Theologico-Political Treatise 1862/Chapter 18

the Hebrew state, as exhibited in the preceding chapter, might have been perpetual, still it could not now be imitated; nor indeed were it desirable that it should. For he who would transfer his rights to God must come to an express understanding and agreement with God, as the Hebrews did of old: not only were his own consent, but that of the Supreme, requisite to make the contract complete. But God has made it known to mankind by the apostles that covenants with him are no longer implemented with ink, nor engraved upon stone tables, but are written by his holy spirit on the heart. And then, such a polity as that of the ancient Hebrews might perhaps have been found adapted to them in their state of isolation in Judea, without commerce or communication with the rest of the world, but would never suffice for those nations who must of necessity hold commercial intercourse with others: the constitution of the Hebrew state could have met the wants of only a small number of nations. Nevertheless, although not to be commended in everything, it had still much that is most worthy of being noted, and which perchance it might be found advantageous to imitate. As it is not my purpose, however, to treat expressly of the Hebrew republic, I shall pass by the greater number of its distinguishing peculiarities, and only pause upon those that seem to fall within the scope of my undertaking. And first I shall show that the election of a chief ruler, possessing the highest attributes of government, is not inconsistent with the idea of a divine kingdom.

After the Jews had transferred their rights to Jehovah, we see that they also delivered the supreme authority into the hands of Moses, who thus acquired the sole right of instituting and of abrogating laws in the name of God; of choosing the ministers of the religious rites; of judging, teaching, inflicting punishment, — in short, of ruling absolutely in all things.

Again, although the ministers of religion were the interpreters of the laws, still it was not within their province to sit in judgment upon the people, nor to excommunicate any one; these high functions belonged exclusively to the judges and chiefs elected by the community (Josh. vi. 26, Judges xxi. 18, and 1 Samuel xiv. 24). Besides these important points, if we consider the successful career of the Jews, and consult their histories, we shall find other particulars very deserving of attention; for instance, 1st, that there were no religious sects among them until after the chief priests under the second empire had acquired the power of issuing decrees, of transacting the business of the state, and, with a view of making their authority perpetual, had arrogated to themselves the rights of sovereign princes, and even hinted a wish to be called kings. The reason of this is obvious; for in the first empire no decree could derive a title from the high priest; he having no authority to issue decrees, but only to deliver the responses of Jehovah to questions proposed by the chiefs or councils of the tribes. In these times, therefore, the high priests could have had no desire to promulgate new commandments; their duty and business lay in the administration and defence of ancient decrees and familiar institutions; for in no other way could they preserve their own privileges and immunities against the jealousy of the chiefs but by keeping the laws uncorrupted. But after they had acquired the power of meddling in the business of the state, and had associated princely with their proper pontifical duties, each began to seek for fame and reputation, not only in the sphere of his religious duties, but beyond these, and wherever he could connect his name with affairs of state; hence the manifest desire of determining everything by pontifical authority, and of constantly issuing decrees on such subjects as new ceremonies and new articles of faith, which they desired should be held no less sacred, nor of less authority, than the laws of Moses. From this it came to pass, by and by, that religion declined into a sort of spasmodic superstition, and law became corrupted against all sense and reasonable interpretation; to which must be added the circumstance, that whilst the priesthood were paving the way to the seat of civil power in the beginning of the restoration, they assented to everything that could win the people to their party; approving of acts done by them, although most reprehensible, and twisting Scripture into agreement with all their immoralities. To this unworthy conduct Malachi testifies in the most pointed manner; inveighing against the priests of his day, he designates them as contemners of the name of God, and proceeds in these words: "The priest's lips should keep knowledge, and the people should seek the law at his mouth; for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts. But ye are departed out of the way; ye have caused many to stumble at the law; ye have corrupted the covenant of Levi, saith the Lord of hosts" (ii. 7, 8), and so he goes on to accuse them of arbitrarily interpreting the laws, and of having no respect to God, but of being swayed only by personal considerations. It is certain, however, that the priests could never walk so warily but that they were challenged in their innovations by some of the more clear-sighted and forward of the people, who, subsequently increasing in boldness, contended that no laws were binding save those only that were written; and that no other decrees which the Pharisees, who were mostly sprung of the common people, entitled traditions of the patriarchs, were in any wise to be observed. However this may have been, it is still certain that the flattery of the priesthood, the corruption of religion and the laws, and the incredible increase in the number of these, gave frequent and grave occasions for difference and disputation, of a kind too that could never be composed or concluded; for when men fall out on the score of their superstitions, which they then designate their religion, and the civil power abet any party, it is impossible to bring them to a reasonable understanding; they necessarily fall off from one another, and become divided into sects which mutually hate and, with the opportunity given, persecute one another.

2. It is worthy of remark that the prophets, mere private individuals, by the freedom of their admonitions, warnings, chidings, and denunciations, seem rather to have excited than improved the people, who would have yielded and been corrected had they been addressed by their king or chiefs. The prophets, indeed, were often insufferable even to good and pious kings, by reason of the right they arrogated of adjudging this and that as pious or impious, and even of reproving with their tongue the sovereign himself who ventured to do aught, whether of a public or a private nature, in opposition to their judgment. King Asa, who by the testimony of Scripture appears to have ruled justly, put Hanani the prophet into prison because of the freedom of his criticisms on the treaty which Asa had concluded with the King of Syria (2 Chron. xvi). Besides this, there are other instances which plainly show that religion took more damage than benefit from such liberty; to say nothing of the fact that disastrous civil wars arose out of the assertion by the prophets of their right to speak as they pleased.

3. It also deserves to be noted that so long as the people kept the supreme authority in their own hands, only a single civil war arose, which was soon entirely put an end to, when the victors were so tender of the vanquished that they took care of them in every way, and restored them to their former rights and privileges. But after the people had changed the first form of their government to a monarchy, and were ruled by kings, there was scarcely any end of the civil wars that ensued, in which battles so bloody were joined that the accounts we have of their atrocity almost surpass credibility: In one battle we read of 50,000 of the Israelites slain by the Judeans or Jews; and in another, on the contrary, the Jews were slaughtered in vast numbers by the Israelites (the precise number of the slain is not given in Scripture). In this battle the King of Judah was taken prisoner, the walls of Jerusalem were almost entirely demolished, and the Temple itself was despoiled of all its treasures, as if to show that the victors set no bounds to their rage. Laden with the spoil of their brothers and satiated with their blood, the Israelites finally consented to receive hostages, and leaving the king in his now desolated empire, they sheathed the sword, feeling secure, not of the good faith, but of the weakness of Judah. No great number of years having elapsed, and the Judeans having by this time recruited their strength, we find them again at war with the Israelites, in which these last were again the victors, and slew, as it is stated, 120,000 of the Judeans, leading besides into captivity as many as 200,000 of their women and children, and bearing away an immense booty. Worn out by these and other sanguinary wars, which only receive a passing notice in Scripture, the Hebrew nation at large was so much weakened as by and by to become a prey to foreign enemies.

When we inquire into the various periods during which the Hebrew people enjoyed the blessings of peace, we find great differences in the several epochs of their history; for often, before there were kings in Israel, we read of 40, and once (but this is beyond all likelihood) of 80 years passed happily without a foreign or civil war. But after the kings had acquired the supreme power, inasmuch as the prize now was not peace and liberty, but glory and conquest, we read that all, with the single exception of Solomon, whose wisdom and tastes had a better field for display in peace than in war, were addicted to war, whereunto was added the uneasy lust of ruling, which made the way to the throne a bloody one to many.

Lastly, under the democracy the laws remained uncorrupted, and were more regularly and willingly observed. For before the epoch of the kings there were few prophets who taught and admonished the people; after the election of kings, however, they appear to have been very numerous; and we read of Obadiah on one occasion rescuing a hundred of them from slaughter and concealing them lest they should perish by the sword. Neither do we see that the people were ever deceived by false prophets until after they had yielded the empire to the kings, with whom these prophets were mostly in alliance. In addition, the people, who are always haughty or abject according to circumstances, readily correct themselves in adversity, return to God, and appeal to the laws, and thus, indeed, mostly find help out of their difficulties and dangers; kings, on the other hand, whose tempers are always alike elate, and who cannot yield without ignominy, cling pertinaciously to all the vice in their system of rule, and rather than bend would perish in the ruins of their country.

From what immediately precedes we see, 1st, how disastrous it is both to religion and the commonwealth to concede to the ministers of religion a right to pass decrees or administer the business of the state; and, on the contrary, that things go on much more smoothly if the religious body are only heard on worldly affairs when their counsel is asked; their proper duty being to teach and to act in conformity with received ideas and accredited custom.

2. How dangerous it is to refer to the divine right things that are purely speculative, and to institute laws to regulate opinions about matters on which men are wont to differ, or may at any time differ; for there assuredly is the government a tyranny where opinions, which are the individual right of every one, and which no one can of his mere will give up, are regarded as crimes. Where such a state of things prevails, indeed, the rage of the multitude is usually found in place of the law. Pilate, yielding to the dislike of the Pharisees, ordered Christ to be crucified, knowing him all the while to be innocent. Then, too, the Pharisees, that they might wrest their dignities from the more wealthy among the citizens, began an agitation about religious matters, and accused the Sadducees of impiety; and following this example of the Pharisees, the worst of hypocrites possessed by the like wickedness, which they always designate as holy zeal, have still gone on persecuting men of distinguished probity, illustrious for their virtues, and on this very account disliked of the many, proclaiming their opinions detestable and dangerous, and exciting the savage multitude against them. And this licence, because it wears an appearance of piety, cannot easily be curbed, especially where the ruling powers have been parties to the introduction of a sect of which they themselves were not the originators. For then they are not regarded as the interpreters of the divine law, but as sectarians, or as acknowledging the teachers of the sect who are interpreters of the divine law; consequently, the authority of the magistrate in these circumstances is wont to have little influence with the people, whilst the authority of the teachers is great, so great, indeed, that they have often declared that even kings should bow to them. To escape such evils, nothing better for the commonwealth can be thought of than that piety and religion should be held to consist in good works, that is to say, in the exercise of charity and justice alone, every one being left in all other particulars at entire liberty to follow his own opinions; but on this head I shall have more to say by and by.

3. We have seen how imperative it was, both for the commonwealth and religion, that the civil power should be possessed of the authority to decree what was right and lawful, what was wrong and against law. For if this power of determining right and wrong could not be intrusted to even divine prophets without great detriment to the state and religion, much less could it be conceded to those who are unable to predict future events, and who can do no miracles. Of this I shall take occasion to speak particularly in the next chapter.

4. Lastly, we have seen how disastrous it was for the people, unaccustomed to live under kingly rule, and already possessed of established laws for their government, to have the election of the sovereign in their hands. For neither could the people themselves bear such a load of power, nor could the regal authority endure laws and privileges among the people which had been instituted by others of less authority than itself; much less could it be induced heartily to defend these laws and privileges, undoubtedly because at the time of their institution there was no thought of a king, but only of the people, or of a council invested with the supreme power. A king in the position of defender of the ancient rights and privileges of the community would have the appearance of a servant rather than of a master. The new monarch, therefore, would naturally be disposed to give his mind to the institution of new laws, and the introduction of reforms favourable to himself, and to place the people in such a position that they should find it less easy to curtail than to extend the privileges of the Crown. But here I must not omit to say that it is no less dangerous to do away with the kingly office once established, even when he who holds it is acknowledged on all hands to be a tyrant; for the people, accustomed to the royal authority, and only kept in check by it, will despise any less dignified form of government, and make it the subject of their mockery; so that were the king in present possession removed, it will soon become matter of necessity to have another in his place, just as it was formerly with the prophets, and he very certainly will prove himself a tyrant, less, it may be, of his own will and pleasure than of necessity. For, in case the former king have been put to death, with what eyes should his successor behold his subjects, their hands reddened with the blood of his predecessor, boasting of their deed as something meritorious, and perchance hinting that what had occurred should be an example and a warning to him? If he would be a king indeed, and not have the people for his judges; if he would have his subjects submissive, and not be content himself to reign on the slippery tenure of popular approval; he will revenge the death of the former sovereign, and, by making examples of the leaders of the revolt against him, deter the people from committing a crime of the kind again. But he will not effectually avenge the death of his predecessor by the slaughter of any number of citizens, unless at the same time he defends his cause universally, approves of his deeds, and treads in his steps in everything. Whence it has so commonly happened that peoples have often changed their tyrants, but have never succeeded in getting rid of them altogether; nor has the monarchical yet been permanently changed for any other form of government. The people of England have left a memorable example of this fact, even when they had deposed and with a show of justice put their king to death. The king removed, they could not do less than attempt to change the form of their government; but after much bloodshed, disorder, and disagreement among parties, it came to this, that a new monarch was saluted in a bold soldier by another name — as if the whole question had been one of names! — But this arrangement could not possibly last; and soon after the death of the Protector there seemed but one desire in the general mind, and this was for the restoration of the old royal family. The restoration was accordingly effected under the auspices of another astute soldier, and England, as of yore, was once more nominally ruled by a king.

Here, however, it may perchance be objected to me, that instances might be quoted from, the Roman history in which the people did really get rid of their tyrants. But I am rather of opinion that my view will be found confirmed by any example that can be cited from thence. For, although the Roman people might more easily than common remove a tyrant from among them, and even change the form of their government (the right of choosing a king and appointing his successor lying with the people themselves, and they not having been long accustomed to kingly rule), still, though they put to death three of the six kings they had in the early period of their history, yet in no instance did they accomplish more than that instead of one they obtained several tyrants, who kept them miserably engaged in a series of foreign and domestic wars, until at length the government reverted, with a change of name only, as in England, to a monarchy. With regard to the States of Holland, these, so far as we know, seem never to have had kings for their rulers, but counts, to whom, however, no sort of sovereign right ever belonged. For the high and mighty States of Holland, by an instrument drawn up by them in the time of the Earl of Leicester, plainly declare that they have always kept the supreme authority in their own hands, and reserved to themselves the right and power to direct these counts in the exercise of their authority; that they, with a view to the defence of civil liberty, and to freeing themselves of their officers should they degenerate into tyrants, pronounce all their acts and ordinances null and void unless reviewed and approved by the general council of the States. Whence it follows that the supreme power has always lain with the States-general; and when the last of the counts of Holland did actually attempt to usurp this, the people could not be said to revolt or to rebel against him, when they successfully re-asserted their proper authority, almost lost through his usurpation. These examples I think suffice to prove what we set out by saying, viz. that the form of government which has long obtained in a state ought by all means to be preserved, and that no attempt to change it can be made without extreme danger of total ruin. And this is the conclusion to which I have been desirous to come as the fruit of this portion of my undertaking.