The Story of Nations - Holland/Chapter 30

The period which intervened between the peace of Nimeguen and the next outbreak of war was one of continual anxiety and alarm. The peace had practically confirmed the French king in his acquisitions, and convinced him that he could quarrel safely with all Europe, and aggrandise himself at the expense of his neighbours. His resources were so considerable, the patience of his subjects was so enduring, and the discipline of his army so perfect, that he believed, as many other persons believed, that he had the destinies of Europe in his hands. Indeed, that Europe, however united, should be able to resist the domination of France, was believed to have become possible only through the astonishing errors in tactics which the pride and self-will of Louis led him to commit. The English king was a pensioner of France, and could be counted on as neutral, the Spanish monarchy was reduced to the extremity of weakness, the Germany emperor was engaged in incessant struggles with the Turks, and with his own revolted subjects in Hungary, and Louis was supposed to have been in league with both.

In the early years of this uneasy peace, Louis strove to strengthen his frontier by building with all the appliances which science at that, time possessed the strongest fortresses. But, on the other hand, he quarrelled with the Jansenists, a school which, while within the Roman Church, contained the most pious and learned men of that communion, and strove to extirpate the Huguenots. He gave himself up entirely to the advice of the Jesuits, but insulted, plundered, and irritated the Pope. He continued his attacks on the Spanish Netherlands, and captured city after city. He bombarded Genoa, simply because it had been on good terms with Spain, and constrained the Doge of that ancient city to sue for peace at Versailles, under insulting conditions. Every state in Europe was irritated and alarmed at his pretensions and his actions.

Many of the French nobles and a large section of the French people had embraced the Reformation and had accepted the teaching and the discipline of Calvin, the form of religion which had been adopted in Holland. The Huguenots, as these sectaries were called, had formed the mainstay of Henry IV. Without their aid, their grandfather of the French king, the grand monarch, as his contemporaries called him, would never have worn the crown of France. They were, as a rule, loyal to the monarch of their choice, even after he had deserted the creed in which he had been brought up, and which he long professed. Henry saw, or thought he saw, no chance for his final victory, unless he was reconciled to the Roman Church. He suffered himself to be converted, foreseeing that he could thus win the Malcontents, without seriously affronting his own friends. But he accorded the Huguenots toleration, by the famous Edict of Nantes, and allowed them to retain in their own hands certain fortresses, and even districts, colleges, and churches.

It was the policy of Richelieu to consolidate the power of the French monarchy, to diminish the privileges and weaken the political independence of the French sectaries. In course of time, many of the nobles of the Huguenot party deserted the creed which their fathers maintained, and like the king whom they had fought for, reconciled themselves to the Church. But the great body of the sectaries remained faithful to their creed. They naturally dwelt in towns, and became the principal manufacturers, artisans, and merchants of France. The Huguenots were the people whom the policy of Colbert had favoured, and their enterprise and wealth enabled them to establish in France those industries which were the mainstay of French trade, and the source of the king's revenue. These men possessed the largest part of that wealth which is the life of manufacturers and commerce.

The Hollanders and the English had a profound interest in the fortunes of the Huguenots. It was a matter of common religious feeling, for some of French sectaries had been among the most famous and competent of the generals whom Louis employed. Now it was these persons whom Louis wished to drive into the Church of Rome by force, and after a time, when they refused compliance with his will, to drive from France. He quartered soldiers on them, and harried them by exactions, he destroyed their churches and schools, he bribed those he could into compliance with his wishes, and he punished with the greatest severity those who relapsed into their ancient creed. In time districts once almost entirely peopled by the reformed sectaries were coerced into conformity.

Finally on October 2, 1686, he revoked, amid the applause of the Jesuits and the congratulations of the Court bishops, the famous Edict of Nantes. Then came a gigantic emigration of the wealthiest, the most industrious, and the most vigorous of the French people. The emigration of the Huguenots was nearly as disastrous to France as the expulsion of Moriscoes in the beginning of the century had been to Spain. The manufacturers came in great numbers to England and Holland, where they were heartily welcomed, bringing with them those arts of which France had previously a monopoly. The subscriptions collected in the English churches on behalf of these refugees were exceedingly large, and mightily vexed Louis and James, who had now succeeded Charles. Men who had grown grey in the military and naval service of the French king now joined the armies of his most implacable enemies, and did eminent service in the struggle which now became imminent. Such men were Marshal Schomberg and Ruvigny. Thousands of trained soldiers and skilful seamen left the country which persecuted them and transferred their services to those who welcomed them.

But not only did Louis weaken himself and lessen the resources of his kingdom by the persecution of the Huguenots, but his pride and violence was raising enemies against him on all sides. He put forward claims to the Palatinate, he forced one of his creatures on the Pope, and strove to make him Bishop of Cologne; he even entered into a personal quarrel with Innocent XI., and made him incline to the alliance which was gradually forming against France. The occasion of this quarrel is curious and instructive. In all civilized countries the person and the domicile of an ambassador are inviolable. It is obvious that it would be impossible for an envoy to perform his functions, unless as long as he resides in a country which is still friendly, he has complete power over his own actions. When countries go to war, the system is suspended. The ambassador is withdrawn. Now every one of the Catholic Powers had an envoy at Rome. There had grown up a custom among these personages of insisting on the privilege of their office being extended to all persons whom they might employ and even harbour, and as many of these envoys at the Papal court thought proper to surround themselves with a large retinue and sometimes large bodies of troops, the quarters in which they resided became an asylum to all the bad characters in Rome. Murders and robberies were committed and the perpetrators shielded from the consequence of their acts. Smugglers took up their bode in these sanctuaries, and the papal revenue was seriously compromised by contraband trade. Innocent was determined to put a stop to the scandal, and found it not difficult to induce the Catholic Powers to restrain within reasonable limits the licence which had been customary. But Louis insisted on continuing the obnoxious system in the person of his ambassador, and sent an envoy with a small army to Rome, whom the Pope refused to admit to an audience. In revenge for this Louis overran the territory of Avignon, and united it to his dominions.

From the peace of Nimeguen onwards, William of Orange had striven to procure a confederation of the European Powers, ostensibly to secure and maintain the provisions of the peace, but really as a counterpoise against the menacing ambition of France. But the principal ally whom he hoped to secure was his uncle, Charles of England, and he seems to have been unacquainted with the secret engagements which that utterly unprincipled sovereign had made with the French king. The States of Holland, however, entirely distrusted Charles, and feared to provoke Louis, who, as it appears that they believed, might be anxious to remain on good terms with the Republic. They were merely anxious to maintain the peace.

The action of Louis himself soon disabused the Dutch of their confidence. Louis insisted on securing some towns of the Spanish Netherlands which had been expressly restored at the peace, he attacked Luxemburg, he occupied Alsace, he got possession of Strasburg, and fortified it for himself. On these acts came the persecution and expulsion of the Huguenots, and Louis succeeded in alienating from himself those states and cities of Holland which had been hitherto anxious to maintain a good understanding with him. Under these circumstances William found that the efforts which he was making to secure the formation of a league against France were more likely to be successful. He contrived to induce the King of Sweden to enter into the alliance, and he used every effort to induce Charles of England to take the same step. But Charles refused, and William induced the Emperor of Spain and some the German princes to join in the alliance. William hoped that at last he should be able soon to enter into a fresh struggle with France, but the obstinate refusal of the city of Amsterdam to back up his policy foiled him. He succeeded, however, in inducing the States to strengthen their navy, and to keep an effective army.

In February, 1685, Charles of England died and his brother James, the father-in-law of William, succeeded. James put on a show of vigour, declared that he would maintain the European balance, and though he was not above receiving the French king's money, exhibited more sense of personal dignity and national feeling than Charles did. He even affronted Louis, and by doing so prepared his own ruin. Meanwhile William kept on good terms with his father-in-law, whose succession he had good reason to expect, and sent away Monmouth from the Provinces. It is alleged by some that he was privy to Monmouth's invasion. Certainly he must have been as dissatisfied with the assumption of the royal title by that adventurer as James was. He not only disavowed it, but sent six regiments in the Dutch service to co-operate with James against the rebels. Meanwhile William had at last contrived to establish an agreement between those who were alarmed at the progress of France under the name of the league of Augsburg.

It is not easy to see when the scheme first took shape of dispossessing James from the English throne. Burnet, afterwards Bishop of Salisbury, had quitted England, now no safe place for him, and was soon as deeply in William's counsels as any man ever was. On the other hand, William sent one of his most trusted adherents, Dykvelt, over to London in order that he might enter into an understanding with the English nobles, disabuse them of any impression which they might have as to his sympathy with his father-in-law's theories of government, and at the same time to assure James of the good will of the States. There is little doubt that Dykvelt was trusted by the English malcontents, who had by this time thoroughly mistrusted James, and were gradually forming those plans which eventuated in the English Revolution. At last William ventured on publishing and circulating his opinions about what James was bent on, the repeal of the Test Act, and the indulgence to Protestant Dissenters. The publication of this document, though it angered James, increased the popularity of William in England.

The birth of the Prince of Wales, known in later history as the Old Pretender, destroyed all William's hopes of the succession to the English throne, which he may have contemplated, and was a serious blow to what William certainly had at heart, the creation of a powerful league against the French king. With England friendly to France, or neutral in the coming struggle, it was justly feared that the alliance would be powerless. It might succeed if England were to declare on the side of the Allies. At first William recognized his infant brother-in-law, but when it was reported that the child was supposititious, and the report was believed, William ceased to have the child's name mentioned in public worship. William must have joined in the popular belief; else it is difficult to see why he should have given James what was a practical warning that he would claim his wife Mary's inheritance by force of arms. To disallow the Prince of Wales was to claim the English throne. The birth of the Prince was the fatal offence of James.

William had sent Zulestein to congratulate the English king and queen on the event, and Zulestein brought back the invitation from the English nobles to William, that he should invade England and liberate it from the Government which was violating the law, and suspending the constitution. William was ready enough, but the difficulties were great. He had to carry out his project in secret, to hoodwink James and Louis, and to induce the United Provinces to acquiesce in his plans. Fortunately for William, Louis had been affronted by James, and was at the height of his quarrel with the Pope and the Emperor, while William was making his preparations. Just at the eve of the enterprise of the Prince of Orange, Louis declared war against the emperor and sent his forces to the Palatinate, far away from the Dutch frontier and thus left the sea open to William.