Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham/Opinion of the Court

In November 1964, the petitioner became a tenant in McDougald Terrace, a federally assisted, low-rent public housing project owned and managed by the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, North Carolina. The lease provided for a tenancy from month to month, and gave both the tenant and the Authority the right to terminate by giving notice at least 15 days before the end of any monthly term. On August 10, 1965, the petitioner was elected president of a McDougald Terrace tenants' organization. The next day the Authority gave her notice of termination of her tenancy as of August 31. The notice did not give any reasons for the cancellation, and the Authority declined to accede to the petitioner's demands for an explanation. The petitioner refused to vacate the premises, and the Authority thereupon brought a summary ejectment action in the Justice of the Peace Court in Durham. The Authority there obtained a judgment of eviction, which was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court of Durham County and the Supreme Court of North Carolina. We granted certiorari. 385 U.S. 967, 87 S.Ct. 515, 17 L.Ed.2d 432. The petitioner has remained in possession of her apartment pursuant to a stay granted by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

The petitioner contends that she was constitutionally entitled to notice setting forth the reasons for the termination of her lease, and a hearing thereon. She also suggests that her eviction was invalid because it allegedly was based on her participation in constitutionally protected associational activities. We find it unnecessary to reach the large issues stirred by these claims, because of a significant development that has occurred since we granted the writ of certiorari.

On February 7, 1967, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a directive to local housing authorities. After reciting the fact that dissatisfaction had been expressed with eviction procedures in low-rent housing projects and that suits had been brought to challenge evictions in which the local authority had not given any reason for its action, the circular stated:

'Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is     essential that no tenant be given notice to vacate without      being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or      other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and      given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he      may wish.'

The circular goes on to require local authorities to keep future records of evictions, the reasons therefor, and summaries of any conferences held with tenants in connection with evictions.

While the directive provides that certain records shall be kept commencing with the date of its issuance, there is no suggestion that the basic procedure it prescribes is not to be followed in all eviction proceedings that have not become final. If this procedure were accorded to the petitioner, her case would assume a posture quite different from the one now presented. Compare Wabash R. Co., State of Missouri ex rel., v. Public Service Comm'n, 273 U.S. 126, 131, 47 S.Ct. 311, 313, 71 L.Ed. 575; Patterson v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 607, 55 S.Ct. 575, 578, 79 L.Ed. 1082; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is accordingly vacated, and the case remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in the light of the February 7 circular of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

It is so ordered.

Judgment vacated and case remanded.