The Vaughan and Telegraph/Dissent Chase

The CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting.

I dissent, and am authorized to say that my brothers CLIFFORD and FIELD also dissent, from so much of the opinion just read as relates to the measure of indemnity for the loss of the barley.

We agree that the loss was through the fault of both boats, and that the libellants were entitled to indemnity; and we agree further that the measure of this indemnity was the value of the barley at the time and place of shipment; and that this value was $2436 in gold. The decree of the District Court, rendered on the 21st day of February, 1868, was for this sum, with interest, making the whole amount of the decree $2924.20.

On appeal, the Circuit Court held that in order to give full indemnity to the libellants, the value in gold must be converted into its equivalent in legal tender notes on the day of shipment. At that time this currency was so much depreciated that $100 in gold were worth $201 in notes. The $2436 in gold, were, therefore, converted into their equivalent in note dollars, making the sum of $4896.36. The decree of the District Court was accordingly reversed, and a decree was entered, on the 26th of March, 1870, for the last-named sum and interest, in all $6515, with costs.

This was much more than indemnity at the date of the decree, and the injustice is still more apparent at this time, when the value of the notes has so much appreciated that the affirmance of the decree of the Circuit Court gives the libellants almost double indemnity.

This case strikingly illustrates the evil consequences of rendering judgments payable in legal tender currency. Hardly anything fluctuates in value more than such judgments. Every day witnesses a change. The judgment debtor gains by depreciation and loses by appreciation.

Doubtless, if the legal tender clauses of the Currency Acts are constitutional, such judgments may be rendered; but there is nothing in those acts which requires that judgments for damages estimated in coin shall be entered otherwise than for coin. On the contrary, we have decided in several cases that judgments for coin debts may be rendered payable in coin. In the present case the amount of indemnity was ascertained in gold, and, in our judgment, the decree should have been for that amount payable in coin. This would have done exact justice between the parties and would have been in harmony with the principles of the cases referred to. It would have given indemnity, and not double indemnity.