Thorp v. Hammond/Opinion of the Court

It is plain, as respects the merits of this suit, that the collision was the result of gross carelessness in the management of the Huntley. Knowing, as the master did, that there were two schooners in close proximity to his own; knowing also, as he must have known, that they were beating out their tacks, and would probably soon come about and put in shore, there can be no excuse for his failure to keep watch of their movements and to notice the change of course by the Brothers in season to port his helm and thus pass under her stern. That the hands on the Huntley were engaged in reefing the mainsail certainly did not relieve her from all obligation to observe the commonest precautions against inflicting an injury upon a neighboring vessel ahead, especially when the movements of that vessel were precisely what ought to have been anticipated.

The respondents, however, insist that it is a custom of the sea not to have a lookout in the daytime, or while reefing, and they have produced witnesses to prove such a custom. But the evidence falls far short of showing that such a custom exists generally, and if it were proved, it would not be a reasonable one, sufficient to justify the absence of a lookout in such a case as this when the Huntley was in close proximity to two other vessels, both beating to the windward, and one of them at least expected soon to cross her bow.

It has not been claimed that the collision was the result of inevitable accident, without fault, but the respondents contend that it was due to the mismanagement of the Brothers, rather than to that of the Huntley. Their argument is that the Brothers was under full sail and perfectly controllable, while the Huntley, being under head sails only, with her hands engaged in reefing, was a crippled vessel, and therefore one to be favored. Hence it is inferred that it was the duty of the Brothers to keep out of the way. It may be conceded that when two vessels are approaching each other, the one crippled and the other in good manageable condition, it is the duty of the latter, if possible, to give way to the former. But the Huntley can in no sense be said to have been a crippled vessel. She was running freely on her off-shore tack, four or five knots an hour, with her foresail and jib set. She obeyed her helm perfectly, and though she may not have been able to come about as easily as she would had her mainsail been set, there was not the slightest difficulty in the way of her taking care of herself and avoiding collision with other vessels. The most obvious manoeuvre, that of porting her helm, was not embarrassed at all by the fact that her mainsail was not spread.

It is further urged that the Brothers had not beaten out her tack when she came about, and, hence, that her putting her helm down and turning in shore when she did was a fault which, by throwing her in the way of the Huntley, caused the disaster. Was it, however, a fault? It is by no means clear, from the evidence, that the Brothers had not beaten out her tack fully. On the contrary, the evidence that she had, appears to us to preponderate. But, whether she had or not, it is fully proved that her coming about when she did was rendered proper, if not necessary, by the fact that the Capes changed to the starboard tack. The Capes was the leading vessel, and while it is possible that the Brothers might have ported her helm and gone astern of her, it is obvious that the safer course was to tack when the Capes tacked. And there was no reason to apprehend that the Huntley, following astern at the distance of five or six hundred yards, and very little, if at all, at the windward, would be embarrassed by her tacking. She had passed the Huntley close on the latter's lee side, at a distance of not more than one hundred yards, and the Huntley, carrying on her foresail and jib, had been constantly falling off to the leeward. Abundant sea-room was, therefore, left for the following vessel. It required only that the Huntley's helm should be ported half a point to carry her safely past the Brothers. We think, therefore, the whole fault of the collision is justly chargeable to the Huntley.

It remains to inquire, whether the respondents, or any of them, are personally responsible for the injury. They were all general owners of the schooner at fault at the time when the collision occurred, but the evidence shows that she was commanded, sailed, and exclusively managed by S. S. Hammond, one of them, under an arrangement made between him and the other owners, whereby he had in effect become the charterer of the vessel, to be employed on his own account, without the management, control, restraint, or possession of the other owners. He sailed the vessel on shares, hiring his own crew, paying and victualling them, paying half the port charges, retaining half the net freight after the port charges were taken out, and paying to the general owners the other half. It is clear, therefore, that he must be considered as having been the owner 'pro hac vice.' This accords with the authorities generally. Notwithstanding this, however, and though Hammond was the special owner, it has been contended on behalf of the libellants that all the general owners are liable for the torts committed by the schooner while she was thus let to charter. The Circuit Court was of opinion that they are not, and this court is equally divided upon the question.

But we are all of opinion that the owner pro hac vice is liable, and that he may be charged in this proceeding. The court below held that he had been sued merely as a part owner, not as the charterer, wrong-doer, or active cause of the disaster, and that as his liability was placed by the libel on the same ground as that of the other owners, the suit must stand or fail as to all the respondents, and they held the act of March 3d, 1851, a bar to the suit in the form in which it had been brought. The court, therefore, dismissed the libel. This, we think, was an error. The act of March 3d, 1851, enacts, by its 5th section, that the charterer or charterers of any ship or vessel, in case he or they shall man, victual, and navigate such vessel at his or their own expense, or by his or their own procurement, shall be deemed the owner or owners of such vessel within the meaning of the act. The previous section had declared what shall be the liability of owners for collisions. Hammond, therefore, is to be regarded as the owner, because the charterer, and as such responsible for the tortious acts of the vessel. If the other general owners are not, he is. The libel, it is true, avers that all the respondents were owners at the time of the collision. It does not set forth whether they were general or special owners. Such an averment was unnecessary, for it is immaterial to their liability whether they were one or the other, if they had the possession and control of the vessel. It is ownership which determines the liability, and an averment of the mode in which ownership was acquired would be superfluous. Had Hammond been sued alone, as he might have been, the libel need not have averred more respecting his ownership than is averred now. It would have been of no importance to set out whether he became owner by purchase of the schooner, or by bequest, or by charter-party, for his liability would have been as fixed in each case as in the others. Nor does the libel in this case charge general ownership, as distinguished from ownership pro hac vice, or ownership as defined by the statute. There is nothing, then, in the structure of the libel which stands in the way of a recovery against Hammond as owner, unless it be that others are also sued with him. And surely that is no bar to a recovery against him. The libel is for a tort, and tortfeasors are jointly and severally responsible. At common law, when several are sued, there may be a recovery against one alone, or against more than one, and less than the whole number. We know of no reason for a different rule in admiralty, and it is in accordance with admiralty practice to decree against one of several respondents to a libel for a tort, and to discharge the others.

Our opinion, therefore, is, that even if the libel was rightly dismissed as to all the respondents except Hammond, the libellants are entitled to a decree against him.

DECREE REVERSED, and the record remitted with instructions to order a reference to ascertain the damages, and to decree that the libellants recover against Hammond.