question, the matter of the difference for which the present suit is brought was not a question decided. But we have looked at the record and proceedings therein, which were in evidence in this case, and are satisfied that it was decided. The report of the case in 1st Keyes, 486, shows that it was the only question before the Court of Appeals, to which court the case was carried. This point, then, is res judicata between the parties. It cannot be litigated again on the same contract.

We pass, then, to the matter of the statute of limitations.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error (the defendant below) insists 'that it was proved and conceded that during all the time of the existence of the contract of 1851, the defendant had property within the State of New York, an office at Corning, New York, directors, officers, and agents, constantly within this State, and at all times amenable to the process of its courts; and, in fact, in 1855, the plaintiff availed itself of this condition of things by bringing a suit against the defendant for a portion of the demand claimed under the contract now in controversy, recovered judgment and collected the same, and that in fact this suit was commenced by personal service of a summons upon the defendant's agent at Corning; and that it is, therefore, apparent that the Tioga company has been, at all times, subject to a suit at law for any debt it owed to the Blossburg company or any other party,' and he argues that the statute of limitations is therefore a defence.

If the facts appeared as stated by the counsel, it could not avail the plaintiff in error. The courts of New York have decided (and two of the decisions were made upon the case of this very company), that a foreign corporation cannot avail itself of the statute of limitations of that State. And this, notwithstanding the defendant was the lessee of a railroad in New York, and had property within the State, and a managing agent residing and keeping an office of the company at Elmira, within the State. These decisions upon the construction of the statute are binding upon us, whatever we may think of their soundness on general principles.

But the facts on which the plaintiff in error relies are not spread upon the record in such a manner that the court can take cognizance of them. They are not found specifically by the referee; he refuses to find them. He finds generally in favor of the plaintiff, namely, that the statute of limitations was not a bar to the action. No error can be assigned upon such a finding.

JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED.

I dissent from that part of the opinion of the court which relates to the defence of the statute of limitations.

If the State courts of New York have construed their statute concerning service of process, to mean that no such service will authorize a judgment against a corporation of another State, which will be valid beyond the limits of the State of New York, it is a most extraordinary and unnecessary decision, for it is the province of those other States, or of the Federal judiciary, to declare the effect of such judgment, outside of the State of New York. Besides it is not asserted that any such decision has ever been made, except with reference to its effect upon the right of such corporations to plead the statute of limitations in the State courts of New York. Nor do I believe that the courts of any State of the Union except New York, have even held that a person doing business within the State and liable at all times to be used and served personally with process cannot avail himself of the statute of limitations, if the time prescribed by it to bar such action has elapsed before it was commenced. The liability to suit where process can at all times be served, must in the nature of things be the test of the running of the statute. A different rule applied to an individual because he is a citizen or resident of another State, is a violation at once of equal justice and of the rights conferred by the second section of the fourth article of the Federal Constitution, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

I can hardly believe, therefore, that the New York statute means that if two men doing business in adjoining houses in the city of New York, one may avail himself of the statute of the State for limitation of actions, when the time prescribed has elapsed, because he is a citizen of that State, while the other cannot because he is a citizen of New Jersey, when each has been equally and always liable to service of process. Nor do I believe, on a review of all the cases, that the courts of New York have intended to give such a construction to those statutes.

My brother STRONG agrees with me in these views.