The Story of Nations - Holland/Chapter 16

The Hollanders were negotiating for the transfer of themselves under the forms of a limited sovereignty, so limited that the new Count of Holland would have little more than a titular supremacy, with Henry III. of France and Elizabeth at the same time. Henry at last threw them over. He had little chance of aiding them, less of engaging them in a new fight for their independence, for he had much ado to maintain his own. Guise and the League, Paris and Spain, were perpetually in arms against him, to say nothing of his cousin and successor, Henry of Navarre. By dint of bribes, Philip was assured that he could paralyze the action of France, were the king ever so willing to appropriate the Netherlands, and perhaps secure the throne of France for his daughter when the last Valois king out of the way. But there was also England to conquer, which Philip thought was an easy task for Parma to accomplish.

Now Parma knew that it was necessary for him to secure the best port in the Netherlands, if this purpose was to be carried out. The Spaniard, victorious and confident by land, was a very poor creature on the water, and in no sense a match for the water Beggars. Still, with a big fleet in a safe harbour protecting a convoy of veterans to the Thames, much might be done. It does not seem that Parma took much thought of the English sailors, though Drake and Hawkins had already given a taste of their quality.

Now there was no harbour in the Netherlands like Antwerp. Safe, capacious, deep, the Scheldt could hold all the navies of Europe. But Antwerp was in the hands of the patriots, and Orange was no more. Antwerp must be captured. “If we get Antwerp,” he used to say, “you shall all go to mass with us; if you save it, we shall all go to conventicle with you!”

Within nine months Parma secured all the cities of Brabant but Antwerp. Ghent and Dendermonde went first. Then Brussels, next them Mechlin, and Antwerp was besieged, to fall also. All this was foreseen as possible by Orange, and before his death the plan of defence was indicated. Orange saw that if Parma could throw a bridge over the Scheldt he could reduce Antwerp. But there was a way of baffling him. If Antwerp could be converted from a river to a sea port, all the efforts of Spain, in the teeth of the Zeland sailors, would be vain. To do this, it was necessary to break down the great dyke and to let the ocean in upon the polders. It would be a temporary measure; when the siege was baffled, the dyke could be repaired and the lake be again converted into pasture.

And now the siege was imminent, and Saint Aldegonde, the military governor of the place, was about to carry out the plans of the dead Stadtholder, when he encountered serious obstacles. Antwerp was divided into factions, and the military authorities, which at that time should have been supreme, were resisted by the personal interests of trading associations. It was madness, they alleged, to think that Parma could build the bridge. It was madness to submerge the meadows. Besides, the most trusted officers of the republic were strangely subordinate and dilatory on a sudden. Treslong was negligent, his successor was well-meaning but incompetent, and the commander of the land forces was capricious. The master mind was gone.

During the winter Of 1584, Parma was collecting all the materials necessary for effecting that which the Antwerpers believed to be impossible. During this time Antwerp was being furnished with supplies, for the price of food was high in the city, and plenty of skippers are venturous enough to brave Parma's forts. Then the Antwerp magistrates, as if with the view of assisting the blockade, fixed a maximum price of corn, and effectually starved themselves. The sluices were opened it is true on the Flemish side, and this measure ultimately assisted the designs of Parma, by making it easy for him to bring up supplies. When it was too late, those who opposed he piercing of the Blauw Garen dyke was anxious to undertake it. But it was already occupied by soldiers, by ammunition, and by forts.

The breadth of the Scheldt at the point where Parma was building his impossible bridge was 2,400 feet, and its depth 60 feet. The piles on which the bridge was built were driven 50 feet into the ground below the river, and yet nothing but light skirmishes were attempted by the Antwerp garrison and militia, in one of which the bravest and most energetic of the commanders was captured. On February 25 the bridge was completed, the deeper parts of the river being covered by a floating bridge, and the Scheldt was closed. And the marvel was that while Parma was performing his great feat, his army was almost without supplies, and he was totally neglected by Philip.

Now there was living at Antwerp an Italian, one Gianibelli, a man of great skill in chemistry and mechanics. He had once offered his services to Philip, but weary of the affronts and delay he met with in Spain, he vowed to do him a mischief. He had counselled the city of a plan for effectually victualling it, but had been snubbed. He then entreated them to give him some ships from the city fleet, in order that he might make an attempt on the bridge. With difficulty he induced them to give him two, in the hulls of which were built what were virtually floating mines, containing several thousand pounds of powder. Besides these, several fire-ships were sent down the river. One of the vessels was to be fired by a slow match, the other by clock-work. As the fire-ships floated down, Parma massed all his troops on the bridge. Of the two infernal hulls, that which was provided with a slow match burnt out harmlessly. The Spaniards boarded the other, when a terrible explosion followed. A thousand Spaniards were instantly slain, a breach was made in the bridge, and had the Italian's expedient been followed by action, Antwerp would have been relieved, Parma baffled, and the war of independence probably shortened at once. But Antwerp was again ill-served by her commanders, and Parma was allowed to restore his bridge without hindrance from the besieged, or even their allies outside.

Gianibelli's efforts had indeed failed for a time. But three years afterwards, when a still more significant struggle was being waged, the memory of the devil ships, as they were called, did more to baffle, disperse, and destroy the great Armada, than the attacks of Drake and Effingham. The cry of “The Antwerp fire-ships!” sent a panic through the whole of the bravest Spanish soldiery.

At last the besieged determined to make the effort of piercing the dyke. The first attempt was unsuccessful, owing to one of these misunderstandings which always were playing into Parma's hands. On May 26th they were more successful. They occupied the dyke after a fierce struggle, and instantly began to break it. But even then the same fatal incapacity showed itself. The leaders of the expedition returned to Antwerp to rejoice over their victory. Parma also returned, the Hollanders were driven from their work, and the dyke was repaired. On August 17th, the capitulation was effected, and Antwerp was reckoned among the obedient cities thenceforth. But its trade and manufactures were destroyed. The Dutch closed the port almost as firmly as Parma had, and the heretics, who had all the industry and nearly all the capital, migrated to Amsterdam. They were succeeded by, the Citadel - and the Jesuits. It was believed indeed that with the fall of Antwerp Holland and Zeland would be early - and easily subdued. As it was their spirit was strengthened, their resistance was more stubborn, their resources were developed, As yet, however, no one guessed what would be the future of the republic.

The English court understood in its own way, clumsy and selfish to our eyes, but infinitely honest in comparison with the conduct of other courts, what was the interest of Holland, and what was the interest of England. France was smooth and false, England was rough and not over ready. The Dutch believed that France was strong, England weak. It was strange that they should entertain the former view, but not strange that they should fancy the latter. Nor is it strange, considering the practice of the times, that Elizabeth corresponded with and tried to overreach both friends and enemies. But for the history of Holland, the presence of Leicester in that country, the intrigues of the English queen, and the alternations of hope and disappointment to which her action gave occasion, have no interest for the general reader. There was a party in England which desired peace with Spain. The marvel is that any one believed that Philip was even commonly honest. It is more important to see how men who had nothing to do with intrigues had been indirectly serving the cause of public liberty, by showing the intrinsic weakness of despotism.

Drake had gone round the world in 1577, and had picked up a good deal of experience, and some property which belonged to the King of Spain, on his voyage. There was to be sure no war declared with Spain, but, on the other hand, there was no peace; and Drake, much to the inconvenience of Philip, was making war on the Emperor of the Indies, though on his own account. By an instinct which could hardly have been accidental, he fastened upon those regions in 1586 from which Philip got his supplies of money, and very much disconcerted the prudent monarch. Now as all the hopes of Philip depended on his treasure ships from the New World, any interruption of supply was exceedingly serious to Parma, who occupied the position of fifth mortgagee on Philip's treasury. There was first the Spanish administration, next France, next the Pope, next the preparations for a descent on England to be satisfied, before Parma could expect or get a maravedi. Now a maravedi is about one-sixteenth of a penny sterling, or one-eighth of a cent.

Drake had been sacking and burning the Spanish towns in the Gulf of Mexico. “He was a fearful man to the King of Spain,” said Burleigh, “The most contemplative ponder much over the success of Drake,” said Parma. But the secret negotiations for peace with Spain were still carried on by the English court, and Parma believed they were genuine. So there had been carried on negotiations for the marriage of Elizabeth with Anjou. Meanwhile Parma advised an invasion of England, in October, 1586. Meanwhile Sidney was killed in the skirmish at Zutphen, and Leicester continued to make himself distrusted, and finally detested in Holland. Yorke and Stanley, entrusted with strong places in Holland, betrayed them to Spain, and the English began to suffer in the estimation of the Dutch, for the treason of their countrymen, Parma got possession of Sluys, a convenient port for the English invasion.

But on April 2, 1587, Drake sailed from Plymouth with four of the queen's ships, and twenty-four others from London and other places. It was a joint-stock buccaneering adventure, the stimulants to which were profit and patriotism. Just after he had started, the queen sent to recall him. I cannot but think that she intended to be too late. Any way, he heard that a great store of ships and munitions of war were being accumulated at Lisbon and Cadiz. On April 19th, Drake entered the bay of Cadiz, destroyed ten thousand tons of shipping, and with them the stores which Philip was collecting. Thence he sailed to Lisbon, and destroyed a hundred more vessels. He evaded easily the great galleys of the Spaniards, and did his mischief before the face of the Spanish admiral. Then he took a rich prize with its treasure on board, and having now “singed the King of Spain's beard,” as he said, he sailed back to Plymouth, to be disavowed by Elizabeth. But he had delayed the Armada.

The designs of Philip in 1588, the year in which the Spanish Armada actually sailed, were well masked. It was said and believed that the object of the armament was the New World, in which a great and wealthy country was to be conquered. But the real purpose of the expedition was not concealed, either from the leading statesmen of Holland or from some of the public men in England, least of all from the freebooters, Drake and his friends. The Dutch before the year was half over, effectually blocked every outlet for Parma and his troops.

The English navy was in number 197, in tonnage 29,744; the seamen were 15,785. But only one vessel was over 1,000 tons, and only ten over 500. The tonnage of the Spanish fleet was 59,120, the size. from 1,200 to 300 tons, and the number on board was about 30,000. The fleet was to pick up Parma's army of 17,000, and to land them at Dover. The admiral of the fleet was to be Santa Cruz, an experienced and competent commander. But before the Armada sailed Santa Cruz was dead. His place was filled by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who was far from being his equal in experience or ability. The Armada sailed from Lisbon at the end of May, met with rough weather, had to put into Corunna, and to wait till July 22nd. On July 29th they first got sight of England, and Englishmen got sight of them, and swarmed out of the numerous ports of the south coast in order to deal with them. Their first encounter was on Sunday, July 31st. On Saturday August 6th, the Spaniards reached Calais roads, the weather, as yet, being favourable to them. The English fleet followed them, and anchored a mile and a half from them. The Dutch fleet was guarding the coast, and effectually preventing Parma's exit, or a junction between him and Sidonia. The moon was at the full. A conference of captains was held on Lord Howard's vessel, the Royal Ark.

Winter suggested that some fire-ships should be sent amongst them. Gianibelli was then in England constructing fortifications on the Thames, and the English remembered the Antwerp devil-ships, the Spaniards remembering them still better. So on Sunday, August 7th, they determined on making the attempt. The day had been fine, but towards evening the clouds rapidly gathered, thunder was heard, and a tempest was evidently at hand. At midnight the Spaniards saw suddenly six burning vessels bearing down on their lines. There was an instant cry of “The fire-ships of Antwerp!” and an instant panic. Every cable was cut, and many of the vessels got entangled. Some were burnt, and in the morning many were disabled, and the rest driving towards the dangerous coast of Flanders.

The rout and the ruin of the Great Armada is the best-known fact in the history of all English-speaking nations. It is unnecessary to describe it here. It is sufficient to say that Philip, apparently convinced that his own resources for his own purposes were boundless, heard of the destruction of his fleet with equanimity, and instantly set to work to repair the loss, and make a fresh venture, as soon as ever the opportunity for action might present itself. So convinced was he, or so convinced were his advisers that the model of the Spanish navy was, under ordinary conditions, the best which could be devised, that from this time, even to the establishment of peace with England and Holland, the dockyards of Spain kept reproducing the same awkward and unmanageable type of vessels, and thereby offered the Dutch and English admirals every opportunity of inflicting on Spain the most crushing defeats on sea, even when the odds seemed desperate, and the Spanish force seemed overwhelming.

The lesson which the Dutch and English learned from these encounters, and especially from that with the Armada, was of the highest significance in the history of both nations. They came to the conclusion, and this not without reason, that they were invincible on sea, and the conviction, as time passed on, assured them of the certainty. As far as England was concerned there was now no doubt as to the policy of Spain, even if the stories which are told of Elizabeth's blindness to the facts, have any real foundation. But both Dutch and English had no difficulty in understanding that they could, while baffling the enemy's attempt on their own countries, destroy his strength by assailing him in the regions from which he drew his wealth, in those territories which he called his in the New and Old World, by reason of the donation of Roderick Borgia or Pope Alexander the Sixth.

Up to the time in which the truce of 1609 was conceded, Holland, as we shall see, carried on this warfare against the distant possessions of Spain, and instructed the other nations, that the two great oceans were not a Spanish lake, reserved for the King of Spain only. Even when the cowardly and arrogant pedant, James Stewart, succeeded Elizabeth on the English throne, and hastened to make peace with Spain, the peace in fact only extended to Europe; and the practice of the English, soon turned into a proverb, “No peace with Spain below the line,” constantly weakened the Spanish monarchy and finally ruined it. Spain was destroyed as a European Power by the dream of Philip after universal empire.

Still for a long time she was conceived to be dangerously powerful. The glamour of a great force often survives for a long time the reality. Cromwell, who saw very far in military matters, was still under the delusion that the power of Spain was a danger to Europe, when that monarchy had lost all its force, and it was not till another danger had come to Europe, from the ambition of another monarch, that Spain ceased to be a terror to statesmen.